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The roll-out of artificial intelligence in public administrations: comparative analysis, challenges and success factors

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SUMMARY

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a key driver in the reform of public policy, but it is neither automatic nor exclusive.

French public administrations have recently seen the adoption of AI at multiple levels. 'Shadow AI' (spontaneous unregulated use) could affect up to 40% of public officials¹, revealing an appetite for AI but creating major risks (data security, inequality between officials, territories and even users, reliability of decisions):

- ♦ **for the State**, the Interministerial Directorate for Digital Affairs (DINUM) has identified more than 140 AI products to name but a few, with significant variation across ministries (from 0 to 74 projects carried out depending on the ministry in question);
- ♦ **local authorities** show that adoption levels are generally correlated with their size (90% of the cities involved, while 73% of municipalities with fewer than 3,500 inhabitants have no AI projects);
- ♦ **the health and social sphere** is also appropriating AI in a variety of ways, particularly in the trade-offs between generative AI and the use of previous technologies notably used in the fight against fraud (data mining, RPA²).

In companies, AI is deployed primarily in support functions and customer relations, with the aim of growth. Considered not only as a technological challenge but as a catalyst for the strategic plan, it is being driven forward at a high level, combining the aspects of organisation, governance, social dialogue and economic management, as part of a multi-year approach that allows for deferred gains.

Foreign administrations aim to achieve both efficiency and high-quality public services in the areas of fiscal and social policies, and for roles demanding high levels of administrative work. The adoption and industrialisation of uses depend mainly on the digital readiness of foreign administrations and on a clearly defined balance between decentralised innovation and strategic regulation.

A classification of uses profiles in French public administrations emerges:

- ♦ **(i)** general-purpose solutions (summary, translation, etc.), which are cross-cutting but are still developed separately by government departments ('GenIAI', 'MIrAI', 'PIAG', etc.);
- ♦ **(ii)** solutions relating to support functions (procurement, legal affairs, human resources, etc.), which are still not widely shared;
- ♦ **(iii)** specialised functional solutions (fight against fraud, job offers, etc.), which are the most promising provided they are developed in consultation with staff.

In this period of widespread testing, national governance and management do not favour pooling. Each administration innovates within the constraints of the resources available to it (budget, human skills), without coordination or real pooling. Unlike companies, AI is still mainly driven by digital departments, without systematic implementation at directorate-general level that would integrate all aspects of the project (infrastructure, data, functional processes, skills and risks) and make it part of a strategic 'public service project'.

¹ According to a study by the SNDGCT (organisation representing and supporting senior local government management) published in September 2025, 40% of local authority staff use AI tools without permission.

² Robotic process automation.

The gains, understood in the broad sense in the public sector (time, quality, reducing errors, improving quality of life at work) are already confirmed by feedback, particularly for computer coding and document management, but only materialise after a period of learning and fine-tuning, due to the inherently changing nature of the technologies.

The task force's implementation of the methodology developed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) for French public administrations indicates that:

- ♦ **one in five public officials is, in theory, significantly exposed to AI**, within the meaning of the ILO categories;
- ♦ **one in seven is significantly so**, particularly in administrative and support functions;
- ♦ one in four public officials is not very exposed (social workers, nurses, etc.);
- ♦ one in two is not very exposed at all as part of their duties involving direct contact with the public (teachers during lessons, law enforcement officers while on duty on the ground, etc.).

This analysis of functions, assessed using this task model, does not prejudge actual productivity gains, as AI can increase their efficiency and reduce the time spent on certain related tasks that are time-consuming or low-value-added, thereby improving quality for them and users alike.

In corporate support functions, the use of AI allows for gains through the optimisation of resources, the reduction of certain costs (maintenance, external services) and time savings. In France, the government's procurement department anticipates time savings of over 60% for public procurers when sourcing suppliers, while the Legal Affairs Directorate of the economic and financial ministries has halved the time spent on document research.

In terms of functions, AI improves quality and efficiency, particularly in relations with users by enabling faster and more personalised responses. Hence, the use of AI-powered document search solutions by staff for 'Services publics +' has reduced response times (from 19 to three days on average) while improving user satisfaction. Conversational AI agents (chatbots) used by municipal services significantly reduce the number of missed calls (for example, 8% of calls missed in Plaisir (Yvelines) compared with 55% previously). Finally, AI helps to attract staff and reduce the staff turnover rate (administrative management centre in Haute-Savoie).

Achieving these gains entails investment and operating costs that are difficult to estimate and often exceed forecasts (**proposal no. 7**). Frugal models and efficient usage can help to keep contain costs while protecting the environment. In public administrations, these gains must offset specific or particularly significant constraints relating to compliance, 'technical debt', data security and sovereignty.

As such, French funding is typically low compared with that of large companies and is characterised by its fragmentation, due to insufficiently structured management and governance. Between 2023 and 2025, DINUM committed €8.7 million to AI, government departments €26.2 million and France Travail €18.7 million. Finally, the 'MAREVA 2' evaluation method needs to be updated (**proposal no. 7**), as it fails to take into account the life cycle, scalability or indirect costs.

The phasing-out of 'shadow AI' requires secure, general-purpose AI tools to be made available to all public officials (**proposal no. 1**), going beyond current arrangements (the ongoing trial of DINUM's 'AI Assistant', which is limited to 10,000 testers). Shared AI solutions for support functions are required (**proposal no. 3**), while specialised use cases for functions must be based on the principle of subsidiarity (**proposal no. 4**).

Scaling up requires various obstacles to be overcome. To facilitate roll-outs while avoiding duplication (**proposal no. 2**) against a backdrop of tight public finances, the pooling of infrastructure and 'shared resources' (graphics processing units, hosting, etc.) is essential (**proposal no. 8**). Architectural choices directly determine performance, sovereignty, security and scalability, while relying on a decarbonised energy mix that minimises the environmental footprint. Data governance, focused on greater sharing and managed at an interministerial level, is crucial because AI can only be effective if it is based on high-quality, interoperable and secure data, with sovereign environments for sensitive uses (**proposal no. 10**).

The European (EU AI Regulation, General Data Protection Regulation) and national frameworks require enhanced governance of all risks throughout the deployment process, and should be designed to guarantee sovereignty and ensure safe, fair and legally robust practices. This covers transparency, explainability, protection of personal and sensitive data, audits and human oversight. Failures elsewhere illustrate the cost of inadequate risk management (litigation, loss of trust), while public procurement must incorporate new contractual requirements (documentation, auditability, reversibility, traceability) to limit technological dependence (**proposal no. 9**).

The many transformations enabled and brought about by AI in public administrations are, first and foremost, organisational and human in nature. To avoid creating a 'graveyard of proof-of-concepts', scaling up must be grounded in the actual work carried out by staff and involve co-developing AI applications with them and with service users (**proposal no. 5**). Although still rarely practised, dialogue on technology and social issues is a key driver for the adoption and continuous improvement of AI-enhanced processes (**proposal no. 11**). The forward-looking management of jobs and skills (GPEC) focused on at-risk functions (**proposal no. 12**) must underpin a training policy structured across three levels: a common foundation for users (opportunities and risks of AI); training for public sector managers in project management; and specialised technical training to enhance strategic autonomy and operational efficiency (**proposal no. 13**). On a broader level, the governance of AI solution roll-out must be based on a structured change management approach which determines its acceptability and effectiveness.

Finally, governance must combine cross-functional oversight with functional autonomy, empowering each department to take responsibility for its own overall transformation and the support required (processes, skills, data and risks). Given the evolving nature of technologies and possible biases, the sustainable performance of AI solutions must be continuously monitored throughout their entire lifecycle, including operational impacts and evolving patterns of use.

The main challenge is no longer the adoption of AI, as that is already under way. Rather, the challenge is its transformation into a means of bringing about lasting improvements for the public service, its staff and its users. It is less a technical matter than a catalyst for transforming organisations, processes and skills, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of public policies.

LIST OF PROPOSALS

Proposal no. 1 [all public administrations]: Make secure, 'general-purpose' AI solutions available to all public officials, with the framework for their use to be defined by the relevant government departments.

Proposal no. 2 [all public administrations]: Develop, maintain and make available a map of AI projects at the level of each public administration (for example, at the level of general secretariats for ministries, national funds for social security bodies, and associations of elected representatives for local authorities), with the aim of identifying available services and avoiding duplication.

Proposal no. 3 [SGG, DAE, DGAFP]: Provide interministerial AI solutions for support functions (procurement, legal affairs and human resources in particular).

Proposal no. 4 [all public administrations]: Ensure that 'functional' AI solutions form part of a process of integration into IT systems.

Proposal no. 5 [project leaders]: Involve users in the evaluation of the gains made possible by the roll-out of AI solutions.

Proposal no. 6 [DINUM]: Adapt the value analysis and feedback method (MAREVA) to make it a methodology for evaluating AI solutions based on the value of projects and their full costs.

Proposal no. 7 [project leaders]: Incorporate the assessment of the impacts and costs of AI solutions right from the design stage. In case of a favourable decisional choice, assess the maturity of the organisation (see the task force's proposal, Annex 17).

Proposal no. 8 [DINUM, DSS]: Establish and fund a multi-year plan for the gradual pooling of the infrastructure and 'shared resources' essential to the development of public AI:

Proposal no. 9 [DINUM, DAE]: Make available to public administrations standard contractual clauses setting out the responsibilities of the AI solutions provider in order to ensure reversibility and the purchaser's autonomy (skills and ownership of data in particular).

Proposal no. 10 [DINUM]: Update and implement a public data governance framework focused on greater data sharing and coordinated at inter-ministerial level, with a particular emphasis on identifying sensitive data and uses.

Proposal no. 11 [all public administrations]: Strengthen dialogue on technology and social issues in the development and implementation of AI strategies and solutions.

Proposal no. 12 [DGAFP]: Define and implement a forward-looking management strategy for jobs and skills (GPEC) that integrates the challenges of AI, by prioritising the necessary skills and the functions most at risk.

Proposal no. 13 [DGAFP, public service schools]: Define and implement a strategy for initial and continuing training of public officials on AI, including (i) common ground on the challenges, opportunities and risks of AI, (ii) specific training in the management of AI projects for managers and (iii) training on the necessary AI skills.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
1. THE ROLL-OUT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS IS ACCELERATING IN A VARIETY OF EVOLVING FORMS.....	3
1.1. AI is a major technological innovation and inherently scalable	3
1.2. Deployment in companies and foreign administrations is useful for identifying promising uses and certain good practices that can be transposed	4
1.2.1. <i>In companies, the use of AI is developing primarily in support functions and customer relations.....</i>	<i>4</i>
1.2.2. <i>In foreign administrations, the dissemination of AI uses is based on their overall digital readiness and clearly defined management.....</i>	<i>7</i>
1.3. The adoption of AI by French public administrations has, very recently, witnessed rapid and multifaced growth.....	9
1.3.1. <i>French public administrations are marked by a proliferation of AI solutions and spontaneous use by staff.....</i>	<i>9</i>
1.3.2. <i>Three main categories of use cases are emerging: generalist AI solutions, intended for support functions and applied to functions.....</i>	<i>10</i>
1.3.3. <i>Current governance and management do not favour pooling.....</i>	<i>11</i>
1.3.4. <i>Public administrations have specific features that explain the lower adoption of AI compared to companies</i>	<i>12</i>
2. THE USE OF AI IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS IS A LEVER FOR IMPROVING PUBLIC SERVICES THAT GOES BEYOND PRODUCTIVITY GAINS.....	13
2.1. The extent of the productivity gains linked to the deployment of AI continues to be debated and difficult to measure.....	13
2.1.1. <i>Economic studies are identifying functions that are more exposed to AI and are leading to heterogeneous estimates of productivity gains.....</i>	<i>13</i>
2.1.2. <i>Between 13% and 20% of French public sector jobs are 'significantly exposed' to AI as defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO), which is without prejudice to productivity gains</i>	<i>15</i>
2.2. The use of AI solutions can save time and improve quality for public officials and users.....	18
2.2.1. <i>Generalist AI solutions bring diffuse but real individual time savings.....</i>	<i>18</i>
2.2.2. <i>AI solutions shared between administrations should help to achieve gains for support functions.....</i>	<i>19</i>
2.2.3. <i>AI solutions specialised in specific functions are intended to improve the quality and efficiency of many public services.....</i>	<i>20</i>
2.3. The value creation of AI solutions must be assessed as part of an overall approach that includes costs, risks and external factors.....	21
2.3.1. <i>Achieving productivity gains requires covering direct and indirect costs, a large proportion of which is recurrent.....</i>	<i>22</i>
2.3.2. <i>Assessing the value of an AI solution must be based on a renewed methodology.....</i>	<i>23</i>



3. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS CAN REALISE THE EXPECTED BENEFITS OF AI DEPLOYMENT PROVIDED A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS ARE MET..... 24

- 3.1. The scaling up of AI solutions requires different kinds of obstacles to be removed24
 - 3.1.1. *A collaborative approach should guide decisions on whether to acquire or develop AI solutions to overcome capacity limits and budgetary constraints* 24
 - 3.1.2. *The quality and accessibility of data determine the performance of AI solutions*..... 25
 - 3.1.3. *Taking staff's 'actual work' as the starting point is key to ensuring effective scaling up*..... **Error! Bookmark not defined.**
- 3.2. Implementing AI solutions involves controlling risks throughout their deployment.....27
 - 3.2.1. *Common to all private and public organisations, the challenges of sovereignty and resilience entail particular constraints for administrations* 27
 - 3.2.2. *The recent failures of AI solutions in foreign administrations illustrate the need to control the risks associated with the use of AI and public data* 28
- 3.3. The success factors are multidimensional and require a strategic approach..... 29
 - 3.3.1. *The governance of AI deployment must combine cross-functional oversight and functional initiatives* 29
 - 3.3.2. *Dialogue on technology and social issues is a lever for the adoption and performance of AI solutions*..... 30
 - 3.3.3. *An active skills management policy is key to ensuring structural autonomy and performance*..... 31
- 3.4. The long-term performance of AI solutions requires continuous monitoring 32



INTRODUCTION

By a terms of reference dated 8 September 2025 (see Annex 1), supplemented on 19 January 2026, the Prime Minister's Office commissioned the Inspectorate-General of Finance (IGF), the General Inspectorate of the Civil Service (IGA) and the General Inspectorate of Social Affairs (IGAS) to carry out a study on the **productivity gains that could be achieved by French public administrations (APU) through the roll-out of artificial intelligence (AI) tools**, based on a benchmarking exercise to be carried out with foreign administrations and businesses.

The European Regulation on Artificial Intelligence (AI Regulation)³ defines an artificial intelligence system as “a machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments” (Article 1).

The terms of reference cite the potential for productivity gains through AI (up to 20%) for a large number of tasks, based on a study by a consultancy firm⁴, which raises the question of whether these conclusions can be applied to the public sector – given that public administrations operate within a specific framework of requirements, particularly to ensure trust in public services – and what conditions need to be met to realise the potential benefits of deploying AI.

Productivity is defined by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) as “the ratio, in volume, between production and the resources used to obtain that production”⁵. As the output of public administrations is not valued at market prices, productivity must be given a broader interpretation here: it is assessed as the ratio between the results achieved – the quantity of services produced, service quality, processing times and user satisfaction – and the resources deployed, which are themselves measurable in full-time equivalents (FTEs) and/or budgetary expenditure. From this perspective, AI potentially offers several drivers for improvement: the automation of repetitive tasks, decision support, improved delivery of public services (user relations, service availability, elimination of errors and/or avoidable contacts), and the reallocation of resources, among others.

In this context, **the challenge is to determine the nature and extent of the expected gains from the roll-out of AI and how French public administrations can achieve them, while reconciling legal requirements, cost control and sustainability of the transformations.**

The task force used the scientific literature and available studies on the expected benefits of AI and consulted a wide range of public sector bodies and private companies, conducting more than 120 interviews and meeting with over 300 people (see below, Annex 2). The task force received written responses to its questionnaire from ministries (secretaries-general, digital departments, legal affairs directorates, etc.), economic departments (in thirteen countries), associations representing local authorities and operators from the health and social care sectors.

³ Regulation (EU) [2024/1689](#) of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (AI).

⁴ Bain & Company, 2024, [Technology Report 2024: Technology meets the moment as AI delivers results](#), 88 p.

⁵ Insee, 2026, website, [Productivity](#).

Report

Without excluding other forms of AI or robotic process automation (RPA), which were frequently mentioned by stakeholders during interviews and questionnaire responses, **the task force focused its work on the potential offered by generative AI and agent-based AI.** The first refers to systems capable of producing content (text, image, code, etc.) in response to an instruction called a 'prompt' and which rely on large language models (or LLMs) or neural networks trained with large amounts of data. The second refers to systems designed to plan actions and interact with other tools and data with minimal human intervention.

To summarise the work carried out, it appears that the deployment of AI in public administrations is accelerating in a variety of ways that are constantly evolving (see **Part 1**). It represents a lever for improving public services that goes beyond productivity gains (see **Part 2**). Administrations can realise the expected gains under a set of conditions (see **Part 3**).

This report is based on the findings and analyses set out in a series of annexes concerning the deployment of AI across different categories of French public administration (see Annexes 3 to 6), on the benchmarking exercise with the private sector and foreign administrations (see Annexes 7 and 8), on the legal, budgetary and risk management framework (see Annexes 9 to 13) and on the factors contributing to the success and evaluation of productivity gains enabled by AI (see Annexes 14 to 17).



1. The roll-out of artificial intelligence (AI) in public administrations is accelerating in a variety of evolving forms

1.1. AI is a major technological innovation and inherently scalable

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) tools is part of a long-term trend and builds on the transformations brought about by previous digital revolutions, notably the emergence and soaring rise of computing technologies, the internet and the data economy⁶. The earliest research into AI dates back to the 1950s, with the aim of designing systems that can replicate certain human cognitive abilities.

Following several phases of rapid growth and slowdowns⁷, these technologies reached a turning point from the 2010s onwards with the advent of machine learning and, more specifically, deep learning. These advances are hinged upon the availability of big data, increased computing power and advances in algorithmic models.

At the same time, public and private organisations have used tools based on explicit, deterministic rules within information systems to automate repetitive tasks, without necessarily using AI. While these tools have the advantage of being scalable and are very useful for many administrative purposes, **automation devices (especially RPA) have limitations**. This is because they are not very effective at handling unstructured documents (free-form text, complex letters, various supporting documents); their use is limited to linear, repetitive processes, with no ability to handle complex cases.

The recent period marks **a new phase, characterised by the rapid spread of generative AI and the emergence of agent-based AI systems**. Generative AI models represent a paradigm shift in human-machine interaction by enabling content production. Agent-based systems take this evolution a step further by combining it with mechanisms for task planning and interaction with other information systems or databases, which can enable sequences of actions to be executed on a potentially autonomous basis.

The classification of the tasks exhibited is expanding as technological progress progresses: repetitive and reproducible tasks, tasks requiring the exploration of massive data (data mining), tasks based on language and analysis (generative AI).

⁶ From the perspective of growth models based on creative destruction, according to which growth relies on the emergence of innovations that gradually replace earlier technologies. See Aghion, Ph. et Howitt, P., 1992, "[A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction](#)", *The Econometrica Journal*, 1992. See also Aghion, Ph., Antonin, C., Bunel, S., [The Power of Creative Destruction](#), Harvard University Press, 2021.

⁷ Often referred to as "AI winters", a term used to describe, on the one hand, the mid-1970s, which were marked by a reduction in funding following the report by the British mathematician James Lighthill on the limitations of AI, and, on the other hand, the late 1980s, which were marked by the collapse of the expert systems market. See Mitchell, M., 2019, [Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking Humans](#), ed. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.



The combination of two fundamental properties is now used to characterise AI⁸:

- ♦ **functional autonomy**: AI systems rely on learning mechanisms enabling them to be trained using data and to develop content independently;
- ♦ **Ability to deduct**: AI systems generate predictions, suggestions and context-specific content based on the available information.

These two properties combine to give these systems a new capability that distinguishes them from software based on deterministic rules. This justifies increased vigilance with regard to public policy. **The European AI Act thus classifies a large part of the AI systems likely to be used by the administration in the category of 'high-risk' systems**, particularly in the areas mentioned in its Annex III (access to social benefits, education systems, human resources, etc.)⁹.

At all events, **interaction with the user remains central**. Language models and generative systems are founded on dialogue with humans (instructions, prompts, supervision of results) which determines the quality of the responses produced. Their results remain probabilistic and may present biases or 'hallucinations', i.e. the production of plausible but inaccurate information. Their use therefore requires organisational and human supervision.

In the public sector, the challenge goes beyond the search for efficiency in the execution of administrative tasks, to include more broadly **the digital transformation of functions and in particular those relating to customer relations**. With that in mind, the introduction of generative and agent-based AI tools is based primarily on the activities and needs of specific sectors, rather than on the technical solutions available.

These transformations could be stepped up in the future. The expected progress relates in particular to the general introduction of multimodal systems combining productions in different forms (text, image, video, computer code, etc.), the coordination of specialised AI agents and the integration of AI tools into operational and even decision-making processes¹⁰.

1.2. Deployment in companies and foreign administrations is useful for identifying promising uses and certain good practices that can be transposed

1.2.1. In companies, the use of AI is developing primarily in support functions and customer relations

The private sector, especially the largest companies, is setting aside increasing resources to the deployment of AI systems. Globally, companies thus invested US\$1.8 trillion in AI in 2025 and plan to invest US\$3.3 trillion in 2027¹¹. They see AI primarily as a lever for growth and development of their market share and are focusing use cases on marketing and customer relations with this in mind. AI is also used to improve operational efficiency through support functions.

⁸ In particular, in the definition set out in the aforementioned EU Regulation on AI.

⁹ See Annex 10, "Legal framework and compliance".

¹⁰ See in particular Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, *AI Index Report 2023-2025*, OECD reports [Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory](#) and report of the McKinsey Global Institute, 2023, [The economic potential of generative AI](#).

¹¹ Gartner, 2026, [Gartner Says Worldwide AI Spending Will Total \\$2.5 Trillion in 2026](#).



The benchmarking¹² exercise shows that the organisations that appear to be the most mature adopt governance models at a strategic level, seek to standardise the use of AI within the functional units themselves, and factor in the measurement of total costs and return on investment (ROI) from the start of projects, even though these practices are not yet widespread. **They view AI not merely as a technological challenge, but as a key element of their strategic plan, considering organisational, governance, social dialogue and economic management aspects in combination.**

Ultimately, the most advanced companies place AI at the very heart of their strategic transformation, viewing it as more than just a digital innovation, and recognise that it takes time for its benefits to materialise. They consider that the main risk would be failing to deploy AI solutions, with the prospect of losing competitiveness in a competitive environment.

At an international scale, AI is being rolled out primarily in companies that use big data for training and managing customer records, and in companies that are already largely digitised and generate content, starting with computer code.

This applies both in terms of sectors – **technology, media, healthcare, banking and insurance** – and in terms of functions: within companies, the primary areas where AI is deployed relate to **digital operations and operational services linked to customers (operations, sales and marketing) or to internal processes (product and service development, particularly research and development)**. Finally, the observation that a growing proportion of employees are using AI spontaneously is leading companies to adopt general-purpose AI assistants, made available to all staff.

In France, the trends observed are the same: the larger the company and the more its sector of activity is already broadly digitised, the more French companies are deploying AI solutions, in connection with uses primarily focused on marketing and internal operations (see Box 1)¹³.

¹² See below, Annex 7 “Benchmarking: deployment of AI in companies”.

¹³ For a comprehensive overview of the relevant use cases examined by the task force and an analysis of their conditions for deployment, see the case studies presented in the box in Annex 7, as well as Table 11, which summarises the findings.



Box 1: Examples of AI use cases in large French companies

In three major public-sector service organisations, the key uses of AI tools are as follows:	
▪ in one case, providing staff with a chatbot (conversational agent) with access to 70,000 reference documents, rolled out across the entire group, aimed at staff training and knowledge management; ▪ for another, implementing three levels of tools depending on the sensitivity of data: a conversational agent licensed from a solution marketed to the general public, a generative AI portal hosted on local servers, and a specific functional tool accessible only via the secure intranet; ▪ for a third, a chatbot developed using Mistral's AI tools to support customer support and sales functions, as well as a secure generative AI solution aimed at external customers, developed in partnership with French organisations.	
In a large company in the insurance sector:	
▪ more than 50 use cases are currently in production; in particular, AI tools automatically categorise and route 15 million customer conversations each year (call summaries, assistance in completing files, etc.).	
In a large banking company:	
▪ a strict selection of just eight use cases was made, involving a structural overhaul of functional processes; for example, agent-based chatbots were deployed for claims management, after consolidating the relevant departments beforehand to ensure the tool's effectiveness.	

Source: Task force, based on interviews conducted. See Annex 7 for a detailed presentation.

The main elements identified are the following (see Table 1).

Table1: Key operational lessons from private sector practices

Aspect	Business best practices in deploying AI solutions
Strategic management	High-level implementation (CEO, executive committee); clear priorities
Defined objectives	Growth; productivity; quality
Timeframe	Multi-year vision
Data	Mass-scale upstream and continuous investments
Human resources	Mass-scale and targeted training
'Shadow IA'	Formally supervised or equipped
Acceptability	Management-driven
Testing	Transitional stage with scale-up vision
Scaling up	Integration with core processes

Source: Task force.



1.2.2. In foreign administrations, the dissemination of AI uses is based on their overall digital readiness and clearly defined management

Despite the diverse range of contexts under consideration, an international¹⁴ comparison reveals that foreign public administrations are deploying AI solutions primarily with the dual purpose of **improving administrative efficiency** – automation, cost reduction, process optimisation (Canada, the United States, Italy, etc.) – **and to improve the quality of public services** (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Estonia, South Korea). The priority sectors are **social policies, tax functions and administratively intensive services**.

Some of these countries devised national strategies for AI as early as the late 2010s, which were quickly updated to incorporate generative AI. Since 2024, a marked acceleration has been observed. Estonia and Singapore stand out with their vision that already incorporates agent-based AI.

Legal approaches vary, ranging from the adoption of prescriptive regulations (Germany, South Korea, Italy) to more flexible guidelines and technical frameworks that encourage experimentation (Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Singapore). In terms of governance, **the most advanced countries combine centralised strategic structures** (the Chief AI Officer Council in the United States, GovTech in Singapore) **with operational decentralisation, allowing ministries to retain the ability to take the initiative** (South Korea, Estonia). The involvement of social partners and civil society remains limited overall¹⁵.

With respect to digital sovereignty, most countries are aiming to control infrastructure and data, rather than achieving technological self-sufficiency, which in any case seems out of reach. Consequently, they are also acquiring commercial solutions.

The most observed **use cases** relate to writing assistance, information retrieval in large regulatory corpora, automatic document summarisation, prioritisation, case handling and anomaly detection (see Box 2). User-oriented applications (chatbots, smart portals) are emerging (Japan, the United Kingdom, Singapore) but remain less widespread and more strictly regulated, owing to risks relating to reliability and data protection. In the Netherlands, the child benefit scandal¹⁶, which highlighted the potential risks of automation and algorithms, has increased awareness of ethical issues, transparency and the need for human oversight.

¹⁴ See Annex 8, “An overview of the deployment of AI in foreign public administrations”, 13 countries studied.

¹⁵ The Netherlands stands out as an exception with the NL AI Coalition, a public-private consortium bringing together government bodies, businesses, universities, research institutes and civil society organisations.

¹⁶ See Politico, 2019, [Dutch scandal serves as a warning for Europe over risks of using algorithms](#).



Box 2: Examples of national AI platforms

- In **Singapore**, public officials are assisted with their tasks of drafting, summarising, translating and analysing texts by a secure generative AI tool ('Pair'), which is strictly compartmentalised for administrative use; an example focused on user service is provided by 'OneService Chatbot', available on messaging apps (WhatsApp and Telegram), which automates the triage, information extraction and referral of municipal reports.
- In the **United Kingdom**, a suite of administrative AI tools – the 'Humphrey suite' – is currently being deployed for a range of cross-functional use cases, for example to transcribe and summarise meetings (the 'Minute' tool), to convert legacy town planning documents into digital data to speed up the issue of planning permission (the 'Extract' tool, based on Google Gemini) and to analyse and summarise public consultations (the 'Consult' tool, based on OpenAI's ChatGPT).
- In **Germany**, the federal government's AI platform, 'Kipitz', offers use cases in the form of applications within the portal, for example to create, summarise, categorise, translate or rephrase texts and documents. Additional features include the integration of knowledge specific to government departments (knowledge bases) and API interfaces with departments' internal IT systems.
- In **Estonia** and **South Korea**, use cases for agent-based AI are emerging, with the aim of gradually moving from assistive AI to systems that can carry out administrative tasks under human supervision (for example, the 'Bürokratt' ecosystem in Estonia).

Source: Task force, based on the survey conducted by questionnaire. See Annex 8 for a detailed presentation.

The most tangible gains relate to the reduction of repetitive tasks, the streamlining of processes and improvements in service quality. However, **measuring these gains remains fragmented, often limited to operational indicators** (time, volumes, lead times) and rarely consolidated at national level. These indicators, which are easy to understand and can be used directly, represent the most widely used basis for quantifying productivity gains. Measures of return on investment, however, remain focused on direct operational gains, without considering indirect costs and external factors.

The maturity of use cases is closely linked to the extent to which public administrations have already been digitised, with countries that have largely digitised public services benefiting from an environment that is more favourable for the rapid integration of AI. In such contexts, **AI can be integrated more easily into processing chains that are already digitised and interoperable, enabling rapid gains in productivity and service quality**. Conversely, in public administrations where digital transformation is less advanced, use cases remain more *ad hoc* or limited to specific areas, reflecting a strong correlation between overall digital readiness and the readiness of AI applications.

The main elements identified are as follows (see Table 2).

Table2: Summary of the benchmarking of foreign administrations

Key lessons	Findings
Internal uses	File management, document automation, drafting assistance, anomaly or fraud detection, data summary
Citizen uses	Chatbots, smart portals, personalised services (employment, tax, health)
Gains	Time savings (reduced deadlines, faster processes), improved quality of services
Success factors / obstacles	Pre-existing level of digitalisation, data quality, in-house expertise, technological sovereignty, legal framework

Source: Task force.



1.3. The adoption of AI by French public administrations has, very recently, witnessed rapid and multifaceted growth

1.3.1. French public administrations are marked by a proliferation of AI solutions and spontaneous use by staff

Within French public administrations, the use of AI is becoming increasingly commonplace, although it is unevenly spread and is regulated in different ways¹⁷.

Reflecting its rapid uptake in French businesses, generative AI is already being used by a significant proportion of public officials (which could reach 40%¹⁸), but spontaneously and based on **unregulated use, referred to as 'shadow AI'**. While this practice reflects a proactive interest on the part of public officials and puts the issue of acceptability into perspective, it may lead to new risks for public policy. These include inequality between public officials and between service users, data security, explainability (bias and neutrality) and the quality of practices (cumulative bias and hallucinations).

The process of phasing out 'shadow AI' must be a priority. In this regard, most public administrations have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, guidelines on the use of AI by their staff (mostly in 2024 or 2025). However, the State has not established a policy governing the use of commercially available AI solutions by staff on their work devices, **nor has it developed a strategy for equipping public sector staff with AI tools**. The roll-out of the conversational tool 'Albert', announced in 2024 as set to become the standard tool for all public sector staff¹⁹, has not materialised, and a new trial is currently underway for the 'AI Assistant', which is running in parallel with the initiative and limited to a pilot involving 10,000 users across eight ministries (primarily at central government level). However, only by making such solutions available to their staff can government departments hope to phase out 'shadow AI' quickly.

Proposal no. 1 [all public administrations]: Make secure, 'general-purpose' AI solutions available to all public officials, with the framework for their use to be defined by the relevant government departments.

With regard to AI solutions officially deployed within the public sector, the (non-exhaustive) overview compiled by the Interministerial Directorate for Digital Affairs (DINUM) identifies 141 AI products across 80 different government units, with varying levels of maturity. Moreover, the task force surveyed nine ministerial general secretariats, whose responses highlight the **variations in the roll-out of these technologies across different ministries**: the number of AI tools reported ranges from 0 to 74 AI tools at the proof-of-concept (POC) stage, and from 1 to 15 AI tools that have been rolled out.

¹⁷ As illustrated, specifically for each category of APU, in Annex 3 "Overview of AI deployment in government departments" (central and decentralised government), Annex 4 "Overview of AI deployment in local authorities", Annex 5 "Overview of AI deployment in the health and social care sector" and Annex 6 "Mapping of use cases in French public administrations identified by the task force".

¹⁸ According to a study by the SNDGCT (organisation representing and supporting senior local government management) published in September 2025, 40% of local authority staff use AI tools without permission. According to a 2025 report by the National Institute for Research in Digital Science and Technology (INRIA) "ChatGPT has become the most widely used tool in shadow AI, overtaking LinkedIn Business Solutions, which had been the leader for the prior two years".

¹⁹ See Inte-Ministerial Committee for Public Transformation (CITP) of May 2024.



With regard to local authorities, according to a survey conducted by the Data Publica Observatory²⁰, almost half of local authorities with more than 3,500 inhabitants (49%) report having already launched at least one AI project within their area by 2025. Metropolitan areas and regions are the most advanced in terms of AI deployment, with 90% and 85% of them respectively having already embarked on projects within their areas. The picture remains more mixed for local authorities, public inter-municipal cooperation bodies (EPCIs) and municipalities with fewer than 3,500 inhabitants. Among the latter, 73% have not yet experimented with AI and do not plan to do so in 2026²¹.

In the health and social sphere, France Travail²² lists 68 AI use cases as of early 2026, including 41 AI tools at the testing proof-of-concept (POC) stage and 27 AI tools that have been deployed. As for **social protection bodies**, social security organisations have prioritised the development of automation based on internal data mining models, such as the one developed by the National Family Allowances Fund (CNAF), which measures the level of risk of overpayment or fraud for each case in order to prioritise staff audit activities; and some, such as the National Health Insurance Fund (CNAM), have recently adopted generative AI solutions. Healthcare organisations, for their part, are prioritising projects focused on specific management activities such as coding healthcare services, forecasting hospital activity or managing healthcare professionals' rotas.

Generally speaking, **the adoption of AI by French public administrative units has happened recently, or indeed very recently**. Within the public sector, although some AI products identified by DINUM date back to 2016, more than half (51%) were launched in 2024 or 2025²³.

1.3.2. Three main categories of use cases are emerging: generalist AI solutions, intended for support functions and applied to functions

The use cases identified by the task force within French APUs fall into three categories.

The first category includes **generalist AI tools**, notably including GPT-type models, which offer versatile features such as 'augmented' information gathering on the internet, text summarisation and generation, multilingual translation and the production of reports. These tools are of cross-cutting interest and can be utilised by a wide range of staff to improve the efficiency of daily tasks and the quality of information available. Notable examples from government departments, developed separately, include the 'GenIAI' platform from the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the 'MIrAI' portal from the Ministry of the Interior, and the 'Generative AI Portal (PIAG)' from the Ministry for Ecological Transition. In the social sector, the main examples are 'Camélia' under the health insurance scheme and 'ChatFT' at France Travail.

The second category concerns **AI tools for support functions**, such as procurement, legal affairs or human resources. These tools can help to optimise administrative processes and facilitate decision-making in these areas, by automating certain repetitive tasks and structuring complex information flows. The projects being rolled out are concentrated in the IT sector, covering development (coding) and internal user support, or solutions purchased from service providers, such as the 'Doctrine' tool, which is being trialled in a small number of ministerial legal affairs directorates. With regard to human resources management, certain AI

²⁰ The Data Publica Observatory is a not-for-profit organisation that aims to encourage discussion and public debate on the use of data and AI in pursuing public interest objectives.

²¹ Data Publica Observatory, 2025, survey [Les collectivités territoriales, la donnée et l'IA](#).

²² France Travail, 2026, information provided to the task force in response to its questionnaire.

²³ A form was first circulated in December 2024/January 2025 and a second time in May/June 2025, and has since been circulated on an ongoing basis; however, most of the overview has been completed and reviewed by DINUM, which endeavours to update the information in line with current developments or documents in its possession.



solutions are used to assist with the preparation of job descriptions in some regional health agencies (ARS), to support the management of hospital timetables or to analyse the administrative tasks carried out by local authority staff (contracts, statutory decisions, etc.).

The third category covers **AI tools applied to specific functions**, designed to meet targeted needs and often integrated into the operational tasks and processes specific to a particular function, building on co-creation with functional teams to maximise the added value and relevance of solutions. This category includes AI tools developed in-house by organisations for staff, as well as tools intended for users, such as chatbots. Some examples include:

- ♦ the DGDDI's '100% scanning' project, which aims to develop an algorithm for identifying illicit goods by analysing scans of postal parcels, for improved targeting of suspicious parcels;
- ♦ the Ministry of the Interior's 'Parole' tool, which enables interviews with child victims to be transcribed, thereby reducing the time spent drafting official reports so that staff can focus on the interview with the child victim;
- ♦ or France Travail's 'NEO' tool, designed to interface with the operator's information system, which aims to facilitate access to the jobseeker's file using natural language, thereby speeding up the examination of information, simplifying the user experience and freeing up time for interview preparation.

1.3.3. Current governance and management do not favour pooling

The **roll-out and governance of AI within the public sector** rely to a limited extent, at interministerial level, on the role assigned by legislation to the DINUM, which is responsible for drawing up technical guidelines, coordinating certain initiatives across ministries and proposing shared services. For its part, the Interministerial Directorate for Public Transformation (DITP) plays a role in promoting the use of AI solutions within certain government departments as a catalyst for public transformation²⁴, such as under the 'Services Publics +'²⁵ programme. The coordination of ministerial roadmaps, where they exist, and the actions of the two interministerial directorates is not structured, as no steering body exists to bring them together in implementing AI for the public sector.

Overall, **each ministry effectively enjoys a high degree of autonomy to define, develop and implement its own AI projects and tools**, which explains the abundance of AI solutions being tested or rolled out. This lack of national coordination of strategies, trials and roll-outs has also been observed by the task force in other sectors, social security bodies, local authorities and healthcare institutions.

Internally, the most mature public sector organisations are those that have structured governance in a way that enables them to stay abreast of projects being undertaken by teams on the ground, prioritise use cases and support roll-outs (as is the case, for example, with France Travail, the CNAM and certain local authorities).

²⁴ DITP, 2025, website, "[L'intelligence artificielle au service des usagers et des agents](#)".

²⁵ 'Services Publics+' is the programme for continuously improving the quality and efficiency of public services to meet users' expectations.



Within organisations, the integration of AI is most often impeded by a certain degree of compartmentalisation in terms of responsibilities: digital departments bear the bulk of the operational burden, while strategic decisions (prioritisation, allocation of gains, risk acceptance) are not explicitly taken at senior management level, contrary to the growing practice within companies. In the absence of explicit objectives, AI continues to be perceived as an optional tool, the benefits of which are pervasive, unmeasured and therefore unmanageable. Moreover, French public sector initiatives continue to be largely funded from innovation or modernisation budgets, which are insufficient to cover the structural costs of an AI project, leading to an accumulation of proof-of-concepts that are technically successful but financially unsustainable. However, **the roll-out of regulated AI within the public sector requires a change in the budgetary paradigm**, treating AI as a recurring expenditure rather than a one-off investment.

The proliferation of pilot schemes, exacerbated by the lack of structure in project governance, makes it difficult to identify and manage these initiatives within organisations.

Proposal no. 2 [all public administrations]: Develop, maintain and make available a map of AI projects at the level of each public administration (for example, at the level of general secretariats for ministries, national funds for social security bodies, and associations of elected representatives for local authorities), with the aim of identifying available services and avoiding duplication.

1.3.4. Public administrations have specific features that explain the lower adoption of AI compared to companies

Public policy is, in part, a data and standards 'industry'. Unlike the private sector, where a significant proportion of added value is based on physical production or logistics, the public sector relies more heavily than businesses on 'back-office' functions. These encompass processing applications (for licences, benefits, visas, etc.), processing supporting documents and drafting legal documents in particular, operations that may fall within the main areas of application for generative and agent-based AI.

However, this greater propensity for AI applications in the public sector is offset by specific constraints which, while weighted differently depending on the administrations concerned, relate to its operations and remit:

- ♦ **a lack of flexibility in terms of tasks and human resources:** public administrations find it difficult to discontinue public services (whereas a company can, if it so wishes, decide to discontinue a product line) and to redeploy or adjust their workforce;
- ♦ **strong budgetary constraints**, particularly with regard to operating expenditure, which is already lower in France (1.6% of gross domestic product – GDP) than in other European administrations²⁶ (1.9% of GDP);
- ♦ **a 'technical debt' that is often higher than in companies**, since underinvestment²⁷ in public digital technology slows down the possibility of integrating AI tools into government information systems;
- ♦ **stricter requirements for sensitive data and uses:** public administrations are subject to sovereignty constraints in most of their processes.

²⁶ Eurostat, [Government revenue, expenditure and main aggregates](#) (government function categories GF0101, GF0103 and GF0106 as defined in the manual COFOG 2019).

²⁷ Not specific to France, but common to all Member States, see European Court of Auditors, 2024, [L'UE face au défi de l'intelligence artificielle](#), Special report 08/2024, 78 p.



2. The use of AI in public administrations is a lever for improving public services that goes beyond productivity gains

2.1. The extent of the productivity gains linked to the deployment of AI continues to be debated and difficult to measure

The roll-out of AI technologies presupposes significant investment, the justification for which derives from the efficiency gains they are likely to generate, including increased output, reduced costs and improved quality of service. However, the scale and timeframe for realising these gains remain uncertain and subject to debate at this stage.

Recent economic research provides helpful insight into these changes but yields varying estimates. Some of the literature analyses the impact of AI based on the nature and distribution of the tasks that make up jobs and identifies the functions most at risk from technological change, while other studies seek to estimate the productivity gains likely to result at the economy-wide level, using various aggregation methods. In this connection, the challenge lies less in assessing the theoretical potential for actual gains than in identifying the conditions under which these rapidly evolving technologies can actually improve the efficiency of public organisations.

2.1.1. Economic studies are identifying functions that are more exposed to AI and are leading to heterogeneous estimates of productivity gains

Recent economic literature analyses the impact of generative and agent-based AI, building primarily on the study of the content, distribution and fragmentation of the tasks that make up jobs. This approach is based on the idea that a function comprises a set of diverse activities, some of which can be automated or transformed by digital technologies, whereas others remain complementary to human labour²⁸.

By their very nature, which is based on the analysis of language and data, the tasks most at risk from generative AI are those that involve intensive document management, data processing, and activities governed by processes and standards, particularly repetitive tasks, but also activities relating to customer and user services. Economists distinguish between **substitutable, complementary or low-risk tasks**, particularly those relying on complex human interactions or judgemental capacities that are difficult to automate²⁹. This analytical framework helps to identify the functions or sectors most likely to be transformed by AI. Consequently, occupations with a high administrative focus feature among those most at risk from AI.

²⁸ Autor, D. (2015), [Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation](#), Journal of Economic Perspectives and Acemoğlu, D., Restrepo, P., 2020, [Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets](#).

²⁹ Pizzinelli, C. et al., [Labor Market Exposure to AI: Cross-country Differences and Distributional Implications](#), IMF Working Paper, 2023; Acemoğlu, D., Restrepo, P., "Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets", *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 128, no. 6, 2020, p. 2188-2244.




Conversely, certain functions appear to be significantly less vulnerable to automation. This is particularly the case for professions involving fieldwork, technical interventions or social and medico-social support roles. In these professions, the proportion of tasks that are difficult to automate remains high.

Some estimates are based on structural models of task automation. Adopting this approach, Daron Acemoglu estimates that AI could increase annual labour productivity growth by around 0.07 percentage points over a decade³⁰. The research carried out as part of the artificial intelligence commission chaired by Philippe Aghion and Anne Bouverot thus leads to higher estimates, ranging from 0.07 to 1.24 percentage points of additional annual productivity growth, with a median estimate of 0.68 percentage points per year over a decade³¹. Research by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), based on macroeconomic models of technology diffusion, also points to positive effects, while emphasising that these gains will depend largely on the pace of technology adoption and its integration into productive organisations³².

Antonin Bergeaud's³³ research on employment in France (see Figure 1 below, all occupational groups) confirms the potential for AI to have a differing impact on different functions, depending in particular on their exposure to AI and the standardisation of their tasks.

Figure 1: Positioning of each occupational family with regard to their potential exposure to AI (y-axis) and the proportion of their tasks that are a priori difficult to automate (x-axis)



Note: The size of each circle is proportional to total employment in France in 2017.

Source: Bergeaud, A., 2024, [Exposure to generative artificial intelligence and employment](#).

³⁰ Acemoglu, D., [The Simple Macroeconomics of AI](#), NBER Working Paper No. 32487, April 2024.

³¹ Aghion, Ph., Bunel, S., et al., figures used in the preparatory work of the Artificial Intelligence Commission; see also Bunel, Simon, presentation "IA : croissance, emploi et conditions de travail", Banque de France / JNM 2025, 20 October 2025, p. 11-12.

³² Filippucci, F., Gal, P., Laengle, K., Schief, M., [Macroeconomic productivity gains from Artificial Intelligence in G7 economies](#), OECD AI Papers, No. 41, 2025.

³³ Bergeaud, A., 2024, [Exposition à l'intelligence artificielle générative et emploi : une application à la classification socioprofessionnelle française](#).

Feedback from companies shows that significant organisational changes and the integration of tools into functional processes are required for these gains to actually be achieved, with returns typically being deferred and expected within a timeframe of one to four years³⁴.

2.1.2. Between 13% and 20% of French public sector jobs are ‘significantly exposed’ to AI as defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO), which is without prejudice to productivity gains

In order to gain a more concrete understanding of the potential changes in the French public sector, the task force drew on the task exposure indicators developed by the International Labour Organization in its recent work on AI³⁵. The ILO rated 30,000 tasks associated with the occupations listed in the International Standard Classification of Occupations, ISCO-08. The ILO used AI to rate each individual task on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 represents the possibility of performing a given task entirely autonomously without human intervention, and 0 indicates that there is no possibility of automation.

Based on this rating, a composite score makes it possible to assess the level of exposure of each job category to AI and the variability of the associated tasks.

The occupations most at risk of automation by AI are categorised into four tiers by the ILO:

- ◆ tier 1 represents occupations with low exposure to AI, but significant task variability (low exposure, high task variability). While some tasks may have a high potential for automation, there are many others in the profession that continue to require human intervention;
- ◆ tier 2 includes occupations with moderate exposure to AI involving a combination of tasks with high exposure and tasks with very low exposure, which has uneven effects since some tasks may be disrupted while others are not affected;
- ◆ tier 3 encompasses occupations where a significant proportion of tasks are constantly exposed to AI, which presents opportunities for automation and requires adaptation strategies for workers .
- ◆ tier 4 groups occupations with the highest share of tasks exposed to potential AI-induced automation, and for which exposure is highly homogeneous for all tasks.

Occupations that are less exposed to AI are divided into two categories:

- ◆ occupations with low exposure to generative AI (moderate opportunities for automation of certain tasks, limited overall exposure);
- ◆ occupations where most of the tasks remain relatively unexposed (stable and low average level of exposure).

³⁴ See below, Annex 7, part 1.1, which notably highlights the role of redesigning work processes, data quality and available skills in the success of AI projects and the realisation of benefits (more in terms of revenue growth than cost reduction).

³⁵ Gmyrek, Pawel, Berg, Janine, Bescond, David, *Generative AI and Jobs: A Global Analysis of Potential Effects on Job Quantity and Quality*, ILO Working Paper, 2023; International Labour Organization, *Generative AI and jobs: A 2025 update*, 2025.



These categories were applied to the job categories within the French civil service, based on the breakdown of staff numbers published by the Directorate General for Administration and the Civil Service (DGAFP) (2022 data), to estimate the proportion of activities likely to be transformed by these technologies.

The results of these calculations are presented in Figure 2 and Table 3 below. They provide a measure of the potential exposure of public sector jobs to AI, rather than a direct estimate of the productivity gains that might result:


- ◆ **20% of public officials are considered to be exposed (tiers 1 to 4), i.e. 1.13 million;**
- ◆ **most of them are classified in the most exposed (tier 4) and significantly exposed (tier 3) categories, i.e. 13% (more than 700,000 officials);**
- ◆ 23% are considered to be at low risk;
- ◆ 47% fall into the category of occupations in which most of the tasks remain relatively unexposed;
- ◆ 7% are not listed in the classification of occupations and therefore cannot be assessed, whereas 3% are part of the armed forces' personnel, who have not been assessed by the ILO.

However, applying this ILO categorisation leads to an incomplete assessment of the benefits that could be achieved through AI. The ILO categorisation classifies most teachers as 'not exposed' in terms of the time they spend with pupils and, at this stage, in relation to AI technologies. Yet it cannot be ruled out, for example, that AI might assist with marking papers or preparing lessons. Similarly, medical staff are partly excluded, while potential benefits in terms of diagnostics cannot be ruled out either. However, this analysis does indicate that, based on the current state of technologies assessed at international level, it is mainly support and administrative roles that are currently most at risk. Professions identified as having low exposure according to the ILO classification should therefore be considered as 'expandable'.

These conclusions are in line with a 2024 study by Antonin Bergeaud, which identified AI as having a differentiated impact on occupations (Figure 1 above), based both on their exposure (as defined by the ILO) and the proportion of tasks with low exposure to AI within each occupation.



Figure 2: Level of exposure to AI of public officials according to the ILO standard



- Occupations exposed to AI (tiers 1 to 4)
- Occupations with low exposure to generative AI (moderate potential for automation of certain tasks, limited overall exposure)
- Occupations in which most tasks remain relatively unexposed (stable and low level of exposure)
- Armed forces personnel not categorised in the ILO
- Public officials not categorised in the PCS framework

Source: Task force.

Table 3: Breakdown of public officials based on their exposure to AI according to the ILO classification

AI exposure tier	Number of employees (in millions)	Top job categories
Occupations exposed to AI (tiers 1 to 4)	1.13	Office staff (general roles), accounting assistants and clerks, payroll staff, human resources staff, administrative staff, software developers, accountants, secretaries, executive secretaries, receptionists, medical secretaries, tax inspectors, supervisors (office roles)
Occupations with low exposure to generative AI (moderate potential for automation of certain tasks, limited overall exposure)	1.29	Nursing staff, intermediate-level social work professionals, university lecturers, managers, administrative and political staff, teachers in technical and vocational education, and directors and senior managers in the education sector
Occupations where most of the tasks remain relatively unexposed (stable and low average exposure)	2.67	Secondary school teachers, primary school teachers, care assistants, police officers, cleaning staff, teaching assistants, doctors, senior nursing staff, childminders, firefighters, judges
Armed forces not categorised in the ILO study	0.18	Not applicable

Source: Task force.



However, AI related productivity gains take time to materialise and are rarely measured within public administrations. As with previous waves of technological innovation, the productivity gains associated with AI rarely become obvious straight away. This dynamic follows a 'J-curve',³⁶ with gains only becoming discernible after a phase of investment and organisational adaptation³⁷.

In public administrations, these gains are even more difficult to observe. Analyses carried out by the task force show that current uses of AI primarily generate scattered time savings for staff and improvements in process efficiency, without these being directly measured by public administrations³⁸.

These findings show that while AI can transform the nature of tasks and improve the efficiency of certain activities, the scale of productivity gains will depend largely on the conditions under which the technologies are rolled out and integrated into the organisation of work.

2.2. The use of AI solutions can save time and improve quality for public officials and users

2.2.1. Generalist AI solutions bring diffuse but real individual time savings

The deployment of generative AI in administrations brings about individual productivity gains that represent significant hourly volumes when cumulated and that tend to increase over time.

In the French public sector, these gains are already manifesting themselves tangibly. The task force was thus able to document several significant experiences. Within the National Old Age Insurance Fund (CNAV), the use of Copilot Chat for certain tasks (writing emails, summarising texts) generates, for 9,000 staff members who have already adopted it, an estimated time saving of between 20% and 30% for 'short activities with low functional value'. For nearly a quarter of the agents of the regional health agencies (ARS) using AI tools for more than nine months, they would enable them to save up to five hours of work per week. Audio transcription, for example, allows agents working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to save three hours of transcription work per hour of recording³⁹.

³⁶ Brynjolfsson, E. et al., [The Productivity J-Curve: How Intangibles Complement General Purpose Technologies](#), NBER Working Paper No. 25148, 55 pp.

³⁷ See below, Annex 7, part 1 and section 2.2.5, which highlight a lag phase before productivity gains, growth and, in some cases, employment increases become evident.

³⁸ See below, Annex 16 "Framework for assessing potential productivity gains from artificial intelligence tools"; see also Annex 12 "Budgetary implications of AI in public administrations", which shows that AI projects are still predominantly incorporated into broader digital programmes and are rarely accompanied by indicators of productivity gains.

³⁹ Ministerial general secretariats, 2026, information forwarded to the task force.



In the UK, the ‘Minute’ tool is used by local authorities for planning permission procedures. It is already saving around one hour of work per meeting through automatic transcription, while the ‘Extract’ tool reduces the time taken to process town planning applications from one or even two hours to just three minutes. In Singapore, the ‘Pair’ suite enables staff to reduce the time they spend drafting notes, summarising documents or producing minutes by 40% to 60%, with 20,000 active users each week. In Germany, 64% of users of the ‘Kipitz’ platform believe that the tool saves a great deal of time on repetitive tasks. Among the general public, initial feedback from OpenAI shows that ChatGPT is used for simple searches in nearly 80% of cases⁴⁰.

AI solutions thus act as ‘partners’ in day-to-day work, with the capability of, for example, generating initial drafts or organising masses of complex information. Automating these low-value-added tasks – such as document formatting or basic research – can therefore free up time for other tasks, such as direct contact with users.

2.2.2. AI solutions shared between administrations should help to achieve gains for support functions

Within organisations, the roll-out of generative and agent-based AI already largely focuses on support functions (procurement, legal, human resources, finance) and customer relations. These functions are a prime area for application as they handle large volumes of both structured and unstructured data.

According to the Boston Consulting Group (BCG),⁴¹ the potential time savings in support functions are estimated at between 20% and 40% as a result of generative AI alone, and could increase by a further 5 to 20 percentage points in the event of a complete redesign of functional processes (see Table 4).

Table 4: AI-related time savings, with and without process redesign, in support functions

Professional function	Gains from automating tasks	Gains from process redesign	Gain (time) differential
1. Customer support	34 - 45 %	48 - 66 %	+ 21 pts
2. Communication	26 - 36 %	34 - 47 %	+ 11 pts
3. Human resources	23 - 33 %	32 - 46 %	+ 13 pts
4. Marketing	24 - 34 %	28 - 40 %	+ 6 pts
5. Finance	21 - 31 %	28 - 39 %	+ 8 pts
6. Computer science (IT)	24 - 34 %	27 - 39 %	+ 5 pts
7. Legal	21 - 31 %	26 - 38 %	+ 7 pts

Source: BCG, 2025, [The GenAI Transformation of the Communications Function](#). The same finding applies in public administrations.

In the area of procurement, the government’s procurement department (DAE) has carried out trials showing that AI can deliver time savings of over 60% for tasks such as sourcing suppliers, drafting contractual documents and summarising tenders.

⁴⁰ “Most conversations focus on everyday tasks, such as looking for information and practical advice”, in Chatterji, A. et al., [How People Use ChatGPT](#); NBER Working Paper 34255.

⁴¹ BCG, 2025, [AI at Work: Momentum Builds, but Gaps Remain](#).



In legal departments, AI facilitates the analysis of complex bodies of legislation. The Directorate for Legal Affairs (DAJ) of the economic and financial ministries has equipped its lawyers with a specialised AI tool that halves the time taken to carry out documentary research. In human resources, AI automates the production of administrative documents such as job descriptions and summaries of individual files.

AI solutions thus deliver various kinds of benefits:

- ♦ optimising the use of resources: human resources, including the preparation of work schedules; finance, including support with the coding of hospital activity or debt management for certain local authorities (the Côte d'Or local authority);
- ♦ cost savings / averted expenditure: maintenance of buildings and infrastructure (management of the water network by the municipality of Saint-Savin, preventive maintenance in several local authorities), legal services (Angers hospital centre);
- ♦ time savings, as with IT development (productivity gains estimated at 5% for the CNAM, based on 100 developers in the testing phase, and between 30 minutes and 2 hours saved per week per developer at the CNAV).

Proposal no. 3 [SGG, DAE, DGAFP]: Provide interministerial AI solutions for support functions (procurement, legal affairs and human resources in particular).

2.2.3. AI solutions specialised in specific functions are intended to improve the quality and efficiency of many public services

According to a study by the McKinsey Institute, improving customer satisfaction (as well as employee satisfaction) features, after innovation, among the main observed effects of the business use of AI in private companies⁴².

For utility users, deploying effective AI solutions can result in **faster, more accurate, and more customised responses**. Numerous compelling examples already exist within central government, local authorities and the social security system (see Annexes 3 to 6).

Accordingly, in the decentralised services, a generative AI solution has been integrated into the 'Je donne mon avis' system since late 2023, to help public servants respond to users by suggesting more appropriate and precise wording. However, civil servants remain responsible for the content and can amend what the AI tool suggests before it is sent to the public; users are then informed that their response was drafted with AI assistance. In terms of gains, the DITP reports that this AI solution has reduced the average response time by a factor of six, from 19 to three days, and increased the proportion of users who found the responses useful to 68% with the AI solution, as opposed to 57% without it. AI also helps to reduce delays in processing applications (one of the objectives of the AI trial for the assessment of applications by the departmental centres for people with disabilities [MDPH]), to manage an increase in workload, and to support a decrease in administrative resources.

The data mining and targeting algorithms used by the CNAF, the Directorate-General for Public Finances (DGFIP) and the Directorate-General for Customs and Indirect Taxes (DGDDI) make it possible to plan and improve the reliability of audit activities. The DGDDI's 'Vitiviz' tool facilitates anomaly detection on vineyard plots through image analysis, thereby increasing the detection rate of infringements.

⁴² McKinsey, 2025, "[The state of AI in 2025: Agents, innovation, and transformation](#)".



In the areas of education, higher education and social services, AI is also being employed to personalise support for the public, whether through 'MIA Seconde' or 'Spiritest' in secondary education, 'Aristote' in higher education, or 'MatchFT' for targeting job vacancies to jobseekers.

Chatbots set up by the towns of Plaisir and Issy-les-Moulineaux, for example, ensure continuity of service for simple administrative tasks (civil status, opening hours), reducing, for example, the rate of missed calls from 65% to 8% at Plaisir town hall.

For public sector staff, AI improves well-being and quality of life at work by eliminating the most time-consuming tasks (such as pre-filling forms, verifying or summarising lengthy files). It also lightens the workload for certain tasks within a complex regulatory environment (classifying criminal offences at the Ministry of Justice via 'PredNatinf', or providing legal assistance in interpreting the Customs Code, for example).

AI is a key factor in attracting and retaining younger generations of civil servants, who expect tools that meet private-sector standards and which they already use on a broad scale⁴³. For example, at the Haute-Savoie management centre, the roll-out of an AI solution to pre-analyse contracts and decisions made by local authorities in the department relating to human resources management (30,000 to 40,000 administrative orders to be checked each year) has reduced staff turnover within the team concerned while freeing up 20% of the team's working time, which has been reallocated to providing advice to local authorities, increasing staff engagement and motivation in the process.

Proposal no. 4 [all public administrations]: Ensure that 'functional' AI solutions form part of a process of integration into IT systems.

Proposal no. 5 [project leaders]: Involve users in the evaluation of the gains made possible by the roll-out of AI solutions.

2.3. The value creation of AI solutions must be assessed as part of an overall approach that includes costs, risks and external factors

While the deployment of AI in public administrations offers the potential for productivity gains that can take various forms, these gains must be assessed **net of negative external factors, whether in terms of direct or indirect costs**, which must therefore be considered **when measuring the value of projects to ensure that useful trade-offs are made**.

⁴³ IPSOS, 2025, [L'usage de l'intelligence artificielle par les Français](#): "18–24-year-olds are by far the biggest users of AI: 74% of them have adopted it, which is 19 percentage points higher than their older counterparts aged 25–34 (55%). This figure continues to fall, reaching 17% among 60–75-year-olds".



2.3.1. Achieving productivity gains requires covering direct and indirect costs, a large proportion of which is recurrent

The roll-out of generative or agent-based AI requires significant capital and operating expenditure and entails the risk of costs spiralling out of control. While some large private companies have invested heavily in AI (see Annex 7), **the investment made by public authorities is uneven and fragmented**. Thus, between 2023 and 2025, DINUM committed €8.7 million to the roll-out of AI within the central government⁴⁴ and €0.75 million was allocated to coordinating the roll-out across public administrations, while over the same period, ministries are alleged to have spent nearly €26.2 million (excluding the Ministerial Agency for Defence Artificial Intelligence – AMIAD)⁴⁵ and France Travail €18.7 million⁴⁶. Conversely, social security bodies (excluding the CNAM), local authorities and healthcare establishments cite budgetary constraints as a major obstacle to AI projects.

For a decision-maker, estimating roll-out costs is more complex than simply purchasing a licence. It includes **capital expenditure** (infrastructure, licence acquisition, data preparation, reducing ‘technical debt’), **compliance costs**⁴⁷ and **security costs** (quality assurance, audits, technical documentation, cybersecurity) and **recurring costs** (maintenance, licence subscriptions⁴⁸, inference⁴⁹, energy costs and others). The deployment of AI solutions is also accompanied by **costs associated with transformation**, including training, staff support and skills development.

AI therefore involves three constraints for public bodies in relation to digital projects. The expenditure **places a significant burden on the operating budget**, particularly in the case of outsourced hosting, thereby increasing budgetary pressure in the current state of public finances and also adversely affecting the organisation’s financial position. Furthermore, **the difficulty in estimating expenditure, particularly on inference**, coupled with the risk of price rises, increases **uncertainties in public decision-making**. Sovereignty over AI projects entails **additional costs relating to compliance and security**. Consequently, opting for ‘SecNumCloud’-certified solutions can result in significant additional costs, often estimated at between 20% and 40% depending on configurations⁵⁰. The costs observed *ex post* most often exceed forecasts⁵¹.

⁴⁴ DINUM, 2026, information provided to the task force. Of which €1.2 million is for AI expenditure in 2026, intended to fund computing infrastructure, hosting, licences for the use of proprietary models, and as-a-service provision and supplies. This budget (which is lower than DINUM’s initial requests) is supplemented by contributions from ministries under the scheme for the pooling of infrastructure and ‘shared resources’ (amounting to €1 million over the year) and could also be supplemented, in 2026, by uncommitted surplus funds from the public sector transformation fund.

⁴⁵ Ministerial general secretariats, 2026, information provided to the task force in response to its questionnaire.

⁴⁶ France Travail, 2026, information provided to the task force.

⁴⁷ See below, Annex 9 “International AI law and a comparison of national AI regulations”, Annex 10 “Challenges and risks of AI in public administration”, Annex 13 “Legal framework and compliance” and Annex 15 “Principles of public AI governance”.

⁴⁸ In the region of €300,000 for eight GPUs and 10,000 active user equivalents (based on an observed utilisation rate of 10%, the contract provides access to nearly 100,000 staff members) over 12 months. If the pilot scheme were to be rolled out more widely, the increase to one to two million users (depending on whether or not teachers are included) would amount to cost of around €3 million per year – excluding any renegotiations based on economies of scale and the current supplier’s (MistralAI) market position, or other solutions depending on the bids then submitted to the contracting authority.

⁴⁹ Inference refers to the “operational phase during which a previously trained artificial intelligence model is used to make a prediction, take a decision or generate new content from previously unseen input data” (see Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF), [“Inference”](#), Vitrine linguistique, Government of Québec).

⁵⁰ See in particular the Court of Auditors “The use of the cloud in public administrations”, 2023; the Senate, work on the “trusted cloud”, 2022–2023; and hearings of sector stakeholders (ANSSI, cloud providers) by the task force.

⁵¹ CIO, [AI cost overruns are adding up — with major implications for CIOs](#).



The frugality of the models can help to keep project costs under control (by limiting infrastructure, hosting and inference costs), while observing the principle of **minimising the data used** as enshrined in the GDPR and the principle of data minimisation⁵². Taking into account the **environmental costs of using AI** also addresses a societal challenge.

These high costs, which act as a barrier to the deployment of AI in public administrations – as identified by the public sector managers who responded to the questionnaires sent out by the task force (see Annexes 3 to 5 in particular) – call for an **assessment of the cost-benefit ratio of generative and agent-based AI** compared with other AI technologies like predictive AI which are less costly and sometimes better adapted to the objective in question, as illustrated by the RPA deployments described in part 1 above. They also call into question the current, unsustainable funding arrangements for these projects, which are based on innovation and seed funding.

2.3.2 Assessing the value of an AI solution must be based on a renewed methodology

The **methods for calculating productivity gains** at national level are incomplete or difficult to use. The Public Action Transformation Fund (FTAP), created at the end of 2017 as part of the major investment plan to support the State's structural reforms, evaluated projects solely based on the amount of the fund's investment. However, as indicated above (2.3.1 and 2.3.2), AI projects are particularly significant for broader expenses and costs. Similarly, the DINUM's framework for evaluating large projects, the **MAREVA 2** tool, designed in 2007 (and updated since, notably in 2014) **for digital projects, has limitations in terms of the overall measurement an AI project's value**. The life cycle of an AI project, its scalability and the necessary iteration of testing, in particular the costs of supporting deployment, which are essential for sustainable adoption, are not integrated. Concerning the gains, MAREVA 2 only takes into consideration the criteria of staff and deadlines, whereas an **informed decision must be based on a multidimensional approach**⁵³, based on the monitoring of quantitative and qualitative result indicators, defined in light of the project⁵⁴ objectives and the strategy of the administration concerned, in conjunction with its staff and, where appropriate, its users.

Proposal no. 4 [DINUM]: Adapt the value analysis and feedback method (MAREVA) to make it a methodology for evaluating AI solutions based on the value of projects and their full costs.

Proposal no. 5 [project leaders]: Incorporate the assessment of the impacts and costs of AI solutions right from the design stage. In case of a favourable decisional choice, assess the readiness of the organisation (see the task force's proposal, Annex 17).

⁵² For example, for certain applications, by using small language models (known as SLMs) – which are smaller LLMs that require less computing power and energy during inference.

⁵³ Report by the "Aghion-Bouverot" Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2025, [IA : Notre ambition pour la France](#), p. 118.

⁵⁴ For example, in *Guidelines 2.0 pour l'introduction et l'utilisation de l'IA de grande taille dans le secteur public*, South Korea has organised a phased assessment process involving safety checklists and performance indicators measured at each stage, see below, Annex 8.



3. Public administrations can realise the expected benefits of AI deployment provided a number of conditions are met

The scaling up of AI within the public sector is not merely a question of rolling out technological tools; it requires the prior removal of structural barriers (technical, budgetary and legal) in order to transform informal practices ('shadow AI'), which carry systemic risks, into a means of achieving sustainable and controlled public sector efficiency.

The development of a sovereign and trustworthy⁵⁵ public AI rests on three inseparable pillars: **infrastructure and data** that are effectively governed, a **framework for compliance and risk management** embedded in practices, and **AI governance that forms part of a strategic approach involving investment in human capital in particular**.

3.1. The scaling up of AI solutions requires different kinds of obstacles to be removed

The roll-out of AI in public administrations requires the technological, human and organisational aspects to be understood. **The spread of 'shadow AI' reflects not only staff enthusiasm but also the inadequacy of solutions made available and the underestimation of risks.** To address this, secure tools are needed that meet regulatory requirements and are tailored to the sensitivity of data; this does not necessarily mean fully proprietary solutions, but rather tools designed to ensure reliability, security and explainability.

This transition is currently reflected in investments that remain scattered, both across and within government departments, encompassing infrastructure, computing power, maintenance, risk management, compliance, training, support and ongoing assessment. However, **AI carries a substantial budgetary burden, both direct** (investment, training, inference) **and indirect** (training, risk management, skills development), the cost of which is exacerbated by the current fragmentation of initiatives. Scaling up ultimately requires a clear organisation of responsibilities, the prioritisation of projects and the integration of operational innovation with medium-term strategic planning, to ensure consistency, efficiency and confidence among staff and users alike.

3.1.1. A collaborative approach should guide decisions on whether to acquire or develop AI solutions to overcome capacity limits and budgetary constraints

The roll-out of AI within public administrations continues to be hampered by insufficient computing power, obsolete information systems (IS) and scattered initiatives, which have resulted in a fragmentation of resources and under-utilisation of existing capacity. A clearly defined 'make or buy' strategy must precisely outline the options available to the State, ministries and operators in terms of infrastructure, hosting, the use of service providers and third-party models.

Inter-ministerial pooling of infrastructure is essential to avoid duplication, ensure security, improve performance and guarantee reversibility. Decisions must simultaneously take into account sovereignty, cybersecurity, cost-effectiveness, the scaling of models and the scalability of both capacities and requirements.

⁵⁵ See Council of State, 2022, [Intelligence artificielle et action publique : construire la confiance, servir la performance](#), report adopted at the plenary general meeting.



The ongoing rise in training, inference and maintenance **costs** requires strategic management to ensure budgetary sustainability while capitalising on France's strengths, particularly in the area of energy. At the same time, tackling technical debt – ageing information systems and data silos – has become essential. AI can contribute to this, provided it forms part of a process involving joint decision-making between functions, digital departments and budget departments, to direct investment towards solutions that can be shared and maintained.

Ultimately, architectural choices determine the conditions for sovereignty, security and performance, as well as the potential for their future development. Like businesses, but to a greater extent due to the critical nature of the risks, AI exposes public administrations to cyber and technological dependency risks, justifying choices regarding hosting, compartmentalisation and scaling aimed at avoiding technological lock-in and retaining adaptability (changing providers, technological developments, etc.), or even reversibility (the technical and organisational capacity to regain control of an AI system, i.e. to halt or modify its operation and correct its effects if necessary). Environmental impact must be considered, with priority given to combinations of models – particularly SLMs – that are more energy-efficient⁵⁶ and less reliant on foreign graphics processing units (GPUs), especially for the simplest applications and segmented tasks. As a highly low-carbon approach, the French model provides a sustainable comparative advantage in this regard.

Proposal no. 6 [DINUM, DSS]: Establish and fund a multi-year plan for the gradual pooling of the infrastructure and 'shared resources' essential to the development of public AI:

- ♦ under the binding governance of the DINUM, for the State;
- ♦ under the governance of the DSS, for social security bodies.

The provision of a range of services based on this common framework should be considered for other public administrations, such as local authorities or healthcare organisations.

Furthermore, when purchasing or leasing all or part of an AI solution, project leaders may encounter difficulties in drafting and negotiating effective contractual clauses that offer sufficient protection.

Proposal no. 7 [DINUM, DAE]: Make available to public administrations standard contractual clauses setting out the responsibilities of the AI solutions provider in order to ensure reversibility and the purchaser's autonomy (skills and ownership of data in particular).

3.1.2. The quality and accessibility of data determine the performance of AI solutions

AI can only be effective within public administrations if it is based on high-quality data that is accessible, interoperable and governed in accordance with consistent standards⁵⁷. At a regional level, some local authorities' projects are hindered by the fragmentation of available data or its poor quality (see Annex 4).

Conversely, due to its ability to link data, AI poses a particular risk of transforming data that is not sensitive when taken in isolation (or even 'open' data) into sensitive data, by:

⁵⁶ See Annex 11 "Environment and frugal artificial intelligence".

⁵⁷ Drawing in particular on the [vademecum sur la sensibilité des données au sens de l'article 31 de la loi SREN](#), (DINUM, 2026).



- ♦ the gradual expansion of individual observations taken in isolation;
- ♦ the ability to re-identify these observations by cross-referencing with small numbers;
- ♦ the ways in which data is used (for example, gathering intelligence on a 'target' using open-source data represents a sensitive use of data that is not in itself sensitive).

International standards (OECD, European Commission) emphasise the importance of having unified catalogues, robust metadata and secure sharing processes. In France, while the accessibility of open data is second to none worldwide, **the maturity of public data management remains inconsistent across government departments**, with the exception of specialised classified information (defence, taxation, medical and statistical data). Furthermore, data quality is assessed nowhere near enough, even though it forms the basis of the information used by AI and determines its reliability.

Data protection requires the provision of two types of environments:

- ♦ sovereign infrastructures for sensitive data and uses;
- ♦ environments that comply with general requirements, allowing controlled but more flexible use.

Other issues concerning access to public data between public administrations⁵⁸ and to the ownership of data produced or used by AI solutions also emerged from the work carried out by the task force.

Proposal no. 8 [DINUM]: Update and implement a public data governance framework focused on greater data sharing and coordinated at inter-ministerial level, with a particular emphasis on identifying sensitive data and uses.

3.1.3. Taking staff's 'actual work' as the starting point is key to ensuring effective scaling up

Scaling up AI must be based on 'real-world work': an analysis of activities, constraints and margins of autonomy. The rapid evolution of technologies necessitates a **testing phase that forms part of a clear path towards eventual implementation. AI projects, like other investments (in technology, physical assets and human capital) must be brought in line with organisations' strategic objectives** (strategic projects or plans, performance agreements) and assessed from the outset using an approach that takes into account transition and maintenance costs, effects on skills and **impacts on the effectiveness of public policies**.

Staff involvement is crucial: an analysis of actual work identifies problem areas and tasks that could benefit from AI.

In foreign administrations as well as in companies, the high failure rate of POCs (70% to 95%, which must be put into perspective given the low selectivity at the start of trials with low initial costs and few technological barriers) reveals organisational blockages: central/peripheral management without a framework for accountability or resource-sharing; budgetary allocations that are too small to cover actual costs, which are often higher than estimates; and compliance constraints that are not adequately taken into account *ab initio*. Finally, industrialisation must be based on a multidimensional assessment using indicators, enabling decisions on whether to continue or halt a project to be reassessed considering the situation surrounding roll-outs and the full scope of the transformations they involve.

⁵⁸ See Council of State, 2022, [Intelligence artificielle et action publique : construire la confiance, servir la performance](#), report adopted at the plenary general meeting.



The public value created must be measured across several aspects (adoption, impacts on the volume and quality of administrative outputs, staff, users, reduction in public service debt, and processing times). Finally, unless net gains (gross gains minus direct and indirect costs) are considered, some roll-outs run the risk of failing to meet expectations.

3.2. Implementing AI solutions involves controlling risks throughout their deployment

The industrialisation of AI within public administrations requires heightened vigilance in view of the risks it entails. Pre-trained models, even when adapted to the administrative context, can generate bias and errors; they therefore require a clearly defined chain of responsibility, covering development, integration and operational use. **As responsibility for public decision-making cannot be delegated**, it is the responsibility of administrations to organise and implement systematic human oversight (sometimes involving at least two officials, see Article 14 of the RIA) to explain, monitor and correct AI outputs.

National standards (the so-called 'Data Protection Act'⁵⁹, administrative law on transparency) and European standards (the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)⁶⁰, RIA) aim to establish a framework of trust: identification of high-risk systems, transparency, explainability, data protection impact assessments (DPIAs), independent audits and public registers. Compliance with this requires a governance framework that integrates security, HR, budgeting and compliance, as well as the integration of AI into risk management systems. This should cover classification of uses, charters, systematic data protection impact assessments, audits, traceability and redress mechanisms, while ensuring that all administrations have equal opportunities in accessing and mastering this demanding framework and the associated challenges.

The European and national legal framework is, in this respect, a key driver for ensuring safe, fair and legally sound practices. It sets out the standards of transparency, proportionality and traceability necessary for social acceptance. Compared with businesses, public administrations face higher compliance costs due to stricter requirements (audits, traceability and reversibility), which reduce the net benefits derived from the deployment of AI solutions, but help to strengthen the quality of their decisions and user confidence.

3.2.1. Common to all private and public organisations, the challenges of sovereignty and resilience entail particular constraints for administrations

The roll-out of AI within public administrations is happening within a **rapidly evolving technological environment**, characterised by the accelerated obsolescence of solutions, a heavy reliance on service providers and growing demands for reliability. **The long-term viability of tools, control over their update cycles and the ability to guarantee service continuity are not only legal** but also strategic imperatives for organisations whose remit often falls within the remit of public authority. These requirements mean that administrations must have a detailed understanding of the responsibilities associated with each data processing operation and must put in place appropriate procedures to ensure compliance and, to a certain degree, enforceability.

⁵⁹ [Law No. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on data processing, files and civil liberties](#), as amended, notably by [Ordinance No. 2018-1125 of 12 December 2018](#).

⁶⁰ Regulation (EU) [2016/679](#) (GDPR) of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.



Cybersecurity and data sovereignty represent a second key area of risk management. AI systems – which also facilitate cyber-attacks by virtue of their very architecture and the volume of data they process – expose the administrations that deploy them to specific vulnerabilities, including risks of intrusion, data breaches, model compromise or manipulation of results. These risks are not merely technical; they can lead to an immediate loss of trust on the part of both staff and users, and maintaining that trust is essential to the acceptability and legitimacy of public policy.

3.2.2. The recent failures of AI solutions in foreign administrations illustrate the need to control the risks associated with the use of AI and public data

The documented failures of public AI systems show the extent of the operational, legal and reputational risks in the event of insufficiently controlled deployment. In Spain, the MeQA system had to be taken offline within a few hours following repeated errors in the authorisation of medicines, resulting in service disruption, remediation costs and a lasting loss of trust. The Netherlands experienced a nationwide scandal involving ‘SyRI’, a tool designed to detect social security fraud which was deemed discriminatory and subsequently banned by the courts, leading to investigations, compensation payments and contributing to the government’s resignation. In Australia, the automated debt recovery system ‘Robodebt’ generated thousands of unfounded debt claims before being ruled unlawful. In the United States, the COMPAS algorithm, used to assess the risk of reoffending, was found to be biased, highlighting the major risks associated with opaque models in public decision-making. These cases all follow the same pattern: a lack of preparation, no impact assessment, inadequate oversight and massive consequences for users and for the legitimacy of the administration.

To prevent such abuses and anticipate the growing obligations under the European framework, administrations must put in place robust assessment mechanisms prior to any operational deployment. The use of **‘structured adversarial testing’** (or **‘red teaming’** involving staff, experts and user representatives) is intended to identify weaknesses in models under realistic conditions, to point out biases, vulnerabilities and unexpected effects, and to test the operational sustainability of systems. Conducted within regulated sandboxes, these assessments enable compliance, robustness, fairness and traceability to be verified prior to more general dissemination. This approach provides an essential safeguard for ensuring the secure public use of AI, minimising the risk of litigation and strengthening public confidence. Risk management must be integrated *ab initio* into projects.

Risk management is a fundamental aspect of any public-sector AI project, even more so than in the private sector, as the critical nature of similar risks is greater within public administrations. It must be integrated from the design stage onwards, so as not to hinder scaling up and to guarantee the quality of processing, data protection and the reliability of results, while distinguishing between sensitive data and uses and those that are not. **This upfront structuring determines both the robustness and the scalability of the system,** making it possible, on the one hand, to anticipate risks linked to the volume, sensitivity or evolution of data and, on the other hand, to support future technical developments.

Managing technical risks requires audit and control mechanisms throughout the entire life cycle: identifying biases, verifying outputs, monitoring model drift, updating parameters, and staying abreast of technological developments. In the same manner as certain current practices, particularly in the social sector, oversight committees comprising staff, experts or trusted third parties may be established to ensure the long-term acceptability and effectiveness of the AI systems deployed. This includes from an ethical perspective.



Finally, sustainable risk management relies on **support for administrations from the relevant authorities, which both guide and monitor practices**. These include, in particular, the national authorities designated as supervisory authorities for the implementation of the RIA (the National Commission for Information Technology and Civil Liberties – CNIL, the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control – DGCCRF), but also the National Institute for AI Evaluation and Security (INESIA), established in 2025 and overseen by the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN) and the Directorate General for Enterprise (DGE).

To ensure that this risk management covers the entire lifecycle of AI and its applications, public procurement plays a key role here, as it incorporates the obligations incumbent upon the ‘deployer’ into the contractual requirements imposed on suppliers. This covers technical documentation, auditability, reversibility and traceability.

3.3. The success factors are multidimensional and require a strategic approach

The wide-ranging transformations enabled and driven by AI within public administrations are, first and foremost, organisational and human in nature. Their success depends on the ability to adapt skills, support the evolution of functions and ensure that staff actually take ownership of the tools. The roll-out of AI tools therefore requires a strategy for familiarisation and training, covering not only the tool itself (explainability) but also its opportunities and risks, as well as its scalability.

These transformations also require a structured and ongoing social dialogue, as provided for in the relevant legislation⁶¹, which serves as a driver for fostering acceptance, understanding, adoption and risk management of AI solutions throughout their life cycles. Anticipating the impacts on the organisation, tasks, skills and career paths is essential to capitalising on AI and maintaining control over the processes involved in the production of public goods and services.

3.3.1. The governance of AI deployment must combine cross-functional oversight and functional initiatives

The proliferation of pilot projects that fail to reach the industrial stage is not unique to the public sector: **70 to 95%⁶² of AI POCs are said never to go into production and thus form a ‘graveyard of POCs’⁶³**, where promising demonstrations pile up without ever becoming tools adopted by staff or services rolled out for users, due to a lack of clear objectives, strategic management or the capacity for industrialisation. Far from being a unique feature of French public administrations, the difficulty in scaling up lies mainly in the poor selectivity of innovations (which is a natural part of an adoption and testing phase), on the one hand, and in the insufficient integration, from the outset, of the conditions necessary for their widespread adoption, on the other.

⁶¹ See Annex 14 “Human resources, dialogue on technology and social issues and training”.

⁶² See Annex 10 for detailed references (RAND studies, 2024; McKinsey, March 2025; [Lenovo CIO Playbook](#), 2025; MIT, NANDA, 2025).

⁶³ Expression used by Matthieu Olivier, Data Director at La Banque Postale Group in March 2022.



The roll-out of trusted AI tools within public administrations requires a governance framework based on innovation, security, pooled resources and ownership. The dynamic balance between shared resources and implementation within departments requires a shared and coherent strategic roadmap across the different levels of administration at which it is rolled out and implemented. Given financial constraints, deployment requires prioritising projects **by combining cross-functional action with functional subsidiarity**.

At national level, ‘shared resources’ must be pooled: equipment (GPUs, hosting, internal RAG⁶⁴, standard APIs) and replicable generic building blocks (assistants for administrative work, transcription, translation, OCR; cross-functional tools for HR management, procurement, legal affairs, coding, document processing or standard responses to users via RAG).

Within this architecture, DINUM must play a bigger role as a platform operator: secure environments, shared APIs, technical standards and shared infrastructure ensure consistency, quality and risk management, **while avoiding duplication of investment**. Governance must also be based on a collaborative approach with staff, to innovate, scale up and monitor the impact of AI on professional practices, cooperation and supervision.

At the same time, **administrative functions must be empowered as part of a holistic approach that utilises AI as well as other drivers of transformation**, incorporating transformation, human resources, processes and data, to ensure that staff take ownership of the process. This initiative focuses primarily on high-volume processes or those involving a ‘public service debt’, including case processing, benefits, payments, checks and targeting.

Against a backdrop of continued innovation, the prioritisation of pilot projects must now be based firstly on an assessment of how well POCs align with public sector organisations’ strategic projects and secondly on the maturity of the functional units, particularly in terms of infrastructure, data quality, risk management and managerial support, in collaboration with staff and users. More generally, **the roll-out of AI solutions must be governed based on a structured approach to change management, which determines their acceptability and effectiveness**.

3.3.2. Dialogue on technology and social issues is a lever for the adoption and performance of AI solutions

The successful deployment of AI in public administrations depends on a structured, continuous social dialogue adapted to the changing nature of technologies. The involvement of staff representatives is an essential condition for supporting technological developments and guaranteeing the acceptability of the changes undertaken. Social dialogue must make it possible to share objectives, anticipate skills needs, define managerial support methods and specify the responsibilities associated with the use of AI in functional processes.

The adoption of AI may, in the early stages, lead to a transitional period marked by organisational adjustments, a learning curve and staff gradually adopting the tools. Concerns may arise about changes to jobs, the transformation of skills or the risk of losing professional autonomy. Social dialogue must help to objectively assess the scope of these changes and seek to bring about a genuine improvement in the quality of service provided, collective performance and working conditions.

⁶⁴ Meaning retrieval augmented generation, a technique that enables generative AI to formulate its responses by taking into account a database of documents provided by the user.



Far from being an obstacle, this dialogue is a key success factor: it enables technological changes to be included within a shared framework, involves staff in a common project, and ensures the consistent, gradual and sustainable implementation of AI within public administrations.

Proposal no. 9 [all public administrations]: Strengthen dialogue on technology and social issues in the development and implementation of AI strategies and solutions.

3.3.3. An active skills management policy is key to ensuring structural autonomy and performance

The rise of AI in public administrations emphasises the need for an active skills management policy. Public administrations must be able to attract, retain and develop specialists in the fields of data, information systems and machine learning, as there are severe labour shortages in these functions. The pay gap with the private sector – which can reach 40 to 60% for certain experienced roles – as well as the scarcity of these skills at both national and international levels, make it essential to undertake a structured review of career paths, working conditions and the resources made available to staff. Technical infrastructure, working environments, clarity of responsibilities and career progression opportunities are all key factors in ensuring these skills are retained within the civil service in the long term, against a backdrop of mass retirements (160,000 per year – DGAFP 2025).

Changes in functions and the need to integrate AI into professional practices also call for the **widespread upskilling of public sector staff**. AI is transforming tasks, methods of analysis and the nature of decision-making, and requires new skills to be acquired. An approach based on three key competencies (proficiency in the use and engineering of prompts, the ability to audit and assess bias, and an understanding of the principles of MLOps⁶⁵ principles and the model life cycle) helps prepare staff to be trained to use these tools in safe and controlled conditions and to adapt to their rapid evolution, while also making the most of them.

This initiative must be supported by a national training and reskilling plan, **first and foremost prioritising staff who are most exposed** to the day-to-day use of AI or AI-assisted decision-making, **as well as project managers**. By strengthening the public sector's capacity to develop and harness the necessary skills, the public sector complements its resources and reinforces its strategic autonomy.

Proposal no. 10 [DGAFP]: Define and implement a forward-looking management strategy for jobs and skills (GPEC) that integrates the challenges of AI, by prioritising the necessary skills and the functions most at risk.

The integration of AI into public administrations requires a structured, ongoing change management process that is adapted to the broad range of working situations. AI is changing the nature of tasks, how people work together, professional practices and the balance between operational and expert-led activities. **A comprehensive training programme is an essential foundation.** Building on initiatives already in place across the three branches of the civil service, it must focus as much on the potential of AI as on the associated risks, whether these relate to bias, hallucinations or data security issues.

⁶⁵ Drawing inspiration from the principles of DevOps and GitOps, MLOps (short for Machine Learning Operations) aims to establish a continuous process for integrating machine learning models into software development. MLOps thus refers to a series of practices designed to streamline the deployment and maintenance of machine learning models.



Beyond this training, change management must include **more specialised training programmes for staff and managers directly involved in the roll-out or oversight of AI tools**. These training programmes must cover the technical, legal and organisational aspects of AI, as well as the skills required for project management, data management, human oversight and the assessment of impacts on functional processes.

Supporting change also involves considering the effects of transformation on working conditions, mental workload, professional autonomy and team dynamics. Training programmes must be linked to processes for jointly developing solutions and continuously assessing impacts, enabling tools to be adapted to the realities on the ground and helping to prevent organisational or psychosocial risks.

Proposal no.11 [DGAFP, public service schools]: Define and implement a strategy for initial and continuing training of public officials on AI, including (i) common ground on the challenges, opportunities and risks of AI, (ii) specific training in the management of AI projects for managers and (iii) training on the necessary AI skills.

3.4. The long-term performance of AI solutions requires continuous monitoring

The integration of AI tools into public administrations requires the implementation of ongoing evaluation mechanisms, to ensure quality, performance and control over usage **throughout the solutions' lifecycle**. This monitoring must cover both the technical performance of the models, their impact on operational processes, their effects on staff, and user satisfaction. This is a key lever both for ensuring the security of deployments in an environment where technologies and usage patterns are evolving rapidly, and for learning from feedback provided by staff and users.

This assessment should aim to compare the situation before and after implementation, taking into account productivity, service quality, workload, mental workload and staff working conditions. This approach facilitates the gradual adaptation of tools, the identification of new risks and the anticipation of necessary changes, whether in terms of training, functional processes or data governance.

Monitoring must, in particular, factor in the challenges of preventing psychosocial risks and managing skills. Initial scientific research into the effects of AI already shows, on the one hand, that it is increasingly difficult to enter the labour market at the start of one's career and, on the other hand, workloads have become heavier rather than lighter, due to the ability (often on employees' own initiative) to take on additional tasks. The results of the assessment must be incorporated into job specifications and training programmes, so as to support staff in developing their professional practices.

Finally, continuous evaluation represents a strategic tool for ensuring the operational and budgetary sustainability of the solutions deployed. It makes it possible to verify the relevance of investments made in relation to the strategy of administrative organisations, to measure the value created for the public service, and to promptly correct systems that fail to produce the expected results. By ensuring informed and adaptable management, such continuous evaluation helps to embed the use of AI within a framework of sustainable performance, for the benefit of staff and service users.



Paris, 3 April 2026



List of Annexes

Annex 1: Overview of the deployment of AI in the health and social sphere

Annex 2: Overview of the deployment of AI in foreign public administrations

Annex 3: Human resources, dialogue on technology and social issues and training



ANNEX 1

Overview of the deployment of AI in the health and social sphere



CONTENTS

1. OVERVIEW OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICE.....	1
1.1. Uneven international deployment despite potential gains from AI tools.....	1
1.2. The roll-out of AI at France Travail	4
1.2.1. <i>Strategy and governance</i>	4
1.2.2. <i>AI use cases and tools</i>	4
1.2.3. <i>Barriers to the roll-out of AI</i>	7
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLL-OUT OF AI IN SOCIAL SECURITY.....	8
2.1. Successive waves of data processing technologies deployed in the social security sector	8
2.1.1. <i>Computerisation and automation of specific processes to facilitate interaction with users and the day-to-day work of public sector staff</i>	8
2.1.2. <i>Data mining techniques to help combat fraud</i>	8
2.1.3. <i>Using generative AI to facilitate certain tasks and improve the quality of service provided to users</i>	9
2.2. Differentiated deployment of AI across social security funds Error! Bookmark not defined.	
2.2.1. <i>Union for the Collection of Social Security Contributions and Family Allowances (Urssaf)</i>	11
2.2.2. <i>National Family Allowances Fund (CNAF)</i>	14
2.2.3. <i>National Health Insurance Fund (CNAM)</i>	16
2.2.4. <i>National Old Age Insurance Fund (CNAV)</i>	19
2.2.5. <i>National Solidarity Fund for Autonomy (CNSA)</i>	21
2.2.6. <i>Union of National Social Security Funds (UCANSS)</i>	24
3. OVERVIEW OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AI IN THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR.....	25
3.1. Regional health agencies (ARS).....	26
3.1.1. <i>Strategy and management</i>	26
3.1.2. <i>Use cases and AI tools</i>	26
3.1.3. <i>Barriers to the roll-out of AI</i>	29
3.2. Healthcare facilities.....	30
3.2.1. <i>Strategy and management</i>	30
3.2.2. <i>Use cases and AI tools</i>	31
3.2.3. <i>Barriers to the roll-out of AI</i>	33
4. CHALLENGES OF DEPLOYING AI IN THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL SPHERE.....	35
4.1. Strengthening actions to combat non-take-up and the personalisation of health and social policies	35
4.2. Increasing pooling to overcome resource-related barriers	36



The use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in public administrations within the social and health sectors – whether these are tools based on traditional machine learning models or on generative AI systems – forms part of an overarching drive for digital transformation aimed at simplifying procedures for users, improving service quality and increasing the efficiency of internal processes. Among other things, **the health and social care sector is characterised by its networked organisation**, with reference to France Travail, the networks of social security bodies, regional health agencies (ARS) and healthcare establishments alike.

The main purpose of this annex is to provide an overview of the deployment of AI tools within these different networks:

- ♦ the public employment service (see part 1 below), in particular France Travail;
- ♦ social security (see part 2), within the Union for the Collection of Social Security Contributions and Family Allowances (Urssaf), the National Family Allowances Fund (CNAF), the National Health Insurance Fund (CNAM), the National Old Age Insurance Fund (CNAV), the National Solidarity Fund for Autonomy (CNSA) and the Union of National Social Security Funds (UCANSS)⁶⁶;
- ♦ the health sphere (see part 3), in ARSs and health establishments (in particular for administrative management tasks, excluding clinical uses of AI).

Cross-cutting issues relating to the deployment of AI tools in the health and social sphere are finally addressed in the part 4.

1. Overview of the deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) in the public employment service

1.1. Uneven international deployment despite potential gains from AI tools

In June 2024, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported that **public employment services (PES) in several countries are using AI tools more and more to improve their services**⁶⁷. AI offers PESs significant potential to improve their role in matching people with jobs, through dynamic tools, more customised and inclusive digital services, better targeting of measures, optimised use of available data, and reinforcements in their administrative capacities for a more efficient use of resources.

On the one hand, **AI tools can enable the deployment of more customised and inclusive digital services**. For example, AI is a lever for the personalisation of automated and personalised communications and messages for PESs. AI-based conversational devices can provide customised responses and process many requests, even complex ones that were not previously

⁶⁶ UCANSS is the employers' federation for the general social security scheme. It negotiates and concludes national collective agreements, fosters social dialogue, and carries out shared human resources management tasks as well as duties of common interest to social security bodies (property management and procurement, among others).

⁶⁷ OCDE, 2024, ["A new dawn for public employment services"](#).



outlined in a predefined script⁶⁸. When deployed in a secure environment, with controlled access to data, these tools can provide more targeted and in-depth support, provided that data protection requirements are strictly observed. Moreover, AI solutions can form effective tools for providing information and guidance, enabling rapid assistance even outside the usual opening hours of user support services. When services are under heavy demand, these tools can help process some of the enquiries, freeing up time for staff to deal with more complex issues⁶⁹. Despite these advantages, the option to forward enquiries to a human PES agent for the handling of certain situations must remain an essential service within the framework of the systems put in place.

In addition, **AI can be used to better target PES services**. To provide relevant support, the PESs must first analyse and classify the specific needs of each user, in particular those of people who are distant from the labour market, for whom individual and adapted monitoring may be essential given the complexity of the situations encountered. With this in mind, the reception and 'diagnosis' phase is frequently based on segmentation or classification systems, often integrated into digital tools, thus enabling job seekers to be guided according to their degree of autonomy and the intensity of support required. These mechanisms facilitate the identification of those who are more likely to find employment quickly with limited support, as well as those in need of enhanced monitoring. The use of AI systems can make it possible for more complex analytical models to be set up and to expand the amount of data mobilised to refine the analysis of the trajectories and behaviours of people looking for work. The information produced in this way can help to more effectively target support schemes and measures towards employment.

AI also opens up major opportunities in the field of **predictive analytics**, which aims to anticipate future situations by analysing historical data. Indeed, within the public employment services sector, certain AI-based predictive tools have the potential to optimise a range of processes and services: they can help develop profiles to assess the risk of long-term unemployment, guide jobseekers towards the schemes best suited to their circumstances and improve how candidates are matched with available vacancies⁷⁰.

More broadly, AI tools can enable PESs to **take better advantage of data that is currently under-utilised**. For example, they can help to improve understanding of users' experiences, whether they be jobseekers or employers, with regard to the services and schemes utilised. While many services already carry out satisfaction surveys, particularly through questionnaires, the implementation and analysis of these surveys can prove time-consuming and resource-intensive for public employment services. The use of AI facilitates the processing of larger data samples by automating the analysis of survey responses as well as other interactions with users, such as conversations via chatbots.

⁶⁸ For example, the Icelandic PES launched its chatbot Vinný in July 2020. While it was being developed, email and telephone correspondence was analysed to identify the priority topics to be covered. Although Vinný was initially limited mainly to general enquiries (particularly those relating to unemployment benefits at the onset of the health crisis), it is now able to provide information to both employers and jobseekers on a wide range of available services, schemes and social benefits. This tool handles around a third of the enquiries received by the Icelandic PES; OECD, 2024, "[A new dawn for public employment services](#)".

⁶⁹ For example, in Norway, the PES rolled out a chatbot called *Frida* as early as 2018, based on natural language processing, to provide its users with information. Faced with a 250% increase in user enquiries at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, Frida handled a workload equivalent to that of 220 full-time staff, processing 270,000 enquiries during the first few weeks of the crisis. Frida was able to respond to 80% of enquiries, with only one in five requiring human intervention via an adviser. The tool thus contributed to a more efficient use of the Norwegian PES's resources at a time of crisis, reducing the need for a massive increase in staff numbers and easing the burden on staff; OECD, 2024, "[A new dawn for public employment services](#)".


⁷⁰ For example, since 2020, the Estonian PES has been using the OTT tool, which is based on machine learning, to profile jobseekers and support advisers in their decision-making. Drawing on around 60 variables relating to individuals' profiles and labour market trends, OTT assesses the likelihood of a return to work, identifies key factors and guides the type of follow-up and appropriate services. The tool is updated every three months and has an accuracy rate of over 95% in its forecasts; OECD, 2024, "[A new dawn for public employment services](#)".



More broadly, AI can help PESs to **improve the efficiency of their human and financial resources**. The roll-out of AI solutions within PESs is likely to promote a more rational and efficient use of available resources. In particular, these technologies can help to step up internal capabilities by taking over repetitive or low-value-added administrative tasks, as well as by supporting staff in carrying out their duties through decision-support tools or automated processing. The automation of time-consuming tasks helps to minimise the risk of error, improve the quality of processes and refocus staff activities on support, expert assessment and advisory tasks requiring human intervention, particularly when dealing with members of the public in complex situations. For example, AI-based chatbots can provide initial information to users (individuals or employers) and process routine enquiries. These tools also have the advantage of ensuring the service is available at all times, regardless of opening hours.

Although the prospects offered by AI are significant, its actual deployment within PESs remains from one country to the next. Thus, in June 2024, one in two PESs among OECD members had implemented at least one AI-based solution. This proportion comprises, on the one hand, around one-fifth of PESs that have rolled out an AI initiative or tool, and, on the other hand, nearly one-third (32%) that have implemented several AI systems. France is among the countries where the PSE (the state-run agency France Travail) has implemented more than one AI tool (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1: Progress in the implementation of AI in PESs, by country



Source: OECD, 2024, "A new dawn for public employment services". Note: PES tools planned or under development are not included in these statistics, which only refer to AI solutions that are operational or implemented at the time of writing. This figure is based on information provided by 41 PES in 39 countries, with information from the three Belgian subnational PESs presented separately.

Overall, **the highest adoption rates of AI solutions in PESs are mainly related to matching tools** designed to pair jobseekers with job vacancies, as well as tools that assist with writing and structuring job advertisements, particularly with regard to job classifications. Around 20% of the PES covered by the study deploy each of these.

Almost 95% of PESs believe that the use of AI tools has helped to simplify and streamline certain processes⁷¹, primarily through automation, reducing the time taken to complete certain manual tasks and mitigating the risk of human error. However, almost three-quarters of PESs also report that the roll-out of AI tools has created new tasks for public sector staff.

⁷¹ Figure based on responses from 38 PESs (including two sub-national responses from Belgium) to an OECD question concerning several predefined impacts of digitalisation on public employment service staff.

1.2. The roll-out of AI at France Travail

1.2.1. Strategy and governance

France Travail⁷² has so far integrated AI tools for use by its public sector staff and jobseekers to improve the relevance of its services and the effectiveness of matching job vacancies with jobseeker profiles.

France Travail has adopted a strategy for the use of AI, led by senior management in collaboration with the IT department⁷³. Following initial testing on isolated use cases in the 2010s, the roll-out of AI technologies by the operator gained momentum in 2019. This was organised around two programmes ⁷⁴:

- ♦ ‘Intelligence Emploi’, implemented between 2019 and 2022, enabling the operator to develop the capacity to create AI solutions, primarily through a technology platform and an ‘AI Factory’ dedicated to designing and developing AI tools. A framework for the use of AI was also formally established relatively early compared to other public sector players, in the form of a charter published in April 2022⁷⁵;
- ♦ ‘Data AI’, launched in 2024, was driven primarily by the emergence of new generative AI technologies, the need to strengthen data governance and the necessity to support the organisation’s transformation. This programme has been accompanied by a significant increase in the number of AI use cases.

Against a backdrop of a sharp rise in remote interactions, the use of AI has become increasingly prevalent at France Travail. Between 2017 and 2024, the number of annual branch visits fell by 42%, from 14.8 million to 8.5 million, while the volume of emails simultaneously increased by 72%, from 19.5 million to 34.3 million⁷⁶.

The roll-out of AI in France Travail is supported by a team specialising in AI transformation. This team comprises 60 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff members with diverse profiles, including DevOps, MLOps and LLMops specialists, developers, data scientists, data engineers, functional experts, transformation experts and product managers/owners.⁷⁷

1.2.2. AI use cases and tools

In early 2026, the organisation identified a **total of 68 AI use cases**, including 41 AI tools at the proof-of-concept (POC) stage and 27 deployed AI tools. Almost all the deployed tools relate to generative AI, of which 26 are generative AI tools and one is an agent-based AI tool. Eight of these are general-purpose tools for tasks such as writing summaries and reports, two are ‘support function’ tools for areas such as human resources, procurement and accounting, and 17 are ‘functional’ tools⁷⁸.

France Travail highlights three examples of **AI use cases/tools deployed**:

- ♦ **ChatFT** (see Attachment 2, Table 6 below): this secure chatbot is connected to France Travail’s information system data and enables public sector staff to reduce the time spent

⁷² A state-run organisation that replaced Pôle emploi on 1 January 2024.

⁷³ France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

⁷⁴ Court of Auditors, 2026, “[France Travail et l’intelligence artificielle](#)”.

⁷⁵ Pôle emploi, 2022, “[Charte de Pôle emploi pour une intelligence artificielle éthique](#)”.

⁷⁶ Court of Auditors, 2026, “[France Travail et l’intelligence artificielle](#)”.

⁷⁷ France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

⁷⁸ France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.



on tasks such as producing written reports and summaries, facilitating access to information more broadly⁷⁹. This general-purpose use case is being developed in-house and is expected to be rolled out to all 55,000 France Travail staff. By the end of 2025, 51,000 staff members had adopted the product, demonstrating its maturity. According to senior management, the tool has delivered financial savings and saved time on staff tasks⁸⁰, while improving well-being and quality of life at work for staff, and enhancing its public image⁸¹;

- ♦ **Panoptes** (see Attachment 2, Table 7): this AI tool aims to improve the processing of incoming documents through three services: document type recognition, quality detection and data extraction. It aims to reduce document processing times and costs, improve service quality by minimising the need for users to repeat requests and ensuring documents are routed correctly, and reduce frustration by minimising the need for advisers to re-index documents. This functional use case is being developed in-house. According to France Travail, this tool has delivered financial savings and saved time on staff tasks, while improving well-being and quality of life at work for staff and enhancing its public image⁸²;
- ♦ **NEO** (see Attachment 2, Table 8): designed to interface with the France Travail information system, NEO aims to facilitate access to jobseekers' records using natural language. This speeds up the retrieval of information, as users do not have to navigate between different tools and pages. NEO thus simplifies the user experience and frees up time, particularly for interview preparation. This functional use case is being developed in-house. According to senior management, it has enabled financial savings and time savings on tasks carried out by staff, as well as improvements in well-being and quality of life at work for staff, similar to the previous two tools. It has also enhanced the public image of the organisation⁸³. A jobseeker adviser testified to the task force about the benefits of this solution, which identifies relevant aspects of a jobseeker's file to guide interviews, helps jobseekers formulate their ideas effectively and supports them in preparing for job interviews. The tool also facilitates the flow of information by enabling this summary to be shared across France Travail's departments and with its employment support partners, such as Cap Emploi⁸⁴.

Other AI tools, such as 'MatchFT', are also being introduced. The latter is a semantic matching engine for job vacancies and jobseeker profiles. Based on a selection of candidates made by the adviser from a list proposed by the job-seeker-vacancy matching tool, an AI module initiates a text message exchange to pre-assess a candidate. During this automated text message conversation, the AI engages in dialogue with the jobseeker to check their interest in the specific role based on the adviser's selected criteria. The adviser takes the results of this exchange into account when connecting the jobseeker with the company⁸⁵.

⁷⁹ Recognising that staff were likely to be using external tools such as *ChatGPT* in the absence of an in-house solution, a trial of the 'ChatFT' tool was launched in March 2024. Gradually, all the document databases were integrated to meet the most common needs, notably drafting emails, supporting jobseekers in revising their CVs and applications, and assisting with the drafting of interview summaries. Furthermore, the tool enables staff to interact with internal databases. It should be noted that the features offered were defined based on requests made directly by users (see interview conducted by the mission with France Travail, 2025).

⁸⁰ For example, a 'business' adviser told the delegation that, the tool has resulted in the time taken to draft a job advertisement falling from around 15 minutes to 3–4 minutes.

⁸¹ France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

⁸² France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

⁸³ France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

⁸⁴ France Travail, 2026, interviews with the task force.

⁸⁵ Court of Auditors, 2026, "[France Travail et l'intelligence artificielle](#)".



With regard to the **planned AI use cases and tools**, France Travail highlights two further examples:

- ♦ **ChatFT écoute** (see Attachment 3, Table 18 below): this tool is currently being tested by 30 advisers across four regions. It aims to facilitate communication and interaction between advisers and users by minimising the time spent operating the computer during a consultation. This allows advisers to focus on the human aspect and improve the quality of their listening, while adopting a coaching approach which enables more personalised support and improves the quality of data collected in France Travail's information systems. According to senior management, the tool should lead to financial savings and save time on staff tasks, while improving staff well-being and quality of life at work, and enhancing the organisation's public image⁸⁶;
- ♦ **Qualif FT** (see Attachment 3, Table 19): this tool enables jobseekers to interact vocally with France Travail's departments. It has been undergoing testing since September 2025 on the mobile app for the Youth Commitment Contract (CEJ) in Île-de-France and on the 'Mes événements Emploi' website⁸⁷. By providing a simple, inclusive, voice-based experience for interacting with France Travail's departments, it could improve user experience, promote independence among users and enrich jobseekers' profiles with more up-to-date data in the information systems. Overall, France Travail believes that it should save time on staff tasks, while improving the quality of service provided to the public and enhancing its public image⁸⁸.

By the beginning of 2026, **almost 37,600 France Travail staff members (i.e. between 60 and 70% of the total workforce) will be affected by the AI tools that have been implemented**⁸⁹. During consultations with various local teams in the operator's network, the task force observed that these teams have a high degree of autonomy in implementing this roll-out framework locally. This has enabled them to implement change management approaches tailored to their local context. While some branches have appointed 'coordinators', others rely on a working group to lead the process⁹⁰.

Overall, France Travail's senior management states that the deployed tools have yielded various benefits, specifically financial gains and time savings on staff tasks, as well as improvements in well-being and quality of life at work for staff, and an enhanced public image for the organisation.

The Court of Auditors considers that the AI tools deployed by France Travail have generated significant efficiency gains for advisers, as well as cost savings, by improving the performance of digital solutions and phasing out obsolete technologies. **Between 2017 and 2025, the Court of Auditors estimates that the 'gross' benefits of implementing AI tools at France Travail will total almost €120 million**, surpassing the €108 million estimated to be spent on developing these AI tools⁹¹. These efficiency gains are expected to increase in the coming years as France Travail gains more experience in developing and deploying AI-based solutions on a large scale.

⁸⁶ France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

⁸⁷ Court of Auditors, 2026, "[France Travail et l'intelligence artificielle](#)".

⁸⁸ France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

⁸⁹ France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

⁹⁰ France Travail, 2026, interviews with the task force.

⁹¹ Court of Auditors, 2026, "[France Travail et l'intelligence artificielle](#)".



1.2.3. Barriers to the deployment of AI

According to France Travail, the main barriers to the roll-out of AI are related to the legal framework (which is overly restrictive and rife with uncertainty), the lack of support for organisational, process and functional transformation, and the social acceptability of AI tools. (Public sector staff and users are reluctant to adopt them.)⁹²

At national level, **France Travail aims to remove these barriers through various means.** In terms of barriers relating to internal social acceptance, France Travail has set up an internal committee to monitor usage. During consultations with local network staff, the task force observed that the adoption rate varies between agencies and public sector staff members. Executives shared their difficulties in persuading certain staff members to use these tools. In this regard, executives' commitment and their own adoption of the tools were highlighted as crucial. The challenge at this stage is therefore to continue providing support and training. To enhance social acceptability, France Travail states that it ensures AI tools are developed for and with frontline staff to create useful products in staff members' day-to-day work and to encourage their adoption⁹³. To enhance social acceptability among users of the public employment department, the publication of an ethical charter in 2022 and the establishment of an ethics unit in 2023, supported by an external ethics advisory committee, are highlighted as examples of good practice. Finally, with regard to the legal aspects and implementation of the framework set out in the European AI Act⁹⁴, France Travail has restructured its internal organisation to establish a dedicated team for this area.

⁹² France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

⁹³ France Travail, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

⁹⁴ With regard to the legal framework, the Court of Auditors noted in its 2024 report that France Travail was significantly behind schedule in meeting its obligations to verify the compliance of the AI tools it designs, tests or uses, and highlighted that the organisation had not made sufficient advance preparations for the entry into force of the European Regulation on Artificial Intelligence, despite a large number of its AI tools falling within the category of 'high-risk' AI systems; Court of Auditors, 2026, ["France Travail et l'intelligence artificielle"](#), page 88.



2. An overview of the roll-out of AI in social security

2.1. Successive waves of data processing technologies deployed in the social security sector

Public administrations in the social security sector have approached their technological transformations in successive waves, shifting their focus from hardware to algorithmic agility. In this respect, France fits perfectly into the international landscape of social security bodies⁹⁵.

2.1.1. Computerisation and automation of specific processes to facilitate interaction with users and the day-to-day work of public sector staff

French social security bodies have gradually digitised administrative processes against a backdrop of rising case volumes and regulatory obligations, which have necessitated the gradual modernisation of their information systems. From the 1990s onwards, this digital transformation has taken the form of computerising operations relating to the management of benefits and claimants' files (e.g. calculation of entitlements and processing of benefits), alongside the emergence of national IT systems in social security funds.

Since the 2010s, social security organisations have supplemented their automated processing systems with robotic process automation (RPA) to meet performance improvement targets set out in the objectives and management agreements (COG) concluded with the State. RPA uses 'software robots' to replicate human interactions with computer interfaces, specifically where application programming interfaces (API) are unavailable to integrate existing systems. This technology has been tested and launched across several bodies within the social security system for various use cases, such as autofill, transferring data between different applications, reading and processing structured documents, and executing simple calculation rules to determine entitlements. For example, since 2022, the National Health Insurance Fund (CNAM) has rolled out nearly 75 online services for social security beneficiaries and 11 for healthcare professionals. This multi-channel strategy has reduced the number of in-person visits to the network's offices⁹⁶.

While they offer the advantage of scalability, the automation systems implemented in the social security sector have limitations inherent in their technical and functional design. These systems primarily rely on explicit, deterministic rules, carrying out operations when the applicable data and rules are clearly defined. Consequently, these systems:

- ♦ **do not adapt easily to frequent or complex regulatory changes.** Any significant change to a scale or calculation rule requires human intervention to reconfigure the processing rules. This can delay tool compliance and increase the risk of operational errors;
- ♦ **are not well suited to handling unstructured data,** such as free-form texts, complex correspondence and various supporting documents. Traditional RPA applications or expert systems have limited ability to interpret free-form content without advanced character recognition or AI techniques;
- ♦ **have no inherent capacity to manage uncertainty.** The way these tools are designed means they cannot interpret ambiguous cases or propose decisions outside a 'pre-programmed' framework. This limits their usefulness to linear and repetitive processes and prevents them from handling cases that fall outside this framework.

⁹⁵ OECD, 2025, "[Harnessing Artificial Intelligence in Social Security](#)".

⁹⁶ IGAS, 2023, "[Évaluation de la convention d'objectifs et de gestion 2018-2022 de la CNAM et recommandations en vue de son renouvellement](#)".



2.1.2. Data mining techniques to help combat fraud

The exponential growth in administrative data resulting from the digitisation of procedures and reporting flows (including nominative social declarations (DSN) and income declarations) has **led social security organisations and public authorities to use statistical and software-based data analysis techniques**. This approach involves cross-referencing large volumes of data from various information systems to identify atypical patterns that may indicate high-risk situations, such as anomalies in benefit payments or potentially fraudulent behaviour.

In this context, certain organisations, such as the National Family Allowances Fund (CNAF), have developed internal data-mining models that enable them to measure the level of risk of overpayment or fraud for each case, allowing them to prioritise audit work.

Within social security organisations, data mining is primarily used to identify cases for prioritised examination, rather than to automate decisions, which remain the responsibility of administrative staff. This distinction aligns with the principles of accountability and human oversight. For example:

- ♦ **at the National Family Allowances Fund (CNAF)**, the statistical tool for data mining incoming data (DMDE) came into operation in early 2026. It aims to detect inconsistencies in declared income or atypical situations, such as variations in income that cannot be explained by the calculation rules. This facilitates targeted verification measures by the audit departments. This methodology is based on analysing variables significant for benefit allocation⁹⁷;
- ♦ **at the Union for the Collection of Social Security Contributions and Family Allowances (Urssaf)**, processing declared data enables companies or employers to be profiled based on statistical indicators of the risk of undeclared work. This complements on-site or phone inspections carried out by inspectors. These cross-checks utilise data from social security declarations, tax returns and historical reporting behaviour patterns to generate risk indicators.

This approach is based on the methods outlined in the administrative report by the Directorate-General for Public Finances (DGFIP). The DGFIP uses data mining techniques to compile tax audit lists by cross-referencing land registry, social security and economic data⁹⁸.

2.1.3. Using generative AI to facilitate certain tasks and improve the quality of service provided to users

Unlike traditional algorithmic systems, generative AI can produce new content, such as text, summaries and structured responses. This feature can improve the efficiency of certain interactions with users and help public sector staff create structured documents. However, it also poses specific challenges. For example, there is a risk of ‘hallucinations’, such as the generation of non-existent sources or facts. This requires the implementation of mechanisms to verify sources, which raises issues regarding the traceability of decisions. Subsequently, ‘agent-based’ AI systems, which can perform tasks autonomously based on defined objectives, could eventually transform more complex administrative processes. However, their integration will require strict frameworks for human supervision and accountability due to their autonomous decision-making capabilities.

⁹⁷ CNAF, 2026, [“Présentation détaillée du “Datamining données entrantes” 2026”](#).

⁹⁸ Vermeillet, S. and Rambaud D., 2024, [“IA, impôts, prestations sociales et lutte contre la fraude”](#), Senate.



Since the emergence of ChatGPT in public debate in 2022–2023, **organisations in the social security sector have been undertaking a cautious transition towards generative AI systems, which are still largely confined to testing.** Some stakeholders are therefore prioritising exploring use cases based on other technologies with which teams are already familiar, such as RPA. This gradual trend of adopting generative AI tools is partly due to legal, ethical, technical and organisational constraints specific to the public department. Some international analyses⁹⁹ suggest that most public bodies remain at the testing stage or are being rolled out incrementally, particularly where applications have a direct impact on users' rights.

AI-based predictive models offer a potential means of reducing non-take-up of entitlements. These models can be leveraged to identify groups that are unlikely to claim their benefits, enabling targeted proactive information and support initiatives. The OECD notes that deploying AI tools improves the speed, accuracy and rates of minimum benefit and unemployment support take-up by providing individuals with information and automatically adjusting eligibility estimates. This is relevant to strategies for reducing non-take-up¹⁰⁰. For instance, Catalonia uses AI to identify individuals eligible for support in tackling energy poverty, as well as to proactively distribute benefits¹⁰¹.

2.2. Differentiated deployment of AI across social security funds

To date, **the main national social security funds have been involved in developing and using AI solutions.** Indeed, the task force has carried out a review of the deployment of AI across all five national funds of the general social security scheme¹⁰²:

- ◆ the Union for the Collection of Social Security Contributions and Family Allowances (Urssaf) (see part 2.2.1 below);
- ◆ the National Family Allowances Fund (CNAF) (see part 2.2.2);
- ◆ the National Health Insurance Fund (CNAM) (see part 2.2.3);
- ◆ the National Old Age Insurance Fund (CNAV) (see part 2.2.4);
- ◆ the National Solidarity Fund for Autonomy (CNSA) (see part 2.2.5).

This overview covers the roll-out of AI tools in these national funds and their respective networks.

The task force also examined the roll-out of AI tools by the Union of National Social Security Funds (UCANSS) (see part 2.2.6)¹⁰³. As well as being the employers' federation for the general social security scheme, UCANSS coordinates human resources policies for social security bodies and supports the efficient management of funds¹⁰⁴.

⁹⁹ For example, the OECD report [“Governing with Artificial Intelligence”](#) of November 2025.

¹⁰⁰ OECD, 2024, [“Using AI to manage minimum income benefits and unemployment assistance”](#).

¹⁰¹ OECD, 2025, [“Harnessing Artificial Intelligence in Social Security”](#).

¹⁰² Social security, 2026, website, [“Les régimes”](#).

¹⁰³ Social security, 2026, website, [“UCANSS”](#).

¹⁰⁴ For example, UNANSS acts as a central purchasing body for social security organisations, entering into joint contracts that allow them to save time and money and protect themselves against legal risks.



2.2.1. Union for the Collection of Social Security Contributions and Family Allowances (Urssaf)

2.2.1.1. Strategy and governance

The Union for the Collection of Social Security Contributions and Family Allowances (Urssaf) has adopted an AI roll-out strategy led by general management, in collaboration with the digital and information systems department¹⁰⁵. A dedicated committee, the National Committee for Artificial Intelligence (CNIA), has been set up and is chaired by the Director General of the Urssaf National Fund¹⁰⁶. This committee is supported by an AI steering committee, which oversees the implementation of various projects relating to governance, funding, communication, monitoring, compliance, support and human resources, architecture and use case management¹⁰⁷. Finally, a committee of experts assesses risks and supports the teams in securing solutions.

The deployment of AI tools is intended to prioritise IT and legal functions, as well as functional areas relating to customer service. This roll-out is supported by a 20-strong team of full-time equivalent (FTE) public sector staff members with diverse profiles and specialising in AI transformation. They include DevOps, MLOps and LLMOps experts, as well as developers, data scientists, data engineers, functional experts and transformation experts.¹⁰⁸

2.2.1.2. AI use cases and tools

The Urssaf National Fund has identified a **total of 12 AI use cases** as of early 2026. These comprise eight AI tools at the proof-of-concept (POC) stage and four deployed AI tools. The four deployed tools relate to generative AI: one is a general-purpose tool for tasks such as writing summaries and reports; another is a tool for ‘support functions’ such as human resources, procurement and accounting; and the remaining two are ‘functional’ tools¹⁰⁹. To keep abreast of initiatives by the network’s teams regarding internal or external department improvements (beyond issues solely related to the deployment of AI), the national fund has set up an ideation platform (called ‘Pépites’), which allows public sector staff in the Urssaf network to submit ideas and project proposals¹¹⁰.

Firstly, regarding the **AI use cases and AI tools that have been deployed**, the Urssaf National Fund highlights two examples:

¹⁰⁵ Urssaf National Fund, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

¹⁰⁶ This body is responsible for managing and prioritising AI projects at the Urssaf National Fund and within its network at national level; it meets approximately once a month (see Urssaf National Fund, 2026, interview with the task force).

¹⁰⁷ Urssaf National Fund, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

¹⁰⁸ Urssaf National Fund, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

¹⁰⁹ Urssaf National Fund, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

¹¹⁰ Urssaf National Fund, 2022, [“Le grand dossier 2021 – Une transformation au service des usagers”](#).



- ♦ **Chatbots** (see Annex 2, Table 9 below): in terms of customer relations, these handle simple level 1 calls and facilitate the routing of calls according to their nature, directing them to the most suitable agent for resolution with great accuracy at the first point of contact. Consequently, **by the end of 2025, ten chatbots** covering a variety of topics and target audiences **were in operation** (including employers, sole traders, self-employed workers, medical practitioners, healthcare assistants, cross-border workers, the company service employment scheme (TESE) and the universal employment service scheme (CESU)). Between 1 January and 30 September 2025, chatbots handled nearly 1.2 million conversations, 4% of which were referred to live chats¹¹¹ with an advisor¹¹². According to the Union for the Collection of Social Security Contributions and Family Allowances (Urssaf), chatbots save staff time on certain staff tasks, increase the volume of work they can complete, and improve the quality of service provided to the public.
- ♦ **Mon'IA** (see Annex 2, Table 10) is a general-purpose generative AI conversational assistant for staff. It is used for day-to-day tasks such as writing texts and emails (39% of uses), summarising documents (20%), analysing documents (15%), correcting texts (10%) and generating ideas (9%)¹¹³. The latter is being developed in-house and could eventually involve 15,000 staff members. By the end of 2025, it had been adopted by nearly 4,300 staff members. According to the Urssaf National Fund, it saves staff time on their tasks, improves their well-being and quality of life at work, and enhances the quality of their work.

With Regarding the planned AI use cases and tools, the Urssaf National Fund has highlighted two further examples:

- ♦ **DecaDSN** (see Annex 3, Table 20): a tool currently under development in collaboration with Mistral for Urssaf administrators to use over the phone. It aims to facilitate dialogue between administrators and declarants to assist them more effectively in correcting errors in declarations by providing clearer explanations of anomalies relating to the nominative social declaration (DSN). This functional use case could involve up to 500 staff members, potentially saving time spent on staff tasks and improving the quality of their work and the service provided to the public;
- ♦ **CRA Assist** (see Annex 3, Table 21): an intelligent assistant based on generative AI designed to help legal professionals prepare cases for the Amicable Appeals Committee (CRA). This will be achieved through analysing situations and relevant case law and anonymising certain elements, among others. This functional use case is expected to be developed in-house and could involve around 150 staff members. Expected benefits include time savings on staff tasks and an increase in the volume of work completed.

At the same time, the Urssaf National Fund has been developing projects in the fields of automation and AI, specifically voicebots¹¹⁴. By the end of 2025, six voicebots were in operation and three others were under development. Mailbots¹¹⁵ have also been developed to respond to users, enabling the organisation to handle as many enquiries as possible (particularly level 1 queries), route complex enquiries to the most appropriate public sector staff – as quickly as possible, smooth out peaks in demand and extend department operating hours. For instance, between 1 January and 30 September 2025, **25% of enquiries were handled by chatbots and 7% by voicebots outside normal working hours**¹¹⁶.

¹¹¹ Instant written chats between users and staff to provide a personalised response.

¹¹² Urssaf National Fund, 2025, information submitted to the task force.

¹¹³ Urssaf National Fund, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹¹⁴ Digital robots capable of interpreting spoken requests and responding to them vocally.

¹¹⁵ Smart tools that automate the management of incoming user requests to support managers in processing them.

¹¹⁶ Urssaf National Fund, 2025, information submitted to the task force.



However, these tools need to be connected to the Urssaf's information systems to improve the accuracy of their responses, which complicates their roll-out¹¹⁷. By early 2026, **nearly 4,500 Urssaf public sector staff members (representing 20–30% of the total workforce) were affected by the AI tools implemented**¹¹⁸, particularly the *Mon'IA* assistant. Overall, the fund reports that the deployed tools have delivered benefits, including financial gains and time savings on tasks carried out by public sector staff, as well as improvements in the quantity and quality of staff work. However, the Urssaf National Fund states that, although potential cuts in full-time equivalent (FTE) positions appear possible in the long term, these cannot be quantified at present¹¹⁹.

2.2.1.3. Barriers to the roll-out of AI

The Urssaf National Fund states that the main barriers to the implementation of AI are budgetary (lack of financial resources), and also relate to data quality and completeness, infrastructure (lack of access to the cloud, language models, GPUs, etc.) and human resources (shortage of public sector staff and/or the necessary skills, training needs, etc).¹²⁰

It believes that these barriers could be overcome by creating a social security cloud to enable computing power to be pooled or shared, and by increasing financial resources (not provided for in the current objectives and management agreement (COG)) and human resources (specifically for data work).

¹¹⁷ Urssaf National Fund, 2025, interview with the task force.

¹¹⁸ Urssaf National Fund, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹¹⁹ Urssaf National Fund, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹²⁰ Urssaf National Fund, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.



2.2.2. National Family Allowances Fund (CNAF)

2.2.2.1. Strategy and management

The National Family Allowances Fund (CNAF) has adopted a strategy for the roll-out of AI, led by the Evaluation and Strategy Directorate, although its governance is organised around several different stakeholders.

Indeed, while the AI Steering Committee (COPIL) – comprising the management teams of the CNAF and three family allowance funds (CAF) – is responsible for overseeing the roll-out of AI, other bodies facilitate discussion on the subject and the dissemination of information. These bodies include: (i) the CNAF's Management Committee (CODIR); (ii) the college of directors (comprising all CAF directors); and (iii) the network council (comprising one CAF director per region). The AI Strategic Committee (COSTRAT), the CNAF's operational body, is responsible for managing, coordinating and monitoring priority actions in conjunction with the 'GenIA Factory' Project Committee. The latter is responsible for monitoring the implementation of ongoing projects and coordinating project ownership (MOA) and project management (MOE). Finally, an 'ethics committee' brings together external experts and association representatives to examine data usage issues¹²¹. The roll-out of AI at the CNAF is ultimately supported by a team specialising in AI transformation. This team comprises nearly 12 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff members with diverse profiles, including DevOps, MLOps and LLMOps specialists, developers, data scientists, data engineers, transformation experts, product managers/owners, an 'ethics and data' adviser and a project management coordinator¹²².

2.2.2.2. AI use cases and tools

The first AI projects were reported in part to the national fund through research carried out in partnership with the École nationale supérieure de sécurité sociale (EN3S) and a CAF¹²³. Other projects originated from CNAF departments that were most involved in rolling out AI. However, the CNAF states that a mechanism for reporting initiatives from the field is currently being developed¹²⁴.

By early 2026, the CNAF had identified a **total of ten AI use cases**, including six AI tools at the proof-of-concept (POC) stage and one deployed AI tool. The latter is a generative AI tool relating to 'support functions' (human resources, procurement, accounting, etc.). This fund states that the POCs that were discontinued were halted for various reasons, including budgetary considerations (lack of funding or costs deemed too high), data-related issues (data quality, data completeness or unstructured data) and the absence of expected benefits and low adoption rates¹²⁵.

The only **AI use case/tool deployed** by the CNAF at this stage is an **AI assistant for coding tasks** (see Attachment 2, Table 11 below). The fund expects the benefits to relate in particular to enhancing the organisation's appeal. It states that existing feedback does not currently allow for an objective assessment of time savings or improvements in the quality of developers' deliveries.

¹²¹ CNAF, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹²² CNAF, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹²³ EN3S, 2024, "[Usage de l'IA dans la branche famille, cas d'usages, enjeux, opportunités, limites](#)".

¹²⁴ CNAF, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire."

¹²⁵ CNAF, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.



With regard to the **planned AI use cases/tools**, the CNAF highlights two projects:

- ♦ **Generative AI for all** (see Attachment 3, Table 22 below): this will take the form of an 'in-house' generative AI chatbot. This cross-functional tool is intended for use across all functions for day-to-day tasks, such as summarising documents, compiling case summaries, conducting documentary research and formally establishing reports. The aim is to ensure that the tool adheres to the terminology specific to the family benefits division by training the model using institutional documents. This use case is intended for development in-house and will cover all public sector staff in the family benefits division (nearly 35,000 people). However, the project is still in the design stage and has not yet been rolled out on a large scale;
- ♦ **The @doc MS document management tool** (see Attachment 3, Table 23) is expected to enable users to query the '@doc MS' document database via a chatbot. This will allow them to ask function-specific questions in real time and receive a response generated with the information they are looking for, as well as a list of source documents. This general-purpose use case is also expected to be developed in-house and will involve almost 15,000 public sector staff members, representing around 40% of the division's total workforce. Before a widespread roll-out is considered, a testing phase of the service will be conducted with a group of pilot CAFs¹²⁶.

This testing involves local voluntary funds, such as the CAFs in the departments of Yonne and Yvelines for the @doc MS trial and the CAF in the department of Meurthe-et-Moselle for the *Generative AI for all* initiative. In the absence of a generative AI chatbot being deployed nationally at this stage, some CAFs are conducting local testing, sometimes using Copilot (Microsoft) licences, while recognising limitations relating to the sensitivity of the data processed and the possible uses of such a tool. All the local funds questioned by the task force state that they are awaiting secure national solutions.

Currently, **the AI tools being tested are intended exclusively for public sector staff rather than users**. However, the CNAF is also working on other potential AI tools, such as an AI chatbot for the user phone helpline. This could eventually enable personalised responses to be provided to benefit recipients. As potential AI tools could also benefit the field of accounting and financial management, the CNAF is carrying out a needs assessment to identify areas that could be addressed using generative AI¹²⁷.

The CNAF's overarching **plan is to eventually** roll out AI tools **to all 35,000 public sector staff in the family benefits division**, initially through the deployment of a 'general-purpose' generative AI solution, followed by applications across various professional functions (in particular, case workers who come into contact with benefit recipients)¹²⁸.

However, the CNAF has not produced any quantified estimates of the expected benefits of AI deployment. This is because it believes does not yet have sufficient hindsight, given that the main projects are currently in the development phase.

¹²⁶ CNAF, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹²⁷ CNAF, 2026, interview with the task force.

¹²⁸ CNAF, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.



2.2.2.3. *Barriers to the roll-out of AI*

The CNAF states that the main barriers to the roll-out of AI are budget-related (lack of financial resources and costs deemed too high), as well as a lack of clarity regarding the business model and return on investment from deploying AI tools. These barriers also include issues relating to data quality, completeness and unstructured datasets¹²⁹, and human resources (shortage of public sector staff and/or necessary skills and training needs).

The CNAF believes that these barriers could be overcome by pooling infrastructure, such as GPUs, and by strengthening human resources, for example by dedicating public sector staff full time to this area, as well as by seeking external support from functional and technical experts, particularly in terms of project ownership assistance.

2.2.3. National Health Insurance Fund (CNAM)

2.2.3.1. *Strategy and planning*

The National Health Insurance Fund (CNAM) adopted an AI roll-out strategy at the end of 2024, comprising five objectives¹³⁰:

- ◆ to provide a framework for uses by defining the rules and best practices to be applied on a day-to-day basis, ensuring the responsible use of generative AI in health insurance;
- ◆ to develop prioritised use cases based on clear, shared methods and criteria;
- ◆ to roll out a national service offering based on an in-house generative AI platform, enabling the implementation of use cases in a secure environment;
- ◆ to train health insurance staff in generative AI, promote its use and anticipate changes in specific functions, supporting staff through these changes;
- ◆ to facilitate a network in the health insurance sector, promoting the sharing of knowledge on generative AI between the CNAM and network organisations through a community of advisers and fostering the development of new applications.

This strategy is implemented by general management in collaboration with the Deputy Information Systems Directorate, the Strategy, Research and Statistics Directorate, the generative AI task force (MIAGE) and relevant functional departments. The chief data officer role is held by the Strategy, Research and Statistics Directorate, while the chief AI officer reports to general management¹³¹.

In terms of governance, a COSTRAT data meeting is held with general management every two months, in addition to regular progress updates between MIAGE and general management, as well as *ad hoc* committees organised in the functional departments. MIAGE also coordinates the network on generative AI topics (including coordinating AI advisers at funds¹³², and governance with directors of 'sponsor' funds, among other things).¹³³

¹²⁹ For example, the fragmentation of information systems is an obstacle that was cited by the CAF du Nord during its meeting with the task force.

¹³⁰ CNAM, 2025, memorandum on the development of generative artificial intelligence within the health insurance sector (information provided to the task force).

¹³¹ CNAM, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹³² A network of nearly 180 AI coordinators has been established by the national fund and across the network, with coordination provided at national level.

¹³³ CNAM, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.



Overall, the CNAM hopes that the deployment of AI tools will have an impact on all support functions, such as procurement, accounting/finance, IT, legal and human resources, as well as functions such as fraud prevention and relations with policyholders. The CNAM has a team specialising in AI transformation comprising seven full-time equivalent (FTE) staff members with diverse profiles (data scientists, data engineers and product managers/product owners).¹³⁴

2.2.3.2. AI use cases and tools

In its role as the lead organisation for the health insurance network, the CNAM has implemented a structured methodology to forward use case proposals from functional experts at the network's funds. These proposals are evaluated using a 'multi-criteria' approach and prioritised¹³⁵. Despite identifying **a total of 350 potential AI use cases** by early 2026, the CNAM only had one tool at the proof-of-concept (POC) stage with a national scope at the time of the task force (see below).

The CNAM states that, in the past, other projects have been halted due to data-related issues, such as poor quality, incomplete data and unstructured data, and failure to deliver the expected benefits. Regarding certain projects, it was also noted that generative AI provided little added value compared to other solutions, such as data mining and robotic process automation (RPA).

The only **AI use case/tool currently deployed** nationally by the CNAM is '**Camelia**'. This is a 'secure' internal generative AI platform (not connected to the internet and deployed on the health insurance scheme's servers) that is comparable to an assistant such as ChatGPT. It was developed in six months in partnership with private service providers for the large language model (LLM) and the application layer. As the model is general-purpose, it lacks specific expertise in health insurance. To support its use, a 'Camelia library' has been made available to public sector staff to catalogue the prompts and AI assistants they have developed¹³⁶. The platform has been tested in the health insurance network since July 2025 and was made available to several thousand users by the end of the year. It is expected to be accessible to almost 20,000 staff by the end of 2026. A CNAM review at the end of 2025 indicated that initial user feedback was "encouraging in terms of both ease of use and effectiveness". With regard to time savings, 35% of current users estimated that using Camelia **saved them between 15 and 30 minutes a week**¹³⁷.

With regard to **planned AI use cases/tools**, the CNAM believes that generative AI will play a significant role in its new service strategy for policyholders (online, in offices and over the phone). For example, it will support call centre agents by providing documentary resources which can be used via AI and assistance with replying to emails, and it will analyse the reasons for contact. It says that these building blocks are intended to be developed in 2026–2027. By the end of 2025, several use cases were under development in areas such as legal affairs, human resources, daily allowances, disability, customer relations and IT. Each use case targets a sub-process in which AI automates part of the workflow. These use cases are being developed natively within Camelia, through further development or by integrating a market tool¹³⁸. Tools based on data mining or AI are also expected to benefit the monitoring of sick leave and, more broadly, measures to monitor and combat fraud, enabling the processing of large volumes of data¹³⁹. Therefore, the year 2026 should be devoted to identifying use cases where

¹³⁴ CNAM, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹³⁵ CNAM, 2025, information provided to the task force (presentation of the national strategy).

¹³⁶ CNAM, 2025, information provided to the task force (presentation of the generative AI task force and *Camelia*).

¹³⁷ CNAM, 2025, information provided to the task force (memorandum on the development of generative AI within the health insurance sector).

¹³⁸ CNAM, 2025, information provided to the task force (*ibid*).

¹³⁹ Court of Auditors, 2024, [La CNAM : examen de la gouvernance et de certaines fonctions de gestion](#).



opportunities for efficiency drivers, improved service quality and better working conditions can be realised. The CNAM considers the involvement of functional departments in the selection and development of use cases to be essential for ensuring that the use of generative AI is guided by functional needs¹⁴⁰.

The CNAM also draws on **local initiatives led by the primary health insurance funds (CPAM)**. For instance, the CPAM in Meurthe-et-Moselle is testing tools to facilitate meetings and assist with document searches. Providing public sector staff with licences for a commercially available tool has also enabled the development of 36 context-specific assistants, which are now informing the testing of the national AI assistant. Meanwhile, the Bas-Rhin CPAM is testing use cases in auditing, covering issues relating to the recruitment and employment of district nurses, medical checks during sick leave and combatting fraud in medical transport. To carry out this testing, the CPAMs visited by the task force are drawing on internal resources, such as data scientists and developers, as well as certain local start-ups¹⁴¹.

By early 2026, **nearly 2,300 public sector staff members (less than 10% of the total workforce) were affected by the implemented AI tool**. In general, the CNAM states that this roll-out has led to time savings on staff tasks and improved well-being and quality of life at work for staff, although these benefits have not been quantified¹⁴².

At this stage, the CNAM does not have a specific methodology for monitoring the impact of an AI tool once it has been implemented. This phase is scheduled for 2026 and will involve the gradual roll-out of certain use cases. Plans specifically include incorporating user feedback and a performance monitoring dashboard, which will include tracking of the adoption rate and a user satisfaction indicator.

2.2.3.3. Barriers to the roll-out of AI

The National Health Insurance Fund (CNAM) states that the main barriers to the implementation of AI are related to data (quality and/or completeness and unstructured databases) and human resources (a shortage of staff and/or the necessary skills) as well as social acceptability.

While the CNAM does not propose any specific measures to address these issues, it is investing in its human resources and social dialogue to familiarise and train health insurance staff. Work has indeed been carried out to train staff and raise awareness of the potential, limitations and uses of generative AI. This effort is being relayed locally by the fund management teams, some of which have developed their own training tools¹⁴³. A compulsory e-learning module has been introduced to help public sector staff understand the basics of generative AI and support its use. While the module is intended for a total of 55,000 staff members, nearly 50% had been trained by the end of 2025¹⁴⁴. Regulating the use of the technology is also a priority for the CNAM, notably embodied in a charter on the use of generative AI for staff appended to the internal regulations of all organisations in the network¹⁴⁵.

¹⁴⁰ CNAM, 2025, information provided to the task force (memorandum on the development of generative AI within the health insurance sector).

¹⁴¹ Various CPAM, 2026, interviews with the task force.

¹⁴² CNAM, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁴³ For example, the Meurthe-et-Moselle CPAM has developed an "escape game" with the aim of providing training in a fun way (see interview with the task force).

¹⁴⁴ CNAM, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁴⁵ CNAM, 2025, information provided to the task force (memorandum on the development of generative AI within the health insurance sector).



Furthermore, the CNAM states that it intends to collaborate in future with a **view to pooling resources by capitalising on local fund initiatives** to make them available to the entire network. The **aim is also to share these resources with the other branches of the social security system**¹⁴⁶. This is even more desirable given that some CPAMs are already observing a loss of effort between various funds on similar AI projects ¹⁴⁷.

2.2.4. National Old Age Insurance Fund (CNAV)

2.2.4.1. Strategy and management

The National Old Age Insurance Fund (CNAV) has adopted an AI roll-out strategy led by the Digital Directorate, the Information Systems Directorate and the Transformation Directorate. The director of the Deputy Information Systems Directorate and transformation management acts as chief AI officer.

The fund has a seven-strong team of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff members with diverse profiles and specialising in AI transformation. They include DevOps, MLOps and LLMOps experts, as well as developers, data engineers, functional experts, transformation experts, product managers/product owners, agile testers, scrum masters and UX engineers¹⁴⁸.

The CNAV hopes in general that the deployment of AI tools will have an impact across all support functions, such as procurement, accounting/finance, IT, legal and human resources, as well as across functions, including pension advisers, corporate advisory officers and policyholder relationship managers.

2.2.4.2. AI use cases and tools

The CNAV identified a **total of 16 cases of AI use** in early 2026, including five AI tools at the proof-of-concept (POC) stage and two deployed AI tools. The latter two relate to generative AI: one is considered a 'general-purpose' tool, while the other is considered a 'functional' tool¹⁴⁹. The main reason cited for halting projects at the POC stage was limitations related to data quality, completeness and unstructured datasets.

With regard to the **deployed AI use cases/tools**, the CNAV highlights two examples:

- ♦ **Copilot Chat** (see Attachment 2, Table 12 below): this Microsoft-developed tool is a generative AI chatbot designed to address a range of use cases. These include assisting with writing tasks such as drafting articles and emails, summarising texts and documents, producing Teams meeting minutes, carrying out data analysis based on Excel files and creating documents such as PowerPoint presentations and illustrations based on images or photos. This general-purpose use case, which involves the purchase/rental of a market solution, **is expected to eventually cover all pension insurance staff – nearly 14,000 in total. By the end of 2025, nearly 9,000 staff members had already adopted it.** While the precise benefits are unclear, the CNAV claims that this tool has improved staff members' 'well-being' and quality of life at work, enhanced the quality of their work and the service provided to the public, and increased the institution's appeal. Beyond enabling staff to gradually become familiar with generative AI, including policies

¹⁴⁶ CNAM, 2025, information provided to the task force (memorandum on the development of generative AI within the health insurance sector).

¹⁴⁷ Various CPAM, 2026, interviews with the task force.

¹⁴⁸ CNAV, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁴⁹ CNAV, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.



on security and monitoring personal data¹⁵⁰, the CNAV states that the most significant benefits lie in writing assistance, text summarisation and data analysis, with estimated time savings of between 20 and 30% on 'short tasks with low functional value' (such as drafting meeting minutes)¹⁵¹;

- ♦ **Brévo outbound email contacts** (see Attachment 2, Table 13): this tool is based on a generative AI system and is designed to help staff generate text. The tool is based on off-the-shelf solutions and enables the management and routing of email and text message campaigns. It can manage contacts and create campaigns for analysing and improving copy and email subject lines, among other features. The functional use case is expected to affect around 650 staff, given that it had been adopted by around 530 staff by the end of 2025. The tool enables time savings on staff tasks. Staff can also complete more work and improve the quality of their work and the service provided to the public¹⁵².

With regard to **planned AI use cases/tools**, the CNAV draws attention to the '**IApasdequoi**' tool in particular (see Attachment 3, Table 24 below). Currently under development with several local funds involved in the exploratory phase, this generative AI assistant is an 'in-house' tool expected to feature RAG-type functionalities. These will facilitate functional document searches based on existing regulations or the CNAV's internal documentation, and support staff in their responses, particularly regarding pension information for businesses. This will provide companies with answers on regulations¹⁵³. This functional use case is expected to affect nearly 3,000 staff and will be developed in-house. The aim is to reduce the time staff spend on support activities relating to legislative and regulatory queries, as well as improving the quality of service provided to the public by facilitating access to insured persons' rights and combatting non-take-up by making 'on-demand' information more accessible¹⁵⁴. It could also support advisers from the business advisory service (FCE) during company visits and forums, and accelerate functional AI projects by providing a core AI engine to facilitate the launch of future projects¹⁵⁵.

Another proof-of-concept (POC) focusing on the **management of phone calls received by the old-age pension branch** is also underway. This tool is being developed in collaboration with a private service provider and is expected to test around 15 use cases with two pension funds in early 2026. The stated aim is to create an AI solution that can interact with policyholders, identify the reason for contact ('pre-qualifying' calls) and route the call to the appropriate handling channel, such as a call with a human agent, responses from a voice assistant or interactions with an AI chatbot. In addition to improving the quality of service provided to the public¹⁵⁶, such a tool should reduce the time agents spend on certain tasks, with several hundred full-time equivalent (FTE) staff at the CNAV currently dedicated to answering phone calls¹⁵⁷. In the long term, the tool could analyse submitted documents and request missing ones to improve file completeness and the use of entitlements.

Furthermore, testing on assistance for developers was carried out in 2024, focusing particularly on tasks such as code generation and bug fixing. The Copilot solution was rated more highly than other solutions on the market by the developers who took part in the testing.

¹⁵⁰ CNAV, 2023, presentation: "IA générative assurance retraite – Zoom sur l'expérimentation ChatGPT & perspectives" (information provided to the task force).

¹⁵¹ CNAV, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁵² CNAV, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁵³ CNAV, 2025, interview with the task force.

¹⁵⁴ CNAV, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁵⁵ CNAV, 2025, presentation "L'IA à l'assurance retraite" (information provided to the task force).

¹⁵⁶ CNAV, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁵⁷ CNAV, 2025, interview with the task force.



They estimated that they saved between 30 minutes and two hours per week thanks to this AI tool¹⁵⁸.

More broadly, the CNAV intends to continue testing new and more complex Copilot use cases, for instance by creating Copilot virtual agents¹⁵⁹ for analysis and research tasks (including legal research).¹⁶⁰

By early 2026, **almost 9,000 CNAV staff members (around 60–70% of the total workforce) were using the implemented AI tools**¹⁶¹, particularly Copilot Chat. Overall, the fund reports that the deployed tools have delivered the following benefits:

- ◆ improvements in well-being and quality of life at work for staff;
- ◆ improvements in the quality of work carried out by staff;
- ◆ improvements in the quality of service provided to the public;
- ◆ greater appeal in terms of recruitment.

2.2.4.3. Barriers to the roll-out of AI

The National Old Age Insurance Fund (CNAV) states that the main barriers to the implementation of AI are budgetary (lack of financial resources) and also relate to data (data quality and completeness), infrastructure (lack of access to the cloud, language models, GPUs, etc.) and legal frameworks (overly restrictive frameworks and uncertainties surrounding them).¹⁶²

It believes that these barriers could be overcome by adopting the following measures:

- ◆ budgetary constraints: adopting an approach aimed at measuring ‘return on investment’ to assess the expected benefits;
- ◆ data constraints: carrying out preparatory work to identify and improve the quality of data sources (e.g. removing obsolete data);
- ◆ infrastructure barriers: making a service available at public level;
- ◆ legal barriers: establishing a stable legal framework at State level.

2.2.5. National Solidarity Fund for Autonomy (CNSA)

2.2.5.1. Strategy and management

Having taken over the management of the ‘autonomy’ branch of the general social security scheme in 2021, the National Solidarity Fund for Autonomy (CNSA) differs from other social security funds inasmuch as it doesn’t have its own network. In fact, the CNSA **leads and coordinates the work of various local bodies**, such as departmental councils, departmental centres for people with disabilities (MDPH) and regional health agencies (ARS).¹⁶³

¹⁵⁸ CNAV, 2024, evaluation of the pilot scheme “IA assistance au développement” (information provided to the task force).

¹⁵⁹ Staff extend the capabilities of Copilot by acting as specialised AI assistants tailored to specific domains; they apply knowledge and automation to streamline functional processes, improve decision-making and improve efficiency. These staff can retrieve information, summarise data or even perform actions such as sending emails or updating records (Microsoft, 2026, website, [“Agents pour Microsoft 365 Copilot”](#)).

¹⁶⁰ CNAV, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

¹⁶¹ CNAV, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

¹⁶² CNAV, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

¹⁶³ Social security, 2026, website, [“Les branches”](#).



In a report published at the end of 2025¹⁶⁴, the Court of Auditors considers that the CNSA faces numerous challenges in carrying out its duties, both in terms of its information systems – which are particularly vulnerable to security threats – and in terms of its human resources, which are limited and lead to significant reliance on external service providers. The Court also recommends that the CNSA intensify its efforts to monitor and combat fraud. The **development of new information systems** by the CNSA to tackle these challenges, together with its work to improve data reliability, therefore presents an opportunity to **integrate AI 'natively'**¹⁶⁵.

Consequently, **in 2025, the CNSA adopted an AI roadmap for 2025–2026**¹⁶⁶, with the threefold aim of providing older people and people with disabilities with better support, shorter processing times for their applications and improved regional equity. This strategy is based on five strategic objectives:

- ♦ allow staff to save time on time-consuming and repetitive tasks, so that they can provide more personalised support to service users;
- ♦ speed up the processing of service users' requests by automating certain processes;
- ♦ standardise regional practices, particularly in relation to assessment, with the aim of ensuring fairness;
- ♦ simplify procedures and user journeys by improving interfaces, service accessibility and the customisation of digital journeys;
- ♦ strengthen efforts to tackle under-take-up and combat fraud using detection tools.

2.2.5.2. Use cases and AI tools

The launch of its AI strategy was accompanied by an initial review of use cases. These were identified based on needs on the ground, with priority given, where possible, to use cases that could be integrated directly into the development of information systems, and to use cases that could be shared across the entire sector.

Although the AI tools subsequently deployed should be grounded in the five strategic objectives mentioned above, the CNSA has identified **various examples of potential AI tools**.

Firstly, a 'general-purpose' generative AI tool (for drafting reports, producing summaries and assisting staff with drafting documents, among other things) could lead to 'incidental' time savings on certain tasks.

Other AI tools could assist with the analysis of financial data or help to secure the accounts of social and medico-social establishments (ESMS), thereby generating significant productivity gains for regional health agencies (ARS) and local authorities, for example in relation to the allocation of resources to these organisations.

Furthermore, AI tools could help optimise processes relating to accessing rights, at the very least in areas such as assisting users with submitting applications and checking that these are complete, to reduce processing times. Other tools could, through the integration of various databases, help identify cases of non-take-up. Finally, chatbots could facilitate research tasks carried out by MDPH staff, for example regarding regulations relating to disability¹⁶⁷.

¹⁶⁴ Court of Auditors, 2025, [La caisse nationale de solidarité pour l'autonomie : des fragilités préoccupantes, une consolidation nécessaire](#).

¹⁶⁵ CNSA, 2026, interview with the task force.

¹⁶⁶ CNSA, 2025, [L'intelligence artificielle au service de la branche Autonomie – Feuille de route stratégique 2025-2026](#).

¹⁶⁷ CNSA, 2026, interview with the task force.



In order to identify specific use cases, the CNSA issued a call for expressions of interest (AMI) to all MDPHs and local authorities in November 2025¹⁶⁸. As part of this AMI, the MDPHs were required to select one or both of the following use cases, proposing a minimum of one AI system (vendor solution):

- ♦ the implementation of a legal conversational agent (chatbot) capable of answering questions from professionals in natural language;
- ♦ the implementation of an intelligent document management tool to automate the initial stages of processing applications submitted to the MDPHs (splitting PDFs, naming, filing, checking admissibility).

A total of 27 MDPHs had submitted their applications by the closing date of the call for expressions of interest in December 2025. At the end of January 2026, following a selection process, the CNSA, the DINUM, the Directorate-General for Social Cohesion (DGCS) and the Delegation for Digital Health (DNS) selected 11 successful applicants. These MDPHs will receive a grant of €10,000 or €35,000, depending on the specific use case, to cover the costs of trialling, training and customising the solution¹⁶⁹.

Scheduled to be launched in the first quarter of 2026, trials of these solutions are expected to take place during the second quarter; the results should enable the CNSA to assess the advantages and disadvantages of using AI in these areas.

2.2.5.3. Barriers to the roll-out of AI

The barriers identified by the CNSA mainly concern the immaturity of the MDPHs' information systems, which are both dependent on private software providers and have only recently been equipped with national information systems that nevertheless exist side by side with the paper files submitted by beneficiaries. The reluctance of certain user associations also represents an obstacle to the roll-out of AI solutions, as these associations have expressed reservations about the use of AI tools to assess needs and establish support plans for beneficiaries.

Finally, the CNSA considers that by pooling infrastructure (notably cloud services) for the social security system, this would facilitate the roll-out of AI tools, as the costs of these tools cannot be shouldered by this fund alone¹⁷⁰.

¹⁶⁸ CNSA, 2026, website, "[La CNSA lance une expérimentation avec 11 MDPH pour tester des solutions d'intelligence artificielle \(IA\)](#)".

¹⁶⁹ CNSA, 2026, website, "[La CNSA lance une expérimentation avec 11 MDPH pour tester des solutions d'intelligence artificielle \(IA\)](#)".

¹⁷⁰ CNSA, 2026, interview with the task force.



2.2.6. Union of National Social Security Funds (UCANSS)

2.2.6.1. Strategy and management

Although it has not formalised a strategy on AI, UCANSS has drawn up a charter on the use of AI. Furthermore, in line with its **duty to lead and coordinate the national funds** for the various social security branches and schemes, various forums for discussion on the use of AI by social security organisations have been organised since 2025 in different formats (including the ‘learning from all forms of intelligence’ workshops and ‘AI Tuesdays’, among others)¹⁷¹. UCANSS also aims to compile a list of use cases from the various funds with a view to sharing best practice. Furthermore, at the 2026 ‘social security innovation grand prix’, UCANSS will award a special AI prize to recognise ‘innovative and responsible’ use of AI¹⁷².

2.2.6.2. Use cases and AI tools

The use cases identified relate to UCANSS’s duties, namely human resources management, procurement, IT and legal support.

UCANSS reports that it has four AI tools at the POC stage and one AI tool that has been deployed. The latter is a generative AI chatbot that can carry out document research and drafting tasks. This general-purpose tool, intended for UCANSS’s nearly 200 staff members, should enable them to save time and improve the quality of the work they carry out. It should also help to enhance the institution’s appeal¹⁷³.

UCANSS trialled a commercially available legal assistant solution, which enabled users to carry out documentary research, extract information from unstructured text and generate text summaries. The trial was not considered successful, not least because of limited uptake of the proposed tool; in fact, its users did not perceive it as a useful aid to their work and did not adopt it for day-to-day purposes. This example illustrates the importance of involving staff right from the requirements definition stage. As this trial was not continued, the technical solution was refocused on an AI assistant for human resources intended for around ten staff members, which is currently under development¹⁷⁴.

2.2.6.3. Barriers to the roll-out of AI

The main barriers identified by UCANSS are budgetary considerations (lack of resources, costs deemed too high despite sufficient resources), data (quality and/or incompleteness, unstructured databases), information systems (quality of the software suite, obsolete systems) and human resources (shortage of staff and/or the necessary skills, training needs). For example, the team dedicated to AI within UCANSS comprises two full-time equivalents¹⁷⁵.

¹⁷¹ UCANSS, 2026, information provided to the task force.

¹⁷² UCANSS, 2026, website, “[Lancement du Grand Prix de l’Innovation de la Sécurité sociale 2026](#)”.

¹⁷³ UCANSS, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

¹⁷⁴ UCANSS, 2026, information provided to the task force.

¹⁷⁵ UCANSS, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.



3. Overview of the deployment of AI in the healthcare sector

With regard to the use of AI in health, the task force focused on:

- ♦ the regional health agencies (ARS) (see part 3.1 below);
- ♦ health care facilities (see part 3.2).

This section is largely based on a survey carried out by the task force among these stakeholders, focusing on the deployment of AI tools, while excluding clinical uses.

Indeed, **the task force excluded the use of AI technologies in clinical activities from the scope of its investigation**, whether in relation to prevention or treatment, notably because these activities are subject to specific regulations governing both their use and health data. Furthermore, information relating to a person's state of health is classified as sensitive personal data, subject to enhanced protections under European standards (the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the eHealth Regulation¹⁷⁶ and the European AI Regulation, for example) and French legislation (the Public Health Code, in particular)¹⁷⁷. The processing of this data, a fortiori when carried out via AI systems, requires strict safeguards regarding security, confidentiality and compliance with medical confidentiality, meaning that prominence is given to solutions certified as 'SecNumCloud', such as the 'Health Data Hub' health data platform, within the framework of dedicated national strategies¹⁷⁸.

The national strategy 'AI and health data'¹⁷⁹ published in November 2025 identifies AI as a catalyst for transforming and strengthening the health system. It is establishing a new governance framework led by the Delegation for Digital Health (DNS) and the Directorate-General for Healthcare Provision (DGOS) through a committee of experts on the use of AI in healthcare. The committee is tasked with identifying promising use cases to help accelerate their deployment. Other key contributors to these initiatives include the National Agency for Performance Development in Healthcare and Medico-Social Establishments (ANAP), the French National Authority for Health (HAS) and the CNAM.

In addition to mapping the use of these tools in healthcare, research, prevention and medico-social assessment, this strategy notably provides for a **continuously updated mapping of use cases in the administrative areas¹⁸⁰, logistics¹⁸¹ and piloting¹⁸²**. In these latter areas, which are of interest to the task force as they do not fall within the scope of clinical or related activities, a call for expressions of interest issued in June 2025 has enabled the funding of AI projects within hospitals in the field of human resources (rota management, see part 3.2.2 below). Furthermore, the 'procurement and logistics performance 2025-2027' roadmap, jointly led by the DGOS and the ANAP, envisages the launch in 2026 of a call for expressions of interest in stock management¹⁸³.

¹⁷⁶ [Regulation \(EU\) 2025/327](#) of 11 February 2025 on the European Health Data Space (EEDS), which entered into force on 26 March 2025, formalises a European policy for the use and sharing of health data in Europe. Most of its provisions relating to the secondary use of data, however, will come into force on 26 March 2029.

¹⁷⁷ CNIL, 2026, website, "[Santé](#)".

¹⁷⁸ Ministry of Health, 2025, "[Stratégie IA et données de santé](#)", which links the data aspect (quality, sharing, security and compliance, in part 1) with the use of that data by AI systems (governance, including in particular the establishment of a committee of experts dedicated to healthcare applications, use cases, evaluation, regulation and training, in part 2).

¹⁷⁹ Ministry of Health, 2025, "[Stratégie IA et données de santé](#)".

¹⁸⁰ For example, to simplify and optimise processes (scheduling, invoicing, coding support, etc.).

¹⁸¹ For example, to forecast requirements for equipment and medicines to avoid shortages.

¹⁸² For example, to support investment decisions using digital twins.

¹⁸³ Ministry of Health, 2025, "[Stratégie IA et données de santé](#)".



3.1. Regional health agencies (ARS)

3.1.1. Strategy and management

From 2024, the regional health agencies (ARS) have committed to rolling out AI tools as part of a collaborative approach. Since then, they have gradually developed AI strategies, primarily led by their general secretariats in partnership with the teams responsible for information systems and digital transformation.¹⁸⁴ This roll-out is organised around a common framework for ARS: a user charter, training courses, a community of practice (more than one in four staff members are members), and a 'roll-out kit'¹⁸⁵ describing all the strategic and operational stages from initialisation to deployment, integrating the aspect of social dialogue, training and communication.

At national level, coordination is overseen by an AI Steering Committee (COPIL), placed under the auspices of the ARSs' Digital Transformation Committee and the ARSs' College of Directors General, with the objectives of ensuring overall consistency, prioritising projects and coordinating between the ARSs and central government departments¹⁸⁶. At regional level, the ARSs' executive committees (COMEX) approve the internal roll-out phases for their departments and organise their teams' onboarding. The ARSs have appointed AI project managers at regional level and across ARSs; thus, an inter-ARS project manager leads and coordinates joint initiatives and supports the agencies as part of their regional efforts¹⁸⁷.

Following a year spent exploring certain use cases considered to be the most relevant in 2025, **the ARSs have drawn up a roadmap for 2026 to accelerate the roll-out of priority use cases**, remove obstacles to change and improve the quality of the response to needs. The roll-out of AI tools is therefore intended to cover all 8,500 ARS staff members, both in terms of cross-functional applications useful to all staff (such as drafting tools and assistance with formalising meeting minutes, among others) and through functional use cases supporting the ARSs' duties (regional coordination, authorisations and health safety monitoring, for example).¹⁸⁸

3.1.2. Use cases and AI tools

Across all 18 ARSs nationwide, a total of **57 AI use cases were identified in early 2026**, among which 40 AI tools at the POC stage and 17 AI tools that had been deployed. All the deployed tools relate to generative AI (none to agent-based AI), of which two are considered to be general-purpose tools (drafting summaries, reports, etc.), six are 'support function' tools (human resources, procurement, accounting, etc.) and nine are 'functional' tools.

¹⁸⁴ ARS, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁸⁵ ARS, 2026, information provided to the task force.

¹⁸⁶ Le CODIA (Ministerial Steering Committee on Data and AI, see Annex 3), chaired by the Secretary-General for Social Affairs, brings together central government departments and representatives of the ARSs.

¹⁸⁷ ARS, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁸⁸ ARS, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.



On the one hand, with regard to the **use cases/AI tools deployed**, the ARSs highlight three examples:

- ♦ **the analysis of inspection reports relating to residential care homes for the elderly (EHPADs)** (see Attachment 2 below, Table 14), through the automation of report reading, the identification of key items and departures from norms, enabling the provision of data visualisation tools to quickly identify high-risk situations. This functional use case, deemed a priority to strengthen the oversight of EHPADs following the 2022 scandal surrounding the management of the private group ‘Orpéa’¹⁸⁹, is a project led by the Digital Directorate (DNUM) of the General Secretariat for Social Affairs, aimed at the regional health agencies (ARS), and could affect 700 staff members (nearly 8% of the total ARS workforce). It is expected to lead to time savings on tasks performed by staff, improvements in the quality of their work and the service provided to the public, as well as improvements in decision-making by management. Indeed, the data currently contained in these inspection reports has still not been used due to its format, whereas analysis should make it possible to identify issues and draw up action plans in collaboration with those working on the ground¹⁹⁰;
- ♦ **a chatbot on territorial policies** (see Attachment 2, Table 15): this tool is fed with department-specific schemes, contracts and data, and configured to provide well-sourced educational responses tailored to local circumstances. This functional use case is being developed in-house rather than leased or purchased from a market player, and could eventually involve 2,000 staff members (nearly 25% of the total ARS workforce), despite having been adopted by only around 50 staff members by the end of 2025. According to the ARSs, this AI tool should ultimately lead to time savings on the tasks carried out by staff, improvements in the quality of their work and the service provided to the public, as well as benefits in terms of analytical tasks. Indeed, it aims to (i) facilitate understanding of a complex ecosystem, (ii) ensure the relevance of actions and messages in relation to local partnerships and dynamics, (iii) enable impacts to be anticipated by taking into account specific regional features (new regulations, implementation of initiatives, etc.) and (iv) propose actions and measures that align with local challenges¹⁹¹;
- ♦ **assistance in the analysis and response to complaints and reports** (see Attachment 2, Table 16). This functional use case is being developed in-house and could affect 400 staff members (nearly 5% of the total ARS workforce), despite having been adopted by only around 20 staff members by the end of 2025. According to the ARSs, it should ultimately lead to time savings on the tasks carried out by staff, improvements in ‘well-being’ and quality of life at work for staff, as well as improvements in the quality of the work carried out by staff and the service provided to the public. Indeed, it aims to (i) reduce processing times, (ii) ensure the relevance and quality of responses in accordance with regulations, and (iii) ensure a consistent writing style¹⁹².

¹⁸⁹ Government, 2025, website, “[Une double enquête sur les pratiques du groupe Orpéa](#)”.

¹⁹⁰ ARS, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

¹⁹¹ ARS, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.

¹⁹² ARS, 2026, responses to the task force’s questionnaire.



On the other hand, with regard to the **planned AI use cases/tools**, the ARSs highlight three other examples:

- ♦ **support for authorisation campaigns** (see Attachment 3 below, Table 25), where an AI tool extracts from files the criteria and indicators required to analyse applications. This functional use case would be developed in-house and could affect 400 staff members (nearly 5% of the total ARS workforce). It is expected to enable time savings on tasks carried out by staff, improvements in 'well-being' and quality of life at work for staff, and an improvement in the quality of the work they carry out. By saving time on low-value-added tasks, this tool should enable technical expertise to be focused on specific needs and relevance to the regions¹⁹³;
- ♦ **improving the pre-selection of social and medico-social establishments (ESMS) or services** (see Table 26): with the help of AI tools, the aim would be to determine the risk of malpractice in social care homes (with a focus on cases of abuse), so as to better target the homes to be inspected. The use of AI tools should enable the collection and analysis of multiple types of data (structured data, textual data), strong indicators (user complaints, reports of serious adverse events, etc.) and weak indicators (for example, trends in financial and HR data). This functional use case should be implemented by the DNUM of the social affairs ministries for the ARSs, and could involve 700 staff members (nearly 8% of the total ARS workforce). It should lead to improvements in the quality of work carried out by staff and the service provided to the public, as well as improvements in decision-making by management and in analytical tasks. The ultimate aim would be to improve the targeting of establishments to be included in the inspection and monitoring programme, thereby reducing the number of unscheduled inspections¹⁹⁴;
- ♦ **assistance in carrying out the financial analysis of the ESMS** (see Table 27): various AI tools should help to streamline the work of the ARSs in the health and medico-social sectors, through the automated drafting of letters and analysis reports, data analysis and the identification of potential areas for action. This functional use case should also form part of the DNUM initiative by the social affairs ministries aimed at the ARSs, and could involve 800 staff members (nearly 10% of the total ARS workforce). It should lead to time savings on tasks carried out by staff, improvements in both the quantity and quality of their work, and enhanced decision-making by senior management¹⁹⁵.

At the beginning of 2026, **nearly 3,000 agents (i.e. nearly 35% of the total ARS workforce) are affected by the AI tools put in place** according to the ARSs. Overall, these organisations report that the tools deployed have led to various benefits, including time savings on tasks carried out by staff¹⁹⁶, improvements in the quality of staff work¹⁹⁷, improvements in the quality of service provided to the public and greater appeal in terms of recruitment¹⁹⁸.

¹⁹³ ARS, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁹⁴ ARS, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁹⁵ ARS, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.

¹⁹⁶ For example: support with drafting job descriptions, saving 45 minutes per application; automatic meeting minutes, saving 30 minutes per report; support with analysing and responding to reports and complaints, saving 15 minutes per case, while the ARSs receive tens of thousands of cases each year.


¹⁹⁷ For example, the chatbot for regional policies facilitates the handover of positions and minimises risks in relation to partners; it provides support for authorisation campaigns; and it automates a large proportion of the time-consuming, non-value-adding tasks carried out by specialist staff (medical/paramedical roles, etc.).

¹⁹⁸ ARS, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.



As regards time savings, a survey carried out in October 2025 among ARS staff clearly shows that time savings increase as users' familiarity with AI grows (see Figure 2 below). Thus, for one in four staff members who have been using AI for more than nine months, the time saved through these tools amounts to more than five hours of work per week. While nearly 56% of staff who have been using AI for more than nine months report saving at least one hour per week, only 31% of those who have been using it for less than three months report saving at least one hour of work per week.

Figure 2: Weekly time savings reported by staff through the use of AI tools, by maturity profile



Source: ARS, 2026, data provided to the task force. Note: Responses from ARS staff to the question "How much time do you estimate you save on average each week?", as part of the interim results of the second survey on the use of AI in ARS (October 2025).

While these findings relate to AI tools for everyday uses (such as searches and document summarisation, among others), the inter-ARS coordination body indicates that use cases involving functional processes could save several days' work¹⁹⁹.

3.1.3. Barriers to the roll-out of AI

The ARSs state, however, that the main barriers to the roll-out of AI relate to data (data quality and/or incompleteness, unstructured datasets), a lack of technical support for development, roll-out and scaling up, and social acceptability (reluctance on the part of staff and users).

They believe that these obstacles could be overcome by fostering a climate of trust and accountability (through transparency, demystification and the right to make mistakes, among other measures), by continuing to support staff in understanding and utilising the potential of AI tools for their work, and by positioning management as key drivers of AI's potential in support of organisational objectives. Thus, **the ARSs emphasise the need to invest in the human aspect**, which encompasses support and training for staff, and commitment from senior management, **to ensure the successful roll-out of these tools**. Training from and adoption by managers are also highlighted as essential to the success of such projects²⁰⁰.

¹⁹⁹ For example, in Bourgogne-Franche-Comté, an AI tool enabled the radiology authorisation process to be completed in two days rather than a month.

²⁰⁰ ARS, 2026, responses to the task force's questionnaire.



3.2. Healthcare facilities

This section is based in particular on a **survey carried out by the task force**, relayed by (i) the French Hospital Federation (FHF) to the 'support' establishments within all 135 regional hospital clusters (GHT)²⁰¹ and by (ii) Federation of Private Solidarity Healthcare and Social Care Institutions (FEHAP) among some of its members.

A total of **86 establishments completed the questionnaire**, with the following breakdown:

- ♦ 71 public establishments, including 21 university hospitals (CHU);
- ♦ 15 private non-profit institutions.

Detailed responses are given at the end of this annex (see Attachment 1 below).

Some use cases reported by the institutions concern the use of AI tools for clinical activities; in accordance with its scope, which excludes the analysis of such uses (see above, part 3), the task force has excluded these from part 3.2.2 below, while being unable to isolate them within parts 3.2.1 and 3.2.3.

3.2.1. Strategy and management

Internal governance and management of the roll-out of AI tools vary across healthcare organisations. Indeed, among all respondents, 44% of healthcare organisations have adopted a charter governing the use of AI tools, 42% have an AI strategy and 38% have a data management strategy; however, nearly 21% of responding organisations have not formalised any of these elements²⁰².

While the private, non-profit institutions that responded appear to have formalised their approach to a greater extent (with 63% having a charter, 44% an AI strategy and 50% a data management strategy) than public institutions, **the university hospitals that responded appear to have a higher level of readiness**, with 62% having a charter, 57% an AI strategy and 67% a data management strategy. **Therefore, the size of the institutions appears to influence the structure of their AI deployment approach**²⁰³.

AI strategies are managed by the general management in 47% of the establishments, with certain university hospitals and large healthcare institutions being a particular case, as their research and innovation departments are also involved. Furthermore, **some institutions explicitly identify staff responsible for AI within their organisational charts**, such as the Hospices Civils de Lyon (Lyon University Hospital) with a Department for Data Use and AI (DDIA), the Amiens-Picardie University Hospital with a Department of Research, Innovation, Health Data and AI, the Bordeaux University Hospital with a Directorate for Development, External Relations and AI Strategy, the Grenoble Alpes University Hospital with a Directorate for Health Data and AI, and the Barthélemy Durand Public Health Establishment with a Directorate for Research, Innovation and AI. Furthermore, **ad hoc steering bodies have been set up**, for example at Cahors hospital centre (CH), which has established a dedicated AI committee; at the Haute-Saône regional hospital cluster (GHT), which has an AI steering committee; the Saint-Étienne University Hospital (CHU), which has a dedicated steering committee linked to its ethics committee, and the Angers University Hospital Center (CHU), which has set up an AI working group²⁰⁴.

²⁰¹ FHF, 2025, website, "[GHT : cartographie de l'offre hospitalière publique](#)".

²⁰² Healthcare institutions, 2026, responses provided to the task force.

²⁰³ Healthcare institutions, 2026, responses provided to the task force.

²⁰⁴ Healthcare institutions, 2026, responses provided to the task force.




3.2.2. Use cases and AI tools

Institutions appear to be channelling their efforts into a limited number of AI tools:

- ♦ 72 respondents report a total of 237 AI tools in 'POC', an average of 3.3 per institution;
- ♦ 70 respondents reported a total of 198 AI tools deployed, an average of 2.8 per institution.

Nearly 52% of institutions prioritise purchasing AI solutions available on the market, or a combination of market solution purchases and in-house developments (38% of respondents). Only one institution indicated that it had a strategy consisting mainly of developing its AI tools in-house (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: “Is your strategy mainly to develop these tools in-house or to buy existing solutions on the market?”



Source: Responses of health institutions to the task force's questionnaire (71 responses to the question). Note: () The 'mix of both' category refers to a combination of market acquisitions and in-house developments.*

The **prioritisation of use cases by institutions** seems to be based on five main criteria:


- ♦ the expected productivity gains (in terms of time, staff, increase in activity, etc.) (selected by 75 respondents);
- ♦ economic and financial feasibility (65 respondents);
- ♦ improvements in the quality of the service provided to users (53 respondents);
- ♦ improvements in staff/partner satisfaction (45 respondents);
- ♦ technical feasibility (44 respondents).

The **pursuit of productivity gains is therefore the top priority**, against a backdrop of severe financial strain on healthcare organisations. **The functional categories where organisations expect the greatest impact are professional functions** (67 respondents). As regards support functions, the expected impacts relate in particular to human resources (48 respondents), IT (30 respondents) and accounting and finance (26 respondents). Functions relating to procurement and legal affairs were each selected by 17 respondents.



Based on self-reports, initial feedback from healthcare organisations confirms that the use of AI solutions has resulted in gains, particularly in terms of time savings (46 organisations). Respondents also report having achieved financial gains, increases in the volume of work carried out by staff, and improvements in quality of life at work for staff, among other benefits (see Figure 4 below).

Figure 4: “Have these tools allowed you to achieve productivity gains (four choices maximum)?”



Source: Responses of health establishments to the task force’s questionnaire.

As for the AI tools deployed or planned by the institutions²⁰⁵, they can be grouped into various categories:

- ♦ **‘general-purpose’ AI assistants**, which are useful for a range of everyday tasks, particularly in administrative departments (such as drafting meeting minutes, producing summaries, assisting with document drafting and facilitating document searches, among other things): nearly 30 institutions have begun to roll these out or are planning to do so. Speech recognition and transcription are among the features considered most promising by hospital staff. These tools could also make it easier for medical and nursing teams to draft reports and letters, and may even enable them to complete medical records directly;
- ♦ **relationship with users**: four healthcare institutions have identified projects to facilitate and improve patient relations, ranging from an assistant to help draft responses to patients’ queries (an AI tool deployed at the Paris Saint-Joseph and Marie-Lannelongue hospitals), analysing responses to patient satisfaction questionnaires and a chatbot-style conversational agent to answer patients’ questions (an AI tool deployed at the Hôpital Européen in Marseille for the analysis, with the chatbot due to be rolled out), or an AI-assisted telephone switchboard project (deployed within the Diaconesses Croix Saint-Simon hospital group in Paris);
- ♦ **billing for services**: support for coding and its optimisation is a use case that has been implemented or is envisaged by various organisations, which expect it to boost their revenue. Tools utilising RPA techniques have already been deployed in this area, but advances in AI-related technologies are opening up new prospects for medical information departments (DIM);

²⁰⁵ Healthcare institutions, 2026, responses provided to the task force.

- ♦ **optimisation of resources:** in mid-2025, the Ministry of Health and the ANAP issued two calls for expressions of interest²⁰⁶, accompanied by €4 million in funding, to encourage healthcare and social care organisations to test AI solutions in two key areas central to the management of these organisations: rota management and forecasting patient flows in A&E departments²⁰⁷ (see above):
 - improved rota management through automated and adaptive planning: the tool takes into account organisational constraints, work cycles and staff preferences, with the threefold aim of enhancing quality of life and working conditions, ensuring the stability of shift schedules and improving organisational efficiency;
 - optimising staffing levels by forecasting patient flows: this use case aims to forecast patient flows through A&E to adjust staffing levels accordingly, predict waiting times in A&E, anticipate the need for hospital beds, and optimise rota management within the technical departments;
- ♦ **IT management:** a number of use cases have been identified in this field, including tasks relating to the monitoring and management of network infrastructure (for example, within the Deux-Sèvres Hospital Group), IT programming (Lille University Hospital), cybersecurity to improve risk monitoring coverage and disaster recovery capacity (Poitiers University Hospital), or crisis management in the event of an IT failure using a business continuity tool via AI (Côte d'Opale hospital group²⁰⁸);
- ♦ **public procurement and legal assistants:** two establishments (Périgueux Hospital and Le Mans Hospital) have deployed a tool to help with drafting specifications and the analysis of tenders. Finally, the Diaconesses Croix Saint-Simon hospital group uses a legal assistant solution.

3.2.3. Barriers to the roll-out of AI

The three main obstacles highlighted by healthcare institutions²⁰⁹ are:

- ♦ **budgetary constraints** (lack of financial resources, cost considered too high despite sufficient means, among others) (obstacle reported by 61 establishments);
- ♦ **human resources** (lack of staff and/or necessary expertise in the area, training needs, among others) (46 establishments);
- ♦ **lack of clarity on the business model and/or return on investment** of AI products (29 institutions).

²⁰⁶ ANAP, 2026, website, "[Intelligence artificielle aux urgences et pour les plannings : 2 appels à manifestations d'intérêt pour mesurer et soutenir son déploiement](#)".

²⁰⁷ The call for expressions of interest in emergency services also covers the automatic transcription of calls to the emergency medical services (SAMU), with the aim of improving the quality and traceability of records and simplifying coordination between professionals.

²⁰⁸ This regional hospital cluster (GHT) has rolled out, on a trial basis at this stage, an AI tool for business continuity. This tool acts as a dynamic 'digital twin' of hospital business continuity, incorporating impact assessments on operations and enabling business continuity plans (BCPs) to be recalculated automatically. Using AI, the tool automates the analysis of critical dependencies, prioritises essential activities and directly assists crisis management teams in their decision-making. It enables users to query data using natural language, simulate crisis scenarios and generate BCPs tailored to different timescales, in line with the actual capabilities of healthcare facilities. This tool aims to strengthen the resilience of healthcare organisations when faced with cyber crises, major IT system failures and situations of degraded operational capacity.

²⁰⁹ Healthcare institutions, 2026, responses provided to the task force.



As far as **budgetary issues** are concerned, many institutions are calling for more funding programmes and calls for proposals. While budgetary resources to facilitate the launch of projects enjoy widespread backing, institutions emphasise the need for sustainable funding to cover operating costs and infrastructure. Indeed, for some institutions, the financial barrier lies in high operating costs – which are specific to AI tools compared with other digital projects – while solutions have enjoyed dedicated support and funding in recent years. The deterioration in the financial circumstances of institutions is limiting their operating expenditure, while the business model of certain AI solutions, which are charged on a per-inference basis, makes it difficult to predict the costs associated with these solutions. **The pooling of technical resources at national or local level across several institutions is put forward as a potential lever to be utilised²¹⁰.**

In terms of **human resources**, the pooling of resources is also mentioned, as is making certain roles more appealing. Indeed, with regard to human resources, **nearly 70% of institutions report that they do not have specialist AI staff.** Among the 20 institutions that report having such staff, the number ranges from 0.1 FTEs to 3 FTEs,²¹¹ demonstrating the low number of staff that can be mobilised by the establishments²¹². These resources are also **rarely made available to the GHT** by the support establishments²¹³.

Finally, **health institutions indicate that they are waiting for a clarified national strategy from the State**, with guidance on the priority use cases to be developed, and which prioritises the deployment of sovereign solutions. Some of these organisations have noted a lack of consistency in the recommendations issued by various government departments and public sector bodies, due to the proliferation of guides, white papers and ‘strategic’ documents on AI in healthcare²¹⁴.

²¹⁰ Healthcare institutions, 2026, responses provided to the task force.

²¹¹ Except for the Adolphe de Rothschild Foundation Hospital (Paris) – the only institution with more than 3 FTE staff specialising in AI, which reports having 10 FTE staff.

²¹² Healthcare institutions, 2026, responses provided to the task force.

²¹³ Of the 54 public and private non-profit healthcare establishments reporting that they have specialist IT resources, only 19 of them pool these resources at the GHT level (see healthcare institutions, 2026, responses provided to the task force).

²¹⁴ Healthcare institutions, 2026, responses provided to the task force.



4. Challenges of deploying AI in the health and social sphere

4.1. Strengthening actions to combat non-take-up and the personalisation of health and social policies

In France, tackling the under-utilisation of social entitlements remains a policy objective, and one that can justify piloting AI-based solutions to reach those groups furthest removed from social protection schemes or to target communication or prevention campaigns.

To date, AI tools still appear to be under-utilised for this purpose within the health and social care spheres. In the social care sector, regarding prevention, the CNAM is beginning to develop tools to target information and awareness-raising campaigns, as highlighted by the Meurthe-et-Moselle CPAM during an interview with the task force. The strategy recently unveiled by the CNSA envisages, in this regard, using AI as a means of improving access to benefits and services, through various AI solutions designed to identify areas with gaps in service coverage, to verify the completeness of claims files, and to assist in assessing beneficiaries' needs (see above). In the health sector, the regional diagnostic tool being trialled by the ARSs also illustrates this potential for adapting the delivery of public services. There are numerous prospects for such applications across all stakeholders, with a view to enhancing the personalisation of support and tailoring public policies to specific regions in particular.

One of the challenges in providing more proactive support to service users and beneficiaries is breaking down data silos. Indeed, certain initiatives aimed at tackling the poor take-up of entitlements and personalising support could benefit further from cross-referencing data from systems that are currently fragmented (social security bodies, tax authorities, employment services and local authorities). European examples, such as in Catalonia²¹⁵, show that the secure linking of administrative databases enables eligible groups to be identified more precisely and improves the take-up rate of benefits and services. Beyond improving targeting, the reuse of data across government departments could promote better coordination of interventions and reduce administrative duplication. However, this requires changes to the French legal framework, which the Council of State²¹⁶ recommends be made more flexible in this regard, while complying with constitutional requirements. It also requires significant investment to ensure the security of the information systems concerned and to enable their interoperability in accordance with their intended purposes. Government bodies such as the Directorate-General for Public Finances (DGFIP) and Urssaf have therefore commenced work to facilitate the secure exchange of data with other public bodies.

²¹⁵ OECD, 2025, [Harnessing Artificial Intelligence in Social Security](#).

²¹⁶ Council of State, 2022, [Intelligence artificielle et action publique : construire la confiance, servir la performance](#), report adopted at the plenary general meeting: "Serious consideration should be given to relaxing the legal framework governing the sharing of data within the public sector, given that administrations do not presently have any more rights than citizens, unless specific provisions apply. Furthermore, the constraints imposed by the GDPR on the use of personal data for the design of AI systems remain unclear and are often exaggerated, while the Regulation offers considerable flexibility, including for processing for purposes other than those for which the data was originally collected", page 13; see also page 172.

For its part, DINUM set up a funding scheme in 2025 open to government departments and certain operators to finance projects "related to open data or data circulation"; these projects could, among other things, involve data sharing between government departments via API (see DINUM, 2026, website, ["Financer l'exploitation et la valorisation des données"](#)).



The digitisation of procedures, which has been widely rolled out by social security bodies and France Travail, helps to organise vast amounts of data in a structured way and to utilise it for management purposes or to provide personalised support to the public. AI tools, particularly when they utilise machine learning techniques or generative approaches, are capable of harnessing these vast amounts of data. They can help to proactively target groups who are not making use of services, optimise internal processes (such as audits) and personalise user journeys, thereby ultimately improving the quality of service provided to users.

4.2. Increasing pooling to overcome resource-related barriers

Feedback from public administrations and organisations in the social and healthcare sectors highlights numerous key barriers to a more ambitious roll-out of AI tools. These include budgetary constraints, infrastructural limitations and shortcomings in human resources. In addition, healthcare organisations face a lack of strategy and support for the roll-out of AI tools.

These barriers, which often occur in combination, call for the implementation of a coordinated or even collaborative approach among stakeholders:

- ♦ with regard to infrastructure, for example, social security funds suggest that the introduction of a 'sovereign' cloud service across the social security sector could enable computing power – particularly GPU capacity – to be shared among stakeholders, while also helping to streamline investment²¹⁷;
- ♦ initiatives to pool resources could also be developed in human resources, particularly with regard to the development of shared use cases among stakeholders. For example, teams specialising in the deployment of AI within social security funds comprise between 7 and 20 FTEs²¹⁸, and are therefore limited in the expertise that can be mobilised.

The social and healthcare sector is characterised by a network-based structure – whether it be social security bodies, France Travail, ARSs or healthcare establishments – which can facilitate this pooling of resources. This structure requires specific governance and management procedures at a time when initiatives are in abundance, both to prevent the wastage of resources and to safeguard users against any breach of equality in access to public services²¹⁹. The collaborative approach led by the ARSs regarding the roll-out of AI is therefore worth highlighting. In this connection, the identification of thematic functional expertise made available to the collective helps to empower local teams and strengthen the sense of belonging to the network, while distributing the workload efforts²²⁰.

²¹⁷ The 2023–2027 strategic plan for social security information systems states, in its fifth priority area, that it aims to modernise and enhance the resilience of technological capabilities through the development of a shared social security cloud.

²¹⁸ Responses from the social security funds to the task force's questionnaire, 2026.

²¹⁹ By way of illustration, the harmonisation of regional practices is one of the cornerstones of the CNSA's AI strategy (see CNSA, "L'intelligence artificielle au service de la branche autonomie - Feuille de route stratégique 2025-2026").

²²⁰ The ARS in Brittany is responsible for the call centre, the ARS in Bourgogne-Franche-Comté is responsible for pharmacy and public health, and the ARS in Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes deals with legal issues and serious adverse events.



In the social sector, recognising what is at stake in this process of rationalisation, the Social Security Directorate (DSS) has begun exploring the pooling of use cases, complementing work already underway on the pooling of infrastructure – a move made all the more necessary by the fact that social security funds are not included in the projects launched within the central government sector (for example, the pilot of an ‘AI Assistant’ for inter-ministerial use by the DINUM, see Annex 3).²²¹ This approach to pooling resources does, however, have its limitations, given the significant resources and expertise available within certain social security funds and the varying levels of readiness among organisations. Furthermore, at this stage, the review has found that UCANSS is not fully established as a driving force and unifying body for the initiatives deployed by the national social security funds.

In the healthcare sector, the task force has observed a proliferation of unstructured initiatives across healthcare institutions, with a low level of coordination between projects both at national level and within the GHT²²². The GHT could, however, provide a suitable framework for the roll-out of these projects, consistent with shared medical initiatives, regional information system master plans and pooled procurement processes. As such, the FHF positions the GHTs as ‘catalysts’ for a regional integrated approach that ensures regional equity, by building on existing regional governance through the relevant bodies, centralised procurement and the management of a convergent information system²²³.

Faced with the wide variety of practices across institutions and given the scale of the ethical, legal, financial and organisational challenges arising from AI, various organisations are seeking to provide a framework for its roll-out. For example, FEHAP has set up an ‘AI Academy’ designed to train teams on the technology, identify relevant use cases, provide guidance on best practice and support institutions with their projects. For its part, the FHF made AI the theme of its summer conference in September 2025, alongside the publication of a white paper²²⁴. Among the priorities identified are optimising coding, automating human resource allocation and using AI in administrative tasks. For its part, the UniHA group²²⁵ provides a range of services for its members, designed to support them in their AI deployment efforts, from assessing the organisation’s readiness and identifying priority use cases, to selecting AI solutions listed in the catalogue, right through to providing support during deployment and sharing experiences.

²²¹ This fragmentation of investments had, in fact, been highlighted by the OECD in its report “*Harnessing Artificial Intelligence in Social Security*”, page 32.

²²² The task force was made aware of just one example of shared governance by the Bretagne Atlantique hospital centre, which stated that it had set up a regional AI steering committee.

²²³ FHF, 2025, “[L’IA en santé : qui est le maître ? Ambitions et perspectives](#)”.

²²⁴ FHF, 2025, “[L’IA en santé : qui est le maître ? Ambitions et perspectives](#)”.

²²⁵ UniHA is a central purchasing organisation with 1,550 member hospitals.



ANNEX 2

Overview of the deployment of AI in foreign public administrations



CONTENTS

1. DESPITE OPERATING IN A RANGE OF DIFFERENT CONTEXTS, FOREIGN ADMINISTRATIONS ARE DEPLOYING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES	3
1.1. The majority of the countries surveyed have recently adopted or updated AI strategies to respond to the emergence of generative AI.....	3
1.2. National strategies are moving towards the twin objective of administrative efficiency and improving the quality of public services	Error! Bookmark not defined.
1.3. These strategies have limitations in terms of their scope and expected productivity objectives.....	6
1.4. Foreign countries have adopted contrasting legal models to regulate AI in the public sector, oscillating between binding legislative and regulatory frameworks and flexible mechanisms.....	7
1.5. The most advanced players in the deployment of AI tools in the public sector combine centralised and dedicated management structures.....	8
2. THE DEPLOYMENTS OF AI TOOLS IN FOREIGN ADMINISTRATIONS ARE MAINLY FOR INTERNAL USES, WITH POTENTIAL GAINS, BUT THESE ARE VARIED AND DIFFICULT TO MEASURE	10
2.1. The international comparison highlights a gradual and uneven development of AI tools within public administrations, primarily focused on internal use	10
2.2. The use cases with the most productivity gains declared at this stage relate to support for document production, the processing of large volumes of data and the targeting of checks	12
2.3. The measurement of AI-related productivity gains in foreign public administrations remains fragmented and poorly established.....	14
2.4. International feedback shows AI related productivity gains that can be significant but differ significantly, often limited to targeted use cases and unevenly documented.....	16
2.5. AI ROI measures in administrations remain largely focused on direct operational gains, without integrating indirect costs and external factors.....	17
3. WHILE THE ROLL-OUT OF AI TOOLS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING ABOUT A STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES, IT FACES MANY CONSTRAINTS AND REQUIRES TRAINING INITIATIVES AS WELL AS POLITICAL AND MANAGERIAL SUPPORT	19
3.1. The development of skills among civil servants abroad is based on a common foundation of training and networks of enthusiasts and experts in AI technologies, backed by strong managerial leadership	19
3.2. AI-related change management is based on explicit political support, the use of real-world use cases and the promotion of staff initiatives	20
3.3. National strategies combine general training programmes for staff with targeted specialisation or retraining schemes	21



3.4. The deployment of AI projects in public administrations is hampered by technical, human, legal and sovereignty constraints and issues	22
3.5. The integration of AI tools into public administrations acts as a driver in the structural reform of organisations and processes	23
4. FOREIGN ADMINISTRATIONS COMBINE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, THE USE OF COMMERCIAL SOLUTIONS AND VARIOUS PARTNERSHIPS, WHILE ENSURING CONTROL OF INFRASTRUCTURES AND THE USE OF DATA	24
4.1. Administrations are favouring hybrid models that combine the in-house development of AI tools with the procurement of commercial solutions, while seeking to strengthen their technological sovereignty	24
4.2. Administrations are gradually adopting centralised data governance and security mechanisms to regulate the use of AI.....	26
4.3. Ensuring their digital sovereignty, public administrations are emphasising controlling infrastructures, data and uses, particularly for sensitive uses.....	27
4.4. Partnerships between public administrations and the private sector can bring together technological innovation and risk management in the deployment of AI solutions.....	29



With the assistance of the Directorate General of the Treasury (DG Trésor), the task force circulated a questionnaire on the deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) in public administrations abroad (see Box 1 below) to various regional economic services (SER) and economic services (SE), with a view to assessing the current situation in 13 countries:

- ♦ in Africa: Rwanda;
- ♦ in North America: Canada, United States;
- ♦ in Asia: South Korea, India, Japan, Singapore;
- ♦ in Europe: Germany, Estonia, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom.

The economic services sent their responses to the task force between December 2025 and January 2026. **The task force would like to thank all the services and staff involved who contributed to this work.**

These elements have been summarised in parts 1 to 4 below. In addition, the following are listed at the end of this Annex:

- ♦ the specifications sent by the task force to the DG Trésor (Attachment 1);
- ♦ all the replies sent by the economic services (Attachment 2).



Box 1: Questions asked by the task force to the economic services on the deployment of AI in the public administrations of their countries of operation

Q1 – AI strategy / vision and management

- What is your national strategy for developing and deploying AI tools in public administration (timeline, scope of the institutions involved, progress to date)? To what extent does this strategy cover generative and/or agent-based AI?
- What are the priorities of this strategy and how is it structured (priority sectors, administrative duties, regions) and what is the scope of the policy (legislation, best practice, possible pilot schemes and under what conditions, ongoing evaluation before moving on to the next stage)? What were the criteria used to prioritise sectors?
- Have any quantified ‘productivity gains’ targets been set? If so, what are they, and what is the timeframe for achieving them? How were these targets defined (reference to international targets, prioritisation method used, other factors, etc.)?
- How is the public governance of AI deployment organised (central management, digital agencies, ministries, public operators)?

Q2 – Use cases and measured gains

- What is the maturity level of the use cases: POC, pilot or roll-out? Have you compared these use cases with those identified in the private sector?
- Which use cases work best today to achieve productivity gains within your public administrations (automation, drafting, processing, monitoring, customer service, internal support, etc.)?
- What methods do you use to measure productivity gains (time saved, reduced stock levels, lead times, quality, staff/user satisfaction)? Are these in-house methods – i.e. developed by your organisation – or are they based on private-sector practices or academic research? Which ones?
- Can you share some numerical examples (gain in % or hours, cost, estimated or measured ROI)?
- Are these ROI assessments (or similar) gross figures, or do they take into account the losses/adverse effects associated with the introduction of generative AI (environmental costs, AI slop, transition and transformation costs, etc.)?

Q3 – Organisation, skills, change management

- How have you prepared/are you preparing staff for the integration of AI tools into their work (AI training to develop skills, specific programmes)?
- Which change management levers are the most effective (internal communication, functional support, leadership, incentives, etc.)?
- What policies or initiatives relating to re-skilling (career retraining/learning new skills) or up-skilling (enhancing skills) have you adopted in terms of staff training?
- What obstacles have you encountered (resistance from staff or other stakeholders, regulations, IT procurement, security, ethics, etc.) and how did you overcome them? In particular, were there any difficulties related to scaling up?
- What impact have these projects had in terms of reorganisation (impact on staff numbers and functions), data management workflows, architecture, processes or infrastructure resulting from AI? What compliance rules apply? Are biases being addressed, and if so, how?

Q4 – Tools infrastructures and partnerships

- Are your solutions developed in-house, acquired from market suppliers, or hybrid?
- How do you organise data access, security and computing power (cloud, generative AI, HPC, industrial partnerships)?
- What approach to sovereignty have you adopted (covering computing and data hosting infrastructure, software and data, and the nature of data)?
- What types of public-private partnerships or partnerships with start-ups do you employ (accelerators, framework agreements, public innovation, blended finance)?

Source: Task force.



1. Despite operating in a range of different contexts, foreign administrations are deploying artificial intelligence (AI) solutions to improve the efficiency and quality of public services

1.1. The majority of the countries surveyed have recently adopted or updated AI strategies to respond to the emergence of generative AI

An international comparison reveals that **the first national frameworks to structure public policy on AI were drawn up as early as the late 2010s**. Indeed, Germany (2018, updated in 2020), India (2018, with *AI for All* integrated into *Digital India*) and the Netherlands (2019) were among the first countries to adopt a national strategic framework. The United Kingdom has followed suit, with a guide on the use of AI in the public sector published in 2019, followed by a national strategy adopted in 2021, complemented by the creation of specialised sectoral hubs, notably the NHS AI Lab. Estonia, for its part, has aligned its 'Digital Agenda 2030', adopted in 2021, with a white paper dedicated to data and AI, covering the period 2024–2030. Singapore has updated its 2019 National AI Strategy to a '2.0' version published in 2023, placing AI at the heart of the 'Smart Nation 2.0' initiative. Rwanda adopted a national AI policy in April 2023, with the declared ambition of becoming an AI hub in Africa, although operational deployment remains limited at this stage.

However, an acceleration in the design of strategies around AI has been observed since 2024. In Italy, the national AI strategy, announced in January 2024, has now been defined in terms of operational guidelines for the adoption of AI within the public administration, and was supplemented by the adoption of a dedicated law in October 2025. The United Kingdom has embarked on a particularly intensive programme, with the publication of the *Generative AI Framework for Government* in January 2024, followed by the *AI Opportunities Action Plan* in January 2025, and then the *AI Playbook* in February 2025. The United States, meanwhile, has structured its policy through the issuance of several executive memoranda, including a key document in April 2025 (M-25-21), supplemented by a presidential action plan for AI published in July 2025. Canada, on the other hand, adopted its 2025–2027 national strategy in March 2025. The Netherlands published a specific strategy for the use of generative AI within government as early as January 2024, supplemented by a new strategy for the digitalisation of public services (NDS) in September 2025. In South Korea, the AI Basic Act was enacted in January 2025, with implementation scheduled for January 2026. Japan, for its part, is currently drawing up a national AI strategy (AI Basic Plan), which is due to be launched in 2026.

Finland, for its part, is in a unique position. This is because it has not adopted a dedicated AI strategy for public administration. AI is integrated into the *Digital Compass*, which has been guiding the government's digital transformation since 2022 and is due to be updated in spring 2026. This update will be accompanied by an 'AI Vision 2035', designed to set out the long-term objectives for the use of AI in the public sector.

More broadly, **recent national strategies place generative AI at the heart of their priorities, while agent-based AI is beginning to be recognised as the next stage in technological development.**



Generative AI is emerging as the shared foundation for public strategies and is explicitly incorporated and prioritised in virtually all the strategies analysed. In the United States, the April 2025 memorandum requires every federal agency to adopt a specific policy on generative AI, making this technology a subject of governance in its own right. In Singapore, the government has rolled out the in-house solution 'Pair', based on large language models (LLM), which enables text drafting, summarisation, translation, text analysis and code assistance within secure, strictly compartmentalised environments for administrative use. Japan plans to integrate generative AI solutions across the public sector from 2026 onwards, notably through direct partnerships with OpenAI. In South Korea, the national strategy explicitly targets generative AI as the core of priority use cases within government departments. In Estonia, from the outset the technological approach prioritises the integration of generative AI with early forms of agent-based AI, as part of a long-term strategy.

Agent-based AI is developing at different rates from one country to the other, with its integration remaining varied and often exploratory. It is nevertheless a key focus in Estonia, notably through the 'Bürokratt' ecosystem, as well as in South Korea, which aims to gradually transition from assistive AI to systems capable of carrying out certain administrative tasks under human supervision. In the United States, the April 2025 memorandum implicitly includes agent-based systems within its scope, albeit without making them a separate focus of policy. Germany and Finland are already funding targeted use cases based on AI agents, particularly in the environmental sector (for example, the KIRAS project), without having formalised a dedicated comprehensive strategy at this stage.

1.2. National strategies are moving towards the twin objectives of administrative efficiency and improving the quality of public services

Despite differing institutional and political contexts, national AI strategies show a high degree of convergence in terms of the objectives pursued and the sectors deemed to be priorities. For the most part, they are structured around two main areas: improving the internal efficiency of public administrations and enhancing the quality of services provided to citizens and businesses.

On the one hand, **improving administrative efficiency and public decision-making is a key shared objective**. In Canada, the strategy focuses mainly on improving the efficiency of government services, strengthening data-driven decision-making and modernising internal processes. In the United States, the focus is on government effectiveness and the cost-effectiveness of public policy, with the aim of optimising administrative processes, maximising value for the taxpayer and strengthening sector-specific governance and risk management frameworks. In Italy, the priorities centre on streamlining administrative processes, reducing costs, improving data-driven forecasting capabilities and strengthening security and governance frameworks. The Netherlands, for its part, is adopting a functional approach, particularly targeting the use of AI to enhance the productivity of public servants, appeals and review procedures, open government, the management of public spaces, interaction with citizens and businesses, and the accessibility of public services.



In this context, **some countries have made the systemic reform of the civil service an explicit objective.** South Korea has set out a particularly seminal ambition, aiming to “usher in an era of AI-driven public administration” and to transform the entire national administrative system around innovation and technological leadership, particularly in response to future demographic challenges. In Estonia, the aim is to consolidate a data-driven state capable of adapting to advances in generative AI, while establishing a clear legal framework based on a risk-based approach to AI.

Furthermore, **improving services for citizens and addressing societal challenges are also key priorities.** The Netherlands is therefore focusing on the use of AI to tackle challenges within society and improve public services, relying on a high-quality AI infrastructure based on reliable data, open European models, enhanced skills and appropriate computing capacity. The United Kingdom, for its part, is seeking to make everyday life easier for British citizens, notably through the development of cross-cutting AI tools within the ‘Humphrey’ suite and by forging close partnerships with leading private-sector organisations (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind).

In Singapore, the ‘AI for Government’ strategy aims to simultaneously improve the quality and efficiency of public services, boost staff productivity and position the government as an ambitious yet pragmatic international partner. It is based on identifying common use cases with high added value, the industrialisation of AI tools via centralised development, the selection of ‘showcase’ projects demonstrating the tangible impact of AI on public services, the strengthening and dissemination of technical capabilities within the civil service, and the establishment of governance frameworks that are designed to strengthen trust.

Cross-functional capacity and governance priorities can be found in several countries.

In Canada, the strategy centres on building core AI capacity, establishing clear legal and governance frameworks, and developing talent and training. This is against a backdrop of numerous unfilled digital roles, as well as increased demands for transparency and value for citizens. In South Korea, the focus is on the gradual integration of AI into all administrative functions involving significant public interaction, supported by the establishment of public data and computing infrastructure enabling the secure, standardised and shared use of AI across the State.

The priority areas centre on social policies, core government functions and administrative modernisation. National strategies identify largely overlapping areas of intervention, centred on social policies, core government functions (particularly in the tax sphere) and tasks involving a high volume of administrative processing, while gradually incorporating cross-cutting issues relating to data and territorialisation.

Social policies and essential services are top priorities of the targeted sectors. Healthcare consistently emerges as a priority sector, particularly in Estonia, Singapore and the United Kingdom. Taxation is also a major area of focus: South Korea plans to introduce an automated tax advisory service by 2026, as well as a complete overhaul of its tax return and payment systems by 2027; Estonia also includes taxation among its priorities. Social protection and employment take pride of place in South Korea, with the aim of providing personalised, round-the-clock support for accessing social benefits and employment opportunities. Finally, agriculture is a strategic sector in several countries, in particular in India and Rwanda. South Korea stands out by explicitly targeting the regulatory review of medicines as one of its priority projects, with the aim of speeding up the processing of marketing authorisations (MA), starting with generic medicines from 2026. It also emphasises data structuring and quality, which are regarded as a fundamental condition for the industrialisation of AI.



Some countries favour a decentralised approach to priorities, by agencies or administrations. In the United States, no generic list of priority sectors is defined at federal level. Each agency is required to identify its own sectoral priorities, as part of a common governance framework. However, a cross-cutting priority is clearly established with regard to the structuring, centralisation and utilisation of data, to enable efficiency gains on a large scale.

The strategies primarily target administrative missions with high potential for automation. The key use cases mainly concern the automation of repetitive tasks, support for specialist functions and improvements in user relations. Italy is therefore focusing on the automated sorting and processing of mail, while Germany is exploring the use of AI to assist with drafting legislative. Chatbots designed to enhance user relations are a key focus in Singapore, Japan and the United Kingdom. In Singapore, their applications notably include user services, case management, audit and compliance, finance and human resources.

Finally, **the territorial aspect is making progress in several national strategies.** While the approach remains predominantly national, some countries are now integrating a distinctly territorial aspect. In Japan, local authorities (such as Yokosuka and Tokyo) have outpaced central government in experimenting with AI. The United Kingdom subsequently established the 'GDS Local' unit in November 2025 to harmonise the roll-out of AI between central government and local authorities. In Italy, the strategy provides for the establishment of 'territorial hubs' designed to reduce regional digital divides. South Korea is also following this approach of coordination between the central and local levels.

1.3. These strategies have limitations in terms of their scope and expected productivity objectives

The scope of AI strategies is generally inter-ministerial but rarely extends to the public sector as a whole. In most of the countries studied, AI strategies have a broad scope, often inter-ministerial, but rarely cover the public sector generally:

- ♦ in **Singapore, Germany, Estonia** and the **United States**, the strategies apply in principle to all federal departments and agencies. However, sectoral exceptions remain, such as the tax administration in Singapore, which remains outside the main perimeter;
- ♦ **South Korea** is taking a particularly comprehensive approach by opening up its 'government-wide shared platform' to nearly 7,500 participating organisations. This scope includes not only central government departments, but also local authorities, public enterprises and certain educational institutions. The platform is based on generative AI models provided by private sector organisations, but operated within a sovereign and secure environment, enabling internal administrative data to be integrated without direct exposure to the internet;
- ♦ in **Canada**, the scope of the main directive is narrower: certain sensitive institutions, such as the Armed Forces or the Tax and Customs Authority, are explicitly excluded;
- ♦ in **Finland**, each ministry retains full responsibility for the use of AI within its remit of responsibilities, in the absence of a unified national strategy applicable to the entire administration;



- ♦ the **Netherlands** is characterised by a coordinated approach between central government and local authorities; hence, the strategy on the use of generative AI within government, along with the accompanying guide, has been designed to ensure that common rules apply to all public sector stakeholders. Similarly, the German strategy explicitly covers all federal administrations, the Länder and local authorities.

Furthermore, **existing strategies rarely set quantified productivity targets**. For example, in Germany, the use of AI is seen as a means of helping to achieve one of the objectives of the Modernisation Agenda, namely a 25% reduction in administrative costs and an 8% reduction in the federal administration's workforce by the end of the legislative term. In Estonia, quantified targets for productivity gains and administrative efficiency have also been set out in the AI Action Plan 2024–2026. This is not yet the case in South Korea or Canada, although the Canadian strategy states that AI can increase the efficiency, operational effectiveness and productivity of the civil service. In the Netherlands, the strategy and the guide refer to potential productivity gains, but without quantifying them. The three-year plan for IT in public administration in Italy does not set any measurable quantitative targets. Nor is this the case in Finland.

1.4. Foreign countries have adopted contrasting legal models to regulate AI in the public sector, oscillating between binding legislative and regulatory frameworks and flexible mechanisms

The countries examined have adopted a range of different legal approaches to regulate the use of AI in the public sector, ranging from binding legislative measures to more flexible frameworks based on recommendations, guidelines and technical standards.

Some states are putting in place prescriptive legislative or regulatory frameworks. Italy and South Korea have therefore adopted specific laws to regulate the use of AI in the public sector. Italy enacted Law No. 132/2025 in October 2025, while South Korea adopted the AI Basic Act, which is expected to come into force in 2026. Germany, for its part, is following a similar approach and is preparing to formalise a specific legal framework. In the United States, federal regulation is based on regulatory texts, such as memoranda from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For example, Memorandum M-25-21 of April 2025 ('Accelerating Federal Use of AI Through Innovation, Governance, and Public Trust') requires the maintenance of public registers of AI systems, the mandatory appointment of a chief AI officer in each agency, and strengthened governance and oversight mechanisms, among other operational requirements²²⁶. Meanwhile, Rwanda has expressed its intention to eventually establish a specific legislative framework for AI.

²²⁶ Washington SER, 2026, information provided to the task force; in the United States, memoranda other than M-25-21 have also been published by the OMB. For example, [Memorandum 25-22](#) ("Driving efficient acquisition of AI in government") promotes competition amongst private-sector AI providers and emphasises the procurement of solutions that are "less costly to the taxpayer" and exclusively "made in the USA".



Other countries are implementing flexible frameworks based on non-binding guidelines. For example, some states have opted for non-legally binding framework documents, based on principles, best practices and guidelines. The United Kingdom, in particular, relies on the *AI Playbook*, while Italy supplements its legislative framework with operational guidelines drawn up by the Italian Digital Agency (AGID, Agenzia per l'Italia Digitale). In Canada, the national strategy determines guidelines and priorities without creating legal obligations that are directly enforceable against administrations. For its part, Singapore also favours an approach based on guidelines, technical standards and best practices, rather than on general legal obligations. A similar approach is observed in the Netherlands.

More specific elements, relating to testing for example, also complement the general frameworks in some countries. This is the case, for example, in South Korea, where supplementary legislation to the AI Basic Act sets out the applicable requirements regarding information security, data protection and risk management. The United Kingdom and South Korea advocate a 'test and learn' approach, with limited budgets for rapid pilot schemes before being rolled out more widely. Canada requires algorithmic impact assessments for all automated systems. South Korea has established a phased assessment process (design, pilot, roll-out) with security checklists and performance indicators prior to each phase. In Singapore, administrations are encouraged to experiment in controlled environments (sandboxes, POCs, pilot schemes, etc.) with a gradual assessment of results before roll-out. In the Netherlands, a scandal concerning child benefit payments not only highlighted the potential pitfalls of automation and algorithms in public services but has also heightened the country's awareness of ethical issues, transparency, non-discrimination and human oversight.

1.5. The most advanced players in the deployment of AI tools in the public sector combine centralised and dedicated management structures

The most advanced countries have established centralised governance structures, backed by significant human and institutional resources, while maintaining the capacity for initiative and implementation within sectoral ministries. These frameworks combine strategic centralisation with operational decentralisation.

Thus, **central structures have been set up to ensure strategic steering and interministerial coordination:**

- ♦ in **the United States**, the roll-out of the AI action plan is based on a three-pronged institutional framework: the Chief AI Officer Council (CAIOC), responsible for strategic coordination; the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which ensures governance and compliance; and the General Services Administration (GSA), responsible for operational implementation and shared tools. Each federal agency is also required to appoint a Chief AI Officer (see above), to establish a dedicated AI governance body (AI Governance Board), to publish an agency AI strategy and to submit a compliance plan;
- ♦ in **the United Kingdom**, the Government Digital Service (GDS), now part of the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Technology, forms the core of operational management. It has a staff force of around 1,000 and is supported by an Interministerial Digital Group responsible for cross-departmental coordination. However, the ministries retain significant in-house capacity to develop their own tools and set their sectoral priorities;



- ♦ in **Canada**, strategic management is the responsibility of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, supported by an AI Center of Expertise responsible for supporting departments and agencies in the implementation of projects, standardising practices and sharing digital infrastructures;
- ♦ in **Japan**, AI policy is steered by the Cabinet Office. The AI Strategy Council is under the authority of the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation, while the Digital Agency, created in 2021, is leading the modernisation of public services and the integration of AI. A Chief AI Officer position has been established within each ministry and agency;
- ♦ in **Singapore**, GovTech plays a central role in designing, deploying and sharing digital and AI solutions for the entire administration;
- ♦ in **South Korea**, the National AI Strategy Committee is the central steering body. However, the operational implementation involves several stakeholders: the Ministry of the Interior and Security, the Ministry of Science, the Public Procurement Service and the Korea Development Bank;
- ♦ in the **Netherlands**, the public governance of AI is based on a centralised but collaborative organisation, structured around the Ministry of the Interior, which oversees the 'AI & Overheid' platform;
- ♦ in **Italy**, the National Cybersecurity Agency and the Agency for Digital Italy are the competent national authorities for AI. The latter has, in particular, drawn up guidelines for the adoption of AI in public administration;
- ♦ in **India**, NITI Aayog (a strategic think tank attached to the government) sets the vision, whereas the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology is responsible for operational implementation;
- ♦ in **Rwanda**, the national AI policy is led by the Ministry of Information Communication Technology and Innovation;
- ♦ in **Finland**, the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the use of AI in the administration and for analysing its long-term impacts on public services. It relies on the National Digital Office and an interministerial collaboration group on generative AI, while each ministry remains responsible for the use of AI in its area of competence;
- ♦ in **Estonia**, governance is based on a hybrid model: interministerial steering is provided by the Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs, via the government's Chief Data Officer and a national AI steering committee, while each ministry retains responsibility for the design and deployment of use cases within its scope.

Thus, in many countries, **ministries retain in-house capabilities for development and strategic decision-making**. Despite the growing influence of central bodies, ministries and/or agencies generally retain significant in-house capabilities to develop tools, select use cases and adapt the AI strategy to their specific remit.

Finally, **the involvement of social partners and civil society remains generally limited**. The structured involvement of the social partners and civil society remains rare in public AI governance frameworks. The Netherlands stands out as a notable exception with the NL AI Coalition, a public-private consortium bringing together government bodies, businesses, universities, research institutes and civil society stakeholders. This body provides a framework for dialogue and collective action, mobilised by the government for projects that go beyond the strict administrative boundaries.



2. The deployments of AI tools in foreign administrations are mainly for internal uses, with potential gains, but these are varied and difficult to measure

2.1. The international comparison highlights a gradual and uneven development of AI tools within public administrations, primarily focused on internal use

An international comparison highlights a **high degree of variation in the maturity of AI use cases** within public administrations, ranging from projects that are still largely experimental to fully operational deployments. In some countries, a significant proportion of initiatives remain at the proof-of-concept or pilot project stage, often limited to low- or medium-risk applications such as document analysis, the automation of repetitive administrative tasks or drafting assistance (Canada²²⁷, South Korea²²⁸, Finland²²⁹, United Kingdom). Conversely, some public administrations have already established portfolios of applications integrated into functional processes, based on shared platforms that enable AI tools to be deployed more broadly and on a standardised basis.

A key cross-cutting finding is the **predominance of internal AI uses, primarily aimed at improving administrative efficiency and supporting decision-making by public officials**. The most frequently observed use cases relate to the prioritisation and processing of cases, anomaly or fraud detection, retrieving information within large bodies of regulatory text, and automatically summarising complex documents. In some public administrations, most of the applications identified are primarily intended for civil servants themselves, reflecting a strategy aimed at securing and stabilising internal use (United States²³⁰).

In some countries, the increasing maturity of use cases comes alongside the implementation of **structural governance and resource-sharing mechanisms**, designed to regulate and streamline the use of AI. Cross-functional platforms, inter-ministerial methodological frameworks and centralised portals help to standardise the design, testing and deployment phases, while incorporating requirements relating to security, compliance and performance monitoring^{231;232}. This approach helps to reduce duplication of initiatives, improve capitalisation on pilot projects and allow a more even dissemination of solutions across the administrations concerned.

²²⁷ Ottawa Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; within Canadian public administrations, a significant proportion of AI projects are still at the proof-of-concept or experimental stage. These projects mainly relate to low- or medium-risk applications, such as document analysis, information retrieval, the automation of repetitive administrative tasks or assistance with drafting.

²²⁸ Seoul Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; as things stand, the maturity of AI use cases in the Korean public sector is characterised primarily by a build-up of trials and pilot projects.

²²⁹ Helsinki Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; to date, the introduction of AI into the Finnish central government has mainly been promoted through various pilot projects and trials. In the next phase, the focus will move towards more widespread operational models (scaling up).

²³⁰ Washington Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the adoption of AI by federal agencies is primarily aimed at improving operational efficiency, speeding up processes and enhancing the quality of services, while reducing costs and the workload associated with certain tasks.

²³¹ Washington Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; in the United States, the General Services Administration (GSA) is playing a central role with the launch of 'USAI', a federal platform enabling agencies to access standardised generative AI capabilities (chat, summarisation, code generation) in a secure environment that complies with federal requirements, without the need for intensive in-house development. The GSA has also strengthened the OneGov agreements, which provide inter-ministerial access to models and tools negotiated at federal level.

²³² Regional Economic Service, Singapore, 2026, information provided to the task force; the Singapore Government Tech Stack (SGTS) provides a set of standardised services for developing secure, interoperable applications that are compliant from the design stage, reducing costs through the pooling and reuse of technology building blocks.



Public administrations also face the challenge of **dependence on technologies developed by private sector players**, particularly when it comes to large language models, which raises issues of sovereignty, data control and security. In response, several countries have taken steps to explore or integrate open-source models, as well as solutions hosted or operated in-house. These initiatives reflect a growing desire to reduce technological dependence on certain dominant players while maintaining performance levels that are 'compatible' with the operational expectations of public services.

While internal applications are by far the most common, an international comparison also reveals the gradual emergence of **use cases aimed at citizens and businesses**, notably in the form of chatbots, multilingual conversational assistants or smart portals facilitating access to public services. However, these applications remain less widespread than internal ones and are governed by stricter regulation, due to the risks associated with AI directly interacting with the public, particularly regarding the reliability of responses, the protection of personal data and respect for users' rights. Their broader adoption therefore appears to be a more gradual process, contingent upon thorough testing phases.

The maturity of AI use cases appears to be **linked to the extent to which public administrations are already digitised**, with countries that have largely digitised public services benefiting from a more favourable environment for the rapid integration of AI. In such contexts, AI can be integrated more easily into processing chains that are already digitised and interoperable, enabling rapid gains in productivity and service quality. Conversely, in public administrations where digital transformation is at a less advanced stage, use cases remain more *ad hoc* or limited to specific areas, reflecting a strong correlation between overall digital readiness and the readiness of AI applications.

Finally, all the countries studied demonstrate a **shared scaling up approach**, characterised by a gradual transition from testing schemes to widespread implementation, based on prior impact assessments, the establishment of legal frameworks and investment in skills. The maturity of use cases is therefore not measured exclusively by the number of tools deployed, but by the ability of administrations to integrate these tools into sustainable, managed and evaluated processes – a critical prerequisite for the large-scale deployment of AI in the public sector.



2.2. The use cases with the most productivity gains declared at this stage relate to support for document production, the processing of large volumes of data and the targeting of checks

International comparisons show that the **productivity gains observed at this stage are mainly associated with use cases within the public administration itself, relating to the production, processing and circulation of administrative information.** Tools to assist with drafting, document structuring, the automatic summarisation of large bodies of text and the preparation of reports are among the most widespread and rapidly adopted application (South Korea²³³, Japan²³⁴, Singapore²³⁵). These applications significantly reduce the time spent by agents on editorial tasks and information retrieval.

A second set of particularly productive use cases relates to **automation in document management and the processing of substantial volumes of data, particularly within public sector organisations dealing with high volumes of standardised processes and files.** The automated reading, extraction and classification of administrative documents (forms, supporting documents, emails) enables reductions in processing times – sometimes in the order of several tens of per cent – as well as a more effective allocation of human resources to complex cases (Estonia²³⁶, India, Italy). These applications extend and enhance existing automation systems, particularly within large public administrations.

Conversational services and intelligent search tools, when backed by well-managed administrative databases, also represent a significant source of productivity gains, both for staff and for users. Internally, semantic search engines and question-and-answer assistants facilitate navigation through complex regulatory environments and reduce cross-departmental enquiries (India, South Korea, Singapore). In terms of public services, chatbots and virtual assistants handle a proportion of repetitive enquiries, helping to reduce incoming calls and in-person visits, while improving service availability (Estonia, India, Italy, Singapore²³⁷). However, these gains rely on clearly defined scope of use.

²³³ Seoul Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the most ‘immediately effective’ applications within Korean public administrations relate to the production and processing of administrative information, particularly in supporting the drafting and internal processing of documents. These include assistance with the drafting of memos, reports and administrative decisions, structuring and summarising lengthy documents, and the automated preparation of meeting minutes.

²³⁴ Tokyo Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; among the use cases reported to the Regional Economic Service, employee access to a chatbot (such as ChatGPT) appears to be the most common use case.

²³⁵ Singapore Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the use cases most directly linked to productivity gains in Singapore relate, on the one hand, (i) to cross-functional tools for staff (drafting, summarising, translation, literature reviews, coding support) and, on the other hand, (ii) to automation focused on high-volume functional processes.

²³⁶ Riga Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; Estonian public administrations have reported certain benefits from document automation (a 60% to 80% reduction in processing times).

²³⁷ Singapore Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; for customer services and the handling of enquiries, the OneService Chatbot automates the triage, information extraction and routing of municipal reports.



AI applications in risk management, targeting and anomaly detection are among the most effective ways of improving the overall productivity of public administrations. In the tax field or in benefits administration, models for detecting atypical behaviour and scoring enable human audits to be targeted at the highest-risk cases, thereby increasing the effectiveness of audit activities (Estonia²³⁸, India, Italy²³⁹). These use cases are a continuation of previous practices based on rule engines and robots, to which AI brings an enhanced capacity to process large volumes of data and detect weak signals.

Targeted automation of certain repetitive tasks also leads to measurable productivity gains. This notably includes the automation of the classification and forwarding of alerts, the automatic transcription of parliamentary debates, court hearings or administrative meetings, as well as information extraction from various sources (Singapore²⁴⁰). These uses, integrated into existing processing chains, help to reduce response times and limit repetitive tasks with low added value.

An international comparison highlights that **few public administrations currently have established, centralised methodologies for consistently measuring the productivity gains associated with AI tools** (see part 2.3 below). Assessments are most often carried out at project or ministerial level, using a variety of indicators relating to time saved, volumes processed or reduced processing times, which limits the ability to objectively compare the relative effectiveness of different use cases (Canada²⁴¹, United Kingdom²⁴²). This situation leads administrations to initially prioritise cases in which the gains are most directly observable.

Finally, all feedback points to the conclusion that **the fastest productivity gains are achieved when AI builds on and strengthens pre-existing automation systems**, rather than when it is introduced into processes that are poorly structured or highly discretionary. The most successful use cases are therefore based on optimised processes, high-quality data and close operational integration, which determine the ability of administrations to turn technological testing into performance gains.

²³⁸ Riga Economic Service, information provided to the task force; the Estonian public administrations have observed certain gains in cases where tax risks have been identified.

²³⁹ Rome Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; AI tools are currently being trialled to tackle tax fraud.

²⁴⁰ Singapore Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the 'Pair Noms' tool makes it easier to produce reports, a task that previously took "anywhere from a few hours to a day" and has now been reduced to "under an hour".

²⁴¹ Ottawa Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; no centralised methodology exists for measuring productivity gains linked to AI in the Canadian public sector.

²⁴² London Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; Government Digital Services (GDS) has not carried out any comparisons between the various tools deployed based on the productivity gains they generated.



2.3. The measurement of AI-related productivity gains in foreign public administrations remains fragmented and poorly established

An international comparison highlights, first and foremost, the **frequent lack of unified and established national frameworks** for measuring the productivity gains associated with AI in public administrations. In many countries, the authorities explicitly acknowledge that the assessment of impacts remains at an exploratory or fragmented stage, with approaches varying across ministries, projects and agencies (Germany²⁴³, Finland²⁴⁴, Japan²⁴⁵, Rwanda, ²⁴⁶United Kingdom²⁴⁷). This situation reflects both the newness of the tools, the diversity of the public functions concerned and the difficulty of 'translating' traditional productivity indicators into complex administrative activities.

In this context, several administrations favour **'pragmatic' approaches, based on simple operational indicators**, drawing mainly on 'before and after' comparisons directly linked to the processes concerned. The most used metrics relate to the time spent on a task, the volumes of files processed, the reduction in processing times, the reduction in manual tasks and, more occasionally, the error or rework rates (Estonia²⁴⁸, India, Singapore²⁴⁹). These indicators, which are easily understandable and can be directly used by services, now form the most widespread basis for objectifying short-term productivity gains.

However, some administrations have taken more structured approaches to **link productivity measurement with the life cycle of AI projects**, by defining consistent sets of indicators right from the design phase. The South Korean inter-ministerial methodological framework²⁵⁰ demonstrates this approach by organising indicators around inputs, processes, outputs, and impacts, to link the resources mobilised, the functioning of the systems, the operational results and the practical impacts on public policy. This framework is designed to move beyond a strictly one-off exercise and to incorporate evaluation into a process of ongoing management.

²⁴³ Berlin Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; for its part, the Federal Ministry for Digitalisation and State Modernisation (BMDS) does not yet have any reliable data on productivity gains within public administrations, as the AI strategy is very new.

²⁴⁴ Helsinki Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; Finland is seeking the best indicators but believes it has not yet found them. In its search for the best indicators, it draws inspiration from the report written by Joseph Stiglitz in 2009 (*Report on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress*).

²⁴⁵ Tokyo Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; any potential productivity gains have not yet been quantified by the public administrations.

²⁴⁶ London Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; at this stage, no standardised method exists for quantifying productivity gains within the UK civil service.

²⁴⁷ Nairobi Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; as a general rule, given that the roll-out of AI in Rwanda is still in its infancy, there are currently no quantitative statistics on the impact of AI in the country (still less gains in competitiveness within public administrations).

²⁴⁸ Riga Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the impacts are measured primarily in terms of time saved, the quality of decisions, the accessibility of services and satisfaction among users and staff.

²⁴⁹ Singapore Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the measurement of productivity gains resulting from the use of AI in Singapore's public administration is based on standardised operational methods, which are defined on a project-by-project basis and incorporated from the design phase onwards.

²⁵⁰ Seoul Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the method for measuring productivity gains resulting from the deployment of AI in public administration is set out in the *Public Sector Ultra-Large AI Introduction Utilization Guidelines 2.0* (inter-ministerial methodological framework). This framework is based on an approach that combines the project life cycle with a structured model of performance indicators, organised across four complementary levels (inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes).



At the same time, several countries rely on **existing frameworks for the governance and evaluation of digital or automated projects**, without developing a specific AI policy. This is particularly applicable when AI projects are integrated into broader digital transformation or public programme management frameworks, with performance, cost and outcome indicators already in use for other digital projects (Canada, Finland, India). In such contexts, AI is assessed in terms of its contribution to overall operational objectives rather than as a distinct technological category.

In some administrations, **the measurement of productivity gains is supplemented by qualitative indicators** focusing on the quality of service provided, the accessibility of public services, user and staff satisfaction, and improvements in working conditions. This approach is particularly pronounced in countries where productivity is viewed within a broader framework of 'well-being' and 'social value', and where the authorities highlight the limitations of an assessment based solely on time or costs (Finland). Productivity gains are thus presented as an indirect lever for freeing up time for tasks with higher added value.

Conversely, some public administrations use **aggregate or even macroeconomic targets** – which are sometimes ambitious – to illustrate the potential for productivity gains through the deployment of AI, **without having robust methodologies in place to monitor these targets operationally**. These targets are often based on estimates from international organisations or consultancy firms and cover multi-year timescales, without making a sharp distinction between the respective contributions of different applications or sectors (United Kingdom²⁵¹, Rwanda²⁵²). This approach helps to fuel a political narrative surrounding AI, but continues to be difficult to put into practice for the day-to-day management of public services.

Finally, the public sector organisations that are most advanced in terms of AI deployment tend to **combine productivity metrics, usage indicators and 'product engineering' approaches to manage the transition from piloting to wide-scale adoption**. Cross-functional tools, particularly those based on generative AI, are therefore regularly monitored with reference to adoption (number of users, frequency of use, types of tasks covered), accompanied by estimates of administrative time saved and *ex post* assessments of operational impacts (Singapore²⁵³). This approach, drawing inspiration from both the private sector and public sector performance standards, is now regarded as one of the most effective ways of objectively measuring AI-related productivity gains in the public sector.

²⁵¹ London Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the action plan on AI opportunities has been outlined as the solution to low productivity and growth, as well as to the problems faced by British citizens. It draws on the estimates of AI's impact on productivity produced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its *World Economic Outlook* (April 2024), but without setting this as a target as such (and within a broader scope than the application of AI to public services alone): over a 10-year period, productivity growth could reach 1.5% per annum with the widespread application of AI, representing an additional £47 billion for the UK each year.

²⁵² Nairobi Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; a study by the consultancy firm McKinsey finds that AI could contribute to an increase in Rwanda's GDP of around 500 million US dollars.

²⁵³ Singapore Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; administrations primarily rely on 'before and after' indicators directly linked to the processes concerned, in particular the time spent by staff on a task, the volume of cases processed, reductions in processing times, reductions in manual tasks and, where appropriate, indicators of staff or user satisfaction.



2.4. International feedback shows AI related productivity gains that can be significant but differ significantly, often limited to targeted use cases and unevenly documented

Experiences of deploying AI in public administrations show **potentially significant productivity gains**, whether measured or estimated, although these vary considerably depending on the country and the tools used. These gains mainly relate to the reduced time spent on repetitive tasks, faster processes, automated document processing and improved service quality:

- ♦ in **Germany**: in a qualitative survey of nearly 250 staff members using the 'KIPITZ' platform²⁵⁴, 64% of respondents felt that the tool saves a great deal of time on repetitive tasks, nearly 74% reported that it makes work tasks easier overall, and 64% considered the tool effective for processing large documents. Nearly 90% of participants are in favour of widespread roll-out. These figures illustrate high perceived benefits and strong internal support for the roll-out;
- ♦ in **Estonia**: significant operational gains have been observed, with **time reductions of 60% to 80% for certain administrative processing** and savings in full-time equivalents (e.g. parliamentary transcription). ROI evaluations are primarily focused on internal efficiency and productivity²⁵⁵;
- ♦ in **the United States**: some federal administrations document gains on targeted tasks (automation, writing, control, user service), but aggregating productivity metrics at the national level remains difficult, and the return on investment varies by agency and functions²⁵⁶;
- ♦ in **India**: projects combining digitisation and AI show **20% to 50% reductions in processing times** for standardised cases, increased productivity of tax audits and grants, transfer of routine tasks to chatbots, and benefits in the healthcare sector, with more tests analysed each day and earlier detection of risks. ROI is generally analysed at a programme level and not published in a harmonised manner for AI components alone²⁵⁷;
- ♦ in **Japan**: the gains are not yet measured quantitatively. However, qualitatively, the city of Yokosuka reports streamlined processes, improved communication with residents and more time available for tasks with higher added value²⁵⁸;
- ♦ in **the United Kingdom**: the 'Consult' tool saves the equivalent of 75,000 days per year of manual analysis, the 'Extract' tool **reduces the time taken to process files to three minutes, compared with one to two hours without it**, and the 'Minute' tool saves one hour of work per transcribed meeting²⁵⁹. These examples illustrate significant time savings on specific processes;

²⁵⁴ Berlin Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the federal government's AI platform 'KIPITZ', offers use cases in the form of applications within the portal, for example for creating, summarising, categorising, translating or rephrasing texts and documents.

²⁵⁵ Riga Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force.

²⁵⁶ Washington Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force.

²⁵⁷ New Delhi Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force.

²⁵⁸ Tokyo Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force.

²⁵⁹ London Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force.



- ♦ in **Singapore**: various AI tools show measurable gains²⁶⁰:
 - the ‘**Pair**’ suite enables time savings of 40% to 60% on drafting notes, summarising documents or writing reports, with nearly 20,000 active users per week;
 - the **MyCareersFuture** recommendation engine led to a 9% increase in applications and a nearly 22% increase in successful placements;
 - the **OneService** chatbot processes 30,000 reports per month, saving nearly 2,000 labour hours and reducing resolution times by up to two business days.
 - in the healthcare sector, an early-detection app for dementia enables risk assessment without the need to involve specialists, reducing the time required per test compared with traditional methods.

For other countries (Canada, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Rwanda, South Korea), no specific figures on productivity gains were provided to the task force.

2.5. AI ROI measures in administrations remain largely focused on direct operational gains, without integrating indirect costs and external factors

Return-on-investment assessments or similar evaluations carried out for AI projects in public administrations focus **primarily on direct operational and financial gains**, such as time saved, reduced processing times, improved service quality or freed-up capacity, without systematically taking into account the unintended consequences or indirect costs associated with the introduction of generative AI (South Korea, India, Singapore²⁶¹). In most cases, these assessments are therefore estimates that primarily reflect operational efficiency and value for staff and users.

In some countries, **a purely qualitative approach to risks and external factors is beginning to emerge**. For instance, the Canadian and Singaporean authorities take into account environmental costs, data quality, the risks of model drift (‘AI slop’) and the need for training and organisational support; however, these factors have not yet been quantified or incorporated into formalised return-on-investment models (Canada²⁶², Singapore²⁶³). In other countries, environmental impact standards are being formalised (Estonia).

²⁶⁰ Singapore Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force.

²⁶¹ Singapore Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; assessments of productivity gains associated with AI, and in particular generative AI, within the Singaporean public administration are mainly ‘gross’ in the sense that they focus primarily on direct operational gains (time saved, capacity freed up, reduced processing times, improved service quality) and do not systematically include a quantified assessment of indirect effects or negative external factors.

²⁶² Ottawa Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; at the federal level, no quantified benefits have been published, although the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) has indicated its intention to move towards measuring impacts. The TBS guide states that generative AI has environmental costs and recommends prioritising tools hosted in ‘net zero’ centres, and conducting an environmental impact assessment.

²⁶³ Singapore Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; at this stage, environmental issues are primarily addressed by the Singaporean public administration at a strategic level, through guidelines that favour more efficient AI and the reasonable use of computing resources.



In other countries, the **return on investment remains at a prospective or qualitative stage**, especially when generative AI projects are still in the experimentation phase. This is the case in Japan and the United Kingdom, for example, where productivity gains are observed or expected, but where no quantitative model of return on investment has been defined, and where indirect effects or external factors are not integrated into the evaluations. This approach reflects the difficulty of accurately measuring economic and organisational impacts in complex public environments.

Finally, it is notable that some countries **combine gross measures of return on investment with governance mechanisms aimed at limiting adverse effects**, even if these are not yet internalised in the calculations. In Singapore, for example, productivity gains assessments focus on direct impacts, but the steering frameworks provide *ex ante* training and support budgets, as well as the use of 'human in the loop' principles to ensure solid decision-making, thereby enabling the partial management of risks relating to quality and organisational transitions.



3. While the roll-out of AI tools in the public sector has the potential to bring about a structural transformation of certain administrative processes, it faces many constraints and requires training initiatives as well as political and managerial support

3.1. The development of skills among civil servants abroad is based on a common foundation of training and networks of enthusiasts and experts in AI technologies, backed by strong managerial leadership

A model for preparing public sector staff to integrate AI tools into their work is in sight. It is based on the interplay between a compulsory core foundation, structured in-house expertise, supervised experimentation and thorough managerial oversight.

Firstly, several of the countries studied have embarked on a general training process, aimed at **ensuring a minimum level of understanding of AI among all public sector staff**. This familiarisation generally takes the form of basic training courses, sometimes on a compulsory basis, covering the general principles of AI, the uses of generative AI in daily administrative tasks, and cross-cutting issues such as security, data protection and ethics (Germany, Canada, South Korea, the United States, Finland, India, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and Singapore). The process has two aims: to dispel fears surrounding technologies perceived as complex or opaque, and to prevent the haphazard or inadequately controlled spread of AI use within public administrations.

Beyond this common foundation, the strategies observed focus on **establishing internal networks of enhanced expertise, designed to support public administrations in the long term**. Several countries have therefore chosen to establish networks of AI experts or 'champions', identified within government departments and tasked with disseminating best practice, supporting functional teams and acting as an interface with central digital functions (South Korea, India, the United Kingdom, Singapore). This approach addresses the challenge of embedding expertise sustainably as closely as possible to operational needs. Many countries rely on programmes and initiatives specific to ministries and agencies, sometimes in a fragmented manner (United States).

A third key feature concerns the **central role given to learning by doing and experimentation**. The schemes deemed most effective are those that move beyond a purely theoretical approach to draw on practical use cases, secure experimental environments or real-world projects overseen by the staff themselves (Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States, India). This approach transforms training into a catalyst for organisational innovation, enabling staff to directly test the benefits of AI on their own work processes – whether in document production, data analysis or decision support – and to gradually integrate these into existing professional practices. In the United States, the recent announcement about the creation of the 'US Tech Force' aims, following the framework of the 'digital fellows' programme, to mobilise a pool of engineers, data scientists and digital specialists for temporary assignments within federal government departments to support modernisation, AI and digital infrastructure projects.



The international comparison also highlights an **increasing use of national digital training platforms, designed as single entry points for AI learning in the public service**. These platforms facilitate the rapid, consistent and shared dissemination of educational content, while enabling it to be constantly updated in a rapidly evolving technological environment (Italy, Finland, Canada, India, Estonia). They serve as a key driver for the large-scale development of skills, particularly when content is shared across ministries, agencies and levels of government.

Finally, several countries underline the **decisive role of managerial leadership** in the success of these strategies. Specific training for managers and senior executives is explicitly identified as a key lever for overcoming cultural resistance, guaranteeing safe use and setting AI on a clear and committed strategic course (Finland, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Japan). Without this commitment from senior management, training programmes risk remaining merely formal and impacting professional practices in only a limited way.

3.2. AI-related change management is based on explicit political support, the use of real-world use cases and the promotion of staff initiatives

A key driver of change is explicit and embodied leadership. Several countries emphasise that **the transformation cannot be driven solely by digital services, but must be led by political and administrative leadership**, which sets the course and legitimises the use of AI in public policy (notably Germany, South Korea, Finland and India). This involvement aims to embed AI within a long-term strategic vision and to prevent it from being perceived as a peripheral technical project or one pursued for its own sake.

A second recurring factor relates to **being rooted in practical applications and real-life work situations**. Several public administrations favour a problem-based approach, based on small-scale pilot schemes, multidisciplinary teams and use cases directly linked to the difficulties encountered by staff and jointly designed with them (Estonia, India). This approach aims to minimise resistance by demonstrating the immediate usefulness of AI solutions in day-to-day work ('quick wins' and pilot schemes prior to wider roll-out).

The mission also notes the importance of recognition schemes for staff, which are powerful drivers of engagement. Some countries are introducing **formalised certification or recognition schemes as part of individual performance appraisals** (South Korea and Italy, for example), while others are using competitions and awards to encourage staff to suggest innovative uses of AI (the United Kingdom).

Finally, the experience of foreign public administrations shows that **AI-related change management must be treated as a human resources management and work organisation issue, and not as a subject exclusively for information systems departments**. Several countries, including Finland and the United Kingdom, are specifically targeting senior executives to strengthen the managerial leadership of transformation.



3.3. National strategies combine general training programmes for staff with targeted specialisation or retraining schemes

The approaches observed combine, depending on the country, a general upskilling of public sector staff with more targeted retraining or specialisation schemes ('reskilling').

Some countries prioritise the provision of a common foundation of knowledge on AI to all public sector staff. This widespread skills development aims to ensure the responsible and effective use of these tools. It is most often based on structured training programmes – which are sometimes compulsory – and on centralised digital platforms. Singapore has made AI literacy training compulsory for all staff. In Germany, AI tools cannot be accessed via the KIPITZ platform unless basic training modules have been completed. Estonia has set a target for 80% of its population to have basic AI skills by 2030, including public officials through the Digital State Academy. Italy, Finland and Canada also rely on national platforms offering courses dedicated to AI.

At the same time, **some strategies are developing more targeted retraining or specialisation ('reskilling') schemes, aimed at acquiring expert skills and reducing dependence on external service providers.** South Korea distinguishes itself with its ambitious target of training 20,000 'AI Champions' by 2030, based on practical assignments and certifications. The United Kingdom has launched an acceleration programme (AI Accelerator) enabling 25 AI engineers from various government ministries to enhance their skills through hackathons and by tackling real-world government challenges. India offers specialised courses in data engineering and MLOps²⁶⁴ for its IT staff and explicitly guides the reskilling of staff whose tasks have been automated towards roles with higher added value. Germany is in the process of setting up an AI advisory centre whose remit will be to organise the 'up-skilling' and 're-skilling' of staff. In Singapore, there are specific programmes designed to train practitioners and project teams in the operational use of AI, as well as 'job transformation maps' across different sectors.

Differing approaches can thus be observed in different countries. While the United States does not have a large-scale federal retraining policy and favours the use of external skills through the recruitment of contract specialists, other countries combine internal training and recruitment, by using various incentive levers such as the integration of training into promotion courses or the organisation of incentives for innovation.

²⁶⁴ The term 'MLOps' (machine learning operations) refers to a set of practices aimed at deploying and maintaining machine learning models.



3.4. The deployment of AI projects in public administrations is hampered by technical, human, legal and sovereignty constraints and issues

The scaling up of AI projects in public administrations continues to face **real obstacles, which go beyond the testing phase alone**. These obstacles derive mainly from technical difficulties relating to data and infrastructure, a persistent skills shortage, issues of technological sovereignty, and regulatory and budgetary constraints.

The first obstacle identified relates to data management, which is a prerequisite for the widespread adoption of AI applications. Several countries highlight the fragmentation of data across administrations and the lack of interoperability between existing information systems, particularly in Finland, the United Kingdom and India. Added to these difficulties is the uneven quality of internal databases, found particularly in Italy and Finland, which affects the reliability of the models and increases the risk of errors or 'hallucinations'. Limitations in technical infrastructure present a further obstacle: in the United States, a large majority of agencies consider their computing capacity to be inadequate for large-scale deployment, while Finland highlights the challenges of outsourcing and the difficulty of anticipating the recurring costs associated with scaling up.

The lack of in-house skills appears to be an obstacle in almost all the countries surveyed. Several administrations, including the US government, report a significant shortage of talent in AI and data science, which is furthered by high vacancy rates in digital professions. Competition with the private sector, particularly with major international technology companies, makes it difficult to retain qualified staff, as highlighted by the United Kingdom and Rwanda. In addition to these pressures, in some countries such as Italy and Germany there is cultural resistance from the bureaucracy and civil servants, linked to fears about the impact of AI on employment or the difficulty of making time for training within organisations that are already under pressure. Among the solutions is the creation of partnerships with private-sector organisations.

The experience of some foreign public administrations also highlights issues of sovereignty and technological dependence. Several European countries have highlighted a heavy dependence on US cloud providers, raising concerns about data control and digital sovereignty. South Korea and Japan emphasise the risks of sensitive data leaks associated with the use of AI services accessible via the internet, while Rwanda imposes strict data localisation requirements, which may hinder certain deployments.

Finally, **regulatory and budgetary constraints may, in some cases, limit the ability to roll out projects on a wider scale.** Public procurement rules often appear poorly adapted to the rapid development cycles of AI, with high failure rates in procurement procedures in some countries. Compliance with existing legal frameworks – whether European regulations or national legislation (India, United States) on data protection – is perceived as complex and time-consuming. The experience of the United States also highlights the absence or inadequacy of dedicated and centralised funding, with deployment relying on the aggregation of fragmented budgets at government level.

Against this backdrop, Singapore stands out as an exception. Its small size and highly centralised structure facilitate the sharing of platforms and the rapid deployment of solutions, without facing the same territorial, organisational or budgetary constraints as the other countries analysed.



3.5. The integration of AI tools into public administrations acts as a driver in the structural reform of organisations and processes

The integration of AI solutions into foreign administrations goes far beyond the introduction of a new technological tool. It acts as a driver of structural transformation, profoundly affecting technical architectures, data management, human resources organisation and administrative processes. However, given that the current phase of AI solution deployment remains limited overall, the impact of these projects in terms of reorganisation is still limited and is more potential than actual.

A first series of developments concerns digital architectures and infrastructures. The roll-out of AI requires an overhaul of the technical foundations to support computationally intensive tasks in secure environments. Several countries are moving towards the establishment of shared platforms and cross-cutting 'tech stacks', with the aim of replacing isolated systems with shared infrastructures at state level. This pattern is accompanied by increased focus on issues of digital sovereignty, with the creation of sovereign clouds or internal administrative networks isolated from the internet. At the same time, the modernisation of legacy systems appears to be an essential prerequisite for the widespread adoption of AI applications.

The transformation also concerns **governance and data management circuits, which are now considered a strategic asset.** AI is driving public administrations to make a break with organisations based on information silos, in favour of models based on native interoperability, data standardisation and the reuse of common components. Some countries are developing national public data infrastructures or imposing stricter requirements regarding the cataloguing, traceability, interoperability and security of the datasets used by AI systems.

The deployment of AI solutions in other public administrations highlights **effects on the reorganisation of administrations and functions.** AI is driving the emergence of new governance and management roles, notably through the institutionalisation of dedicated functions at ministerial level and the creation of new job profiles (AI project manager, AI ethics and legal officers, data analysts, etc.). Strategies differ, however, with regard to the impact on staffing levels. Hence, some countries view automation as a means of reducing payroll costs, while others favour an approach aimed at enhancing staff capabilities without replacing jobs. Several public administrations are opting to centralise technical expertise within specialised units, which can then provide support to functional ministries.

Finally, **the integration of AI is transforming business processes and compliance frameworks.** In some countries, such as Germany and South Korea, legal frameworks are evolving to facilitate the use of AI in certain areas, and even to enable the implementation of fully automated administrative procedures in the long term²⁶⁵. Others are introducing formalised algorithmic impact assessment mechanisms to manage risks, ensure human accountability and structure the validation of projects. The gradual automation of repetitive tasks is changing day-to-day workflows and helping to standardise processes.

²⁶⁵ Berlin Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; in Germany, the '[State Modernisation Agenda](#)' established by the Federal Ministry for Digitalisation and Government Modernisation (BMDS) and adopted by the German government on 1 October 2025 provides, among other things, for the adaptation of the legal framework, in particular amendments to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (which sets out the general rules governing the administration's decision-making and actions), to facilitate the use of AI. A legal basis for administrative acts fully automated by AI is expected to be integrated into this legislation.



4. Foreign administrations combine internal developments, the use of commercial solutions and various partnerships, while ensuring control of infrastructures and the use of data

4.1. Administrations are favouring hybrid models that combine the in-house development of AI tools with the procurement of commercial solutions, while seeking to strengthen their technological sovereignty

An analysis of the deployment of AI solutions within foreign public administrations highlights a **marked shift towards hybrid models combining in-house development of strategic building blocks with the targeted use of off-the-shelf solutions**. This approach is now the norm among the administrations studied, whatever their level of digital readiness or their size might be. It aims to reconcile public control over usage, data and governance with rapid access to high-performance, scalable technologies. It can be found, for example, in Estonia (sovereign infrastructure and in-house AI components supplemented by commercial solutions), in Singapore (architectures designed by the state incorporating commercial or open-source building blocks), in Japan (Government Cloud²⁶⁶ and Government AI combining in-house developments and hyperscalers), in India (central public infrastructure and AI applications that are procured or jointly developed), in Canada and the United States (hybrid approaches explicitly promoted at federal level), as well as in the United Kingdom (combination of in-house developments, partnerships²⁶⁷ and procurement).

Entirely internal developments are mainly observed for critical or key digital infrastructure, shared platforms or use cases involving sensitive data, sovereign missions or high security requirements. Germany is a typical case, with an AI system developed in-house, operated on-premises and based on interchangeable open-source models, ensuring a high degree of technological control and freedom from vendor lock-in. Similar approaches can be seen in core infrastructure in Estonia (digital identity, for example), India (DigiLocker), Japan (Government Cloud) and in certain tools developed by the public incubator i.AI in the United Kingdom. In the United States, federal agencies also favour in-house development for critical or highly specialised applications (homeland security, diplomacy²⁶⁸).

²⁶⁶ Tokyo Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the government has developed the 'Government Cloud', a cloud environment shared across the entire Japanese government, and plans to migrate the IT systems of various ministries and local authorities.

²⁶⁷ London Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; for example, the United Kingdom has signed numerous partnerships with US AI companies (the most recent was with Google DeepMind), and is developing certain AI tools based on their models.

²⁶⁸ Washington Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; in-house development programmes do exist, mainly within agencies responsible for sovereign functions or handling sensitive data, such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).



For cross-functional uses (chatbots, administrative assistants, document summarisation, content generation), **administrations seem to favour the acquisition of ready-to-use commercial solutions.** This trend is particularly pronounced in South Korea (generative AI services provided by Upstage²⁶⁹), Italy (solutions procured through public procurement), in the United States (access to resources facilitated by the GSA²⁷⁰), as well as Finland and the Netherlands, where solutions are mainly based on foreign, mainly American, models and infrastructures. This is typically driven by reduced deployment times, cost control, and access to state-of-the-art language models.

Despite the stated strategies of digital sovereignty, most of the countries studied remain highly dependent on foreign providers, particularly the United States, for language models and cloud infrastructures. This dependency is explicitly recognised in Finland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom²⁷¹ (tools based on Gemini, ChatGPT or Anthropic), Japan and South Korea (AWS Korea). Even in countries with in-house capabilities, such as Canada, architectures frequently combine public-sector developments with services provided by international players. In several countries, this situation is fuelling strategic discussions on reducing dependencies and promoting national or regional ecosystems (see below).

Several administrations have **set up public procurement and pooling mechanisms aimed at regulating the use of AI solutions on the market and limiting the risks of over-dependence.** The United States exemplifies this approach through the OneGov inter-ministerial agreements and the shared federal platforms managed by the GSA, which incorporate cybersecurity and compliance requirements from the start. In South Korea, the creation of a dedicated category for generative AI services within the Digital Service Mall facilitates large-scale deployment while guiding demand towards domestic providers. In Italy, certain public actors play a central role in structuring transparent and standardised procurement procedures²⁷², while in Canada and Singapore, partnerships and framework contracts are used to secure uses and governance.

Finally, **several countries are showing a growing desire to strengthen their technological sovereignty in AI,** either through the development of national models or through increased support for local players. This trend is particularly evident in Germany (open source and lack of vendor lock-in) and in South Korea (priority given to Upstage and domestic companies), Canada (partnership with Cohere²⁷³) and India (prominence of public infrastructure and Indian partners). However, these strategies are still largely combined with the use of foreign technologies, reflecting a hybrid approach rather than a strict technological decoupling.

²⁶⁹ Seoul Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the start-up Upstage provides government departments, local authorities and public bodies with a 'Generative AI Office Support Service', designed to automate and optimise administrative tasks.

²⁷⁰ Washington Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; for example, the General Services Administration (GSA) has strengthened the OneGov agreements, which provide inter-ministerial access to commercial and open-source templates and tools negotiated at federal level.

²⁷¹ London Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; for example, in the UK, the AI tool 'Extract' is based on Google's Gemini, the 'Consult' tool on ChatGPT, and 'GovUK Chat' on Anthropic's models.

²⁷² Rome Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the Italian Digital Agency (AGID, Agenzia per l'Italia Digitale) has been devoting increasing attention to drawing up guidelines to identify procurement procedures in accordance with the principles of transparency, fairness and non-discrimination, to avoid excessive dependence on suppliers.

²⁷³ Ottawa Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; for example, the federal government has entered into a partnership with Cohere, a Canadian company that specialises in generative AI, to explore and test the use of AI models in the civil service.



4.2. Administrations are gradually adopting centralised data governance and security mechanisms to regulate the use of AI

The administrations studied are shifting towards centralised data governance systems, based on rules governing classification, traceability and formal authorisation of uses. This approach aims to ensure the secure use of administrative data, particularly within the framework of generative AI, while enabling such data to be shared between public bodies. It is particularly well-established in the United States²⁷⁴, with formal cataloguing, metadata and prior authorisation requirements for the use of sensitive data, as well as in Canada, where the 'Policy on Service and Digital and Classification' (open, protected, classified data) structures access to data. Similar approaches are observed in Italy²⁷⁵, Singapore (inter-agency classification rules) and India (combination of sector-specific legislation, national cybersecurity frameworks and government cloud policies).

Securing AI environments appears to be a systematic prerequisite, with a preference for state-controlled or pre-certified infrastructures. Germany is an example of a 'maximum' control approach, with on-premise operation in a federal data centre²⁷⁶, without data transfer to the outside world and without reuse of the data for model training. Similar approaches to containment and flow control are seen in South Korea (deployment on internal administrative networks), in Estonia (controlled environments with formal security assessments) and in the United States, where only cloud services with certain certifications are permitted to process federal data. The use of secure testing environments, such as the UK's 'AI Sandboxes', also makes it possible to evaluate external solutions before they are rolled out more generally, without unduly exposing data.

The cloud is the standard infrastructure for most AI applications, including generative AI, provided there is stronger public regulation. Several countries have established government clouds or trust frameworks aimed at standardising requirements for hosting, encryption, resilience and reversibility. This is the case in the United States (FedRAMP), Japan (Government Cloud), Italy (the 'Cloud First' strategy and the requirements of the National Cybersecurity Agency), Singapore (Government Commercial Cloud) and India (government cloud policies similar to the 'trusted cloud' approach). These frameworks enable large-scale deployment while natively incorporating requirements for cybersecurity, auditability and regulatory compliance.

²⁷⁴ Washington Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the GSA has developed central catalogues that enable the origin and compliance of data to be traced before use.

²⁷⁵ Rome Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; in addition to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Administration Code (CAD) and the guidelines issued by the Italian Digital Agency (AGID, Agenzia per l'Italia Digitale) and the National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN) set out guidelines and technical standards regarding the use of data.

²⁷⁶ Berlin Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the federal government's AI platform 'KIPITZ', offers use cases in the form of applications within the portal, for example to create, summarise, categorise, translate or rephrase texts and documents; this platform is operated securely within ITZBund's own data centre (on-premises), which ensures full control over the infrastructure and data.



Some administrations explicitly distinguish between computing power requirements based on the nature of the use cases and their sensitivity. Common uses (conversational assistants, document automation, text analysis) are mainly handled on shared and certified cloud environments, such as the Government on Commercial Cloud (GCC) platform in Singapore or supervised public clouds in Finland and Italy²⁷⁷. On the other hand, compute-intensive or strategically sensitive uses (scientific research, complex simulations, advanced models) require dedicated high-performance computing infrastructures. This approach can be seen, for example, in the United States (supercomputers of the Department of Energy)²⁷⁸ and in Singapore (National Supercomputing Centre).²⁷⁹

Finally, **many countries rely on common technical standards to harmonise practices and reduce risks.** The United States is a prime example, with detailed security standards²⁸⁰, regular audits, and systematic human oversight for high-impact uses. Singapore is adopting a similar approach through centralised cloud monitoring, enhanced observability capabilities and management tools²⁸¹. These devices contribute to an increase in the consistency of technical architectures, while allowing a gradual increase in the use of AI in public administrations.

4.3. Ensuring their digital sovereignty, public administrations are emphasising controlling infrastructures, data and uses, particularly for sensitive uses

Digital sovereignty is mainly approached from the perspective of control rather than technological self-sufficiency. The cross-functional analysis shows that most the public administrations studied do not adopt a self-sufficient approach to digital sovereignty, but instead prioritise effective control over infrastructure, data and usage, including within the context of industrial partnerships. This approach is explicit in Germany, where the ‘multi-solution’ strategy allows models and infrastructure to be adapted to the required level of security, while integrating international partners (the United States, France) within a centralised public platform. Similar approaches are observed in the United States, Singapore and Canada, where sovereignty largely rests on the government’s ability to impose its standards, manage hosting conditions and retain the final say, regardless of the origin of the technologies used (Germany, United States, Singapore, Canada).

²⁷⁷ Rome Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; in fact, only a few Italian government departments have their own computing capacity, such as the tax authorities (for risk analysis and combating fraud).

²⁷⁸ Washington Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; for sensitive applications, certain organisations (such as the Department of Energy (DOE)) use supercomputers (High Performance Computing, HPC). These facilities provide massive computing power and total control over the location and security of data for sensitive or strategic research projects.

²⁷⁹ Singapore Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; Singapore has national high-performance computing (HPC) capabilities, notably through the National Supercomputing Centre (NSCC), for more computationally intensive or strategic projects.

²⁸⁰ Washington Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; in terms of cybersecurity, controls are also based on frameworks such as NIST SP 800-53, which set out best practices for managing the confidentiality, integrity and availability of systems.

²⁸¹ Singapore Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the Government on Commercial Cloud (GCC) platform, which hosts critical public services with high traffic volumes and relies on enhanced observability, auditability and cybersecurity capabilities (continuous log export, centralised monitoring, remote management).



In many countries, sovereignty is primarily conceived in terms of computing and data hosting infrastructure. Several states have set up government clouds or equivalent systems designed to ensure the tracking, resilience and public control of critical environments. Italy embodies a structured and proactive approach with the National Strategic Hub (PSN), which is intended to host all critical public data and services in data centres located within the country, under public control²⁸², with a rise in the number of user administrations. Similar approaches exist in the United States (certified federal platforms, national supercomputers), Japan (Government Cloud), Canada (secure and hybrid cloud environments) and India (a preference for data centres and clouds located within the country for government use). Estonia is taking an innovative approach to sovereign resilience with a 'data embassy' project located in Luxembourg, ensuring the continuity of the State in the event of a major crisis²⁸³.

Sovereignty is also discussed at length in terms of the nature and sensitivity of data. In most of the countries studied, public data is subject to strict classification rules governing its hosting, processing and exposure to AI solutions. Sensitive or strategic data is systematically processed in controlled environments, often on internal administrative networks, as is the case in South Korea and Germany. In India and Italy, explicit rules on data location or residency apply to certain sectors or levels of criticality. Singapore bases this approach on a detailed classification of data and the recognition of public data as a national asset, while imposing restrictions on personal and strategic data.

Several countries complement their approach with **explicit support for national capacities in AI models and software, to limit critical dependencies.** South Korea is promoting domestic players capable of operating directly on secure government networks, and the gradual development of independent core AI models. Germany is reinforcing this approach through the systematic evaluation of open-source and sovereign models by a dedicated federal agency, enabling ministries to choose solutions suited to their specific requirements. India is also adopting a proactive approach to promoting domestic capabilities, to avoid exclusive dependence on foreign 'black box' services. These strategies remain complementary, however, and do not lead to the exclusion of international players (South Korea, Germany, India).

²⁸² Rome Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the PSN is at the core of Italy's approach to sovereignty: under the control of the government, it hosts critical public data and services in Italian data centres. Public data is classified and hosted according to its level of criticality. Cloud providers are identified through a qualification process. By 2026, Italy intends to complete the migration of public data to this PSN to enhance its autonomy and security.

²⁸³ Riga Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; Estonia's sovereignty strategy is based in particular on the Data Embassy project in Luxembourg, which hosts copies of the Estonian state's critical data.



Ultimately, the approaches adopted by countries are quite varied, with some countries not structuring their AI strategy around a primary objective of digital sovereignty. For example, in the United Kingdom, priority is given to economic attractiveness and speed of deployment, with significant use of American companies and investments²⁸⁴. The issue of sovereignty can, however, be addressed indirectly through discussions on diversification when faced with a supplier duopoly. Conversely, Finland, while not having formalised a detailed doctrine, is attaching increasing importance to the protection of its data and infrastructure within a geopolitical context perceived as more constrained. These contrasts highlight the absence of a single model of sovereignty in AI, with approaches shaped by national geopolitical, economic and capability contexts.

4.4. Partnerships between public administrations and the private sector can bring together technological innovation and risk management in the deployment of AI solutions

The partnership models observed demonstrate that foreign public administrations are building hybrid ecosystems where open innovation, co-development, framework agreements with large companies and blended finance combine to secure access to AI technologies and critical infrastructure.

On the one hand, many countries are launching **innovation programmes to test and support start-ups in real-world scenarios**. These schemes make it possible to trial lower-risk solutions and to promote the emergence of new public technologies. Estonia, through the Accelerate Estonia programme, funds pilot projects up to €90,000 and brings together universities, start-ups and regional partners. Singapore uses calls for innovation and incubation programmes such as the Llama Incubator, in partnership with the US company Meta, enabling start-ups to work on AI tools tailored to public needs. For its part, Italy combines GovTech accelerators and public consultations to jointly design solutions and test technologies in real-world conditions. These initiatives show that open innovation is becoming a key driver for bringing the public sector and the entrepreneurial ecosystem closer together.

Administrations are also developing **strategic agreements and partnerships with major technology providers to secure access to reliable cloud and AI services** that comply with security standards. In the United States, the OneGov device facilitates access to standardised and secure cloud and AI services (Anthropic, AWS, Google) for all federal agencies, while promoting the adoption of new technologies at scale. Germany is adopting a 'multi-vendor' approach (with the use of Anthropic, Microsoft, OpenAI and Mistral), making it possible to adapt the choice of AI models to different use cases. The UK relies on Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with OpenAI, Anthropic and Google DeepMind to secure access to cutting-edge technologies. These models reflect a **desire to combine technological innovation and risk management**, enabling users to benefit from technological advances while ensuring control over the use of the tools.

²⁸⁴ London Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; the current British government supports and encourages US investment in the construction of data centres within its territory, and is also working with US companies to develop its AI tools.



Some public sector organisations go beyond simply purchasing marketplace solutions and prioritise joint development with industry and academia, especially for compute-intensive infrastructures. In the United States, the Department of Energy and the National Laboratories collaborate with supercomputer manufacturers and software providers to create strategic scientific capabilities, ensuring public control over data and computing²⁸⁵. In South Korea, the competition between private providers to build public cloud infrastructures embodies a combined approach, where the private sector is involved²⁸⁶, while maintaining state control. These experiences show that co-development may seek to reconcile technical performance with operational autonomy.

Partnerships observed between public and private actors are often based on **combined funding models, integrating public and private funds to support AI innovation**. In Italy, the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) is implemented jointly with private funds to co-finance AI projects. India combines national integrators, start-ups, universities and international initiatives, in order to develop and test solutions tailored to the needs of the public sector. These mechanisms reduce **the financial burden for public administrations** while potentially boosting the local and regional AI ecosystem.

Finally, the mobilisation of partnerships is not limited to technology: it also includes **training and governance mechanisms**, which are essential to secure the deployment of AI tools. In the United States, programmes such as the AI Government Leadership Program prepare decision-makers to steer and regulate AI initiatives, sometimes with the support of private actors such as Google and Microsoft²⁸⁷.

²⁸⁵ Washington Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; “initiatives such as GENESIS embody this model, in which the State does not merely purchase existing solutions, but co-develops cutting-edge AI infrastructure and capabilities, while maintaining public control over security, governance and data localisation” [quotation not original].

²⁸⁶ Seoul Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force; in 2025, the South Korean government initiated a tender involving five private companies (including Samsung SDS, Naver Cloud and AWS Korea) for the provision of services and the development of cloud infrastructure for the public sector.

²⁸⁷ Washington Regional Economic Service, 2026, information provided to the task force.



ANNEX 3

Human resources, dialogue on technology and social issues and training



CONTENTS

1. THE ROLL-OUT OF AI, WHOSE IMPACT IS NOT UNIFORM OR AUTOMATIC, RAISES SIGNIFICANT HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR.....	ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
1.1. The impacts of AI on employment, working conditions and the organisation of work in the public sector will vary	2
1.1.1. <i>A degree of exposure and substitutability differs according to the sector, the level of qualification and the length of service</i>	2
1.1.2. <i>Mixed effects on working conditions and work organisation.....</i>	3
1.2. The impacts of AI on the public sector depends on the reform of the human resources management model	4
1.3. The integration of AI into professional practices in the public sector helps to attract and retain younger generations of public sector staff	5
2. DIALOGUE ON TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL ISSUES, WHICH IS ONE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT OF AI, IS STILL NOT WIDESPREAD IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.....	6
2.1. The constructive and desirable use of dialogue on technology and social issues ... Error! Bookmark not defined.	
2.2. Dialogue on technology and social issues facing significant obstacles	9
2.2.1. <i>A conventional framework that is still not very developed.....</i>	9
2.2.2. <i>Dialogue on technology and social issues facing significant obstacles.....</i>	14
3. TRAINING PUBLIC SECTOR STAFF IN AI IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE, YET THIS IS STILL NOT BEING GIVEN SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION.....	17
3.1. The roll-out of AI, which is expected to have a major impact – albeit one whose implications for skills are still unclear – and which requires significant investment in training.....	17
3.1.1. <i>An impact that is certainly significant, but whose implications for skills remain unclear.....</i>	17
3.1.2. <i>The recognised need for a major training initiative</i>	18
3.2. A notoriously inadequate range of AI training programmes, particularly in the public sector	19



While studies and surveys on the deployment of AI in the private sector are becoming increasingly numerous, they are far rarer when it comes to the public sector, particularly in human resources management. It is nevertheless possible to draw on the lessons learnt from the private sector to analyse the conditions for the successful deployment of AI in the public sector. Comparisons with public administrations in other countries also teach us some interesting lessons.

As in the private sector, the introduction of artificial intelligence into public administrations is not primarily a technological issue or priority. It is, above all, part of the structural transformation of the public sector, which is itself facing significant and well-identified challenges²⁸⁸.

1. The roll-out of AI, whose impact is not uniform or automatic, raises significant human resources management challenges for the public sector

1.1. The impacts of AI on employment, working conditions and the organisation of work in the public sector will vary

As highlighted in the Artificial Intelligence Committee's report in 2024²⁸⁹, AI potentially has three categories of effects on workers in both the public and private sectors:

- ♦ **task automation:** AI tools can shift workload from agents to the machine, they can make the completion of tasks simpler or smoother, and they can help to carry out tasks that are currently not being done or are being done inconsistently;
- ♦ **additional efficiency and relevance:** AI tools can provide information, assist public officials during their interaction with users, or assist in leading a discussion or generating the first draft of a text, for example, etc.;
- ♦ **generation of new activities.**

The extent to which staff are exposed to, and can be replaced by, AI varies significantly depending on their functions (see below, Annex 16). Similarly, the effects of AI on staff's working conditions and the organisation of their work are highly mixed.

1.1.1. A degree of exposure and substitutability differs according to the sector, the level of qualification and the length of service

The potential impact of artificial intelligence on jobs varies considerably in both the public and private sectors, depending on the functions and how they are broken down into distinct tasks, which are themselves more or less substitutable or augmentable²⁹⁰.

²⁸⁸ Barrios, D., Cheston, T., Cunningham, B. et Ricardo Hausmann, R. (Harvard Kennedy School), 2021, [Coordination Failures in Adopting New Technological Capabilities as the Binding Constraint to Growth](#), Growth Lab Working Paper Series No. 248, 39 p. See also chapter 1.2 below.

²⁸⁹ [IA : Notre ambition pour la France](#), Report by the Artificial Intelligence Committee chaired by Philippe Aghion and Anne Bouverot, 2024, 139 p.

²⁹⁰ See Annex 16 to analyse the potential impact of AI on jobs in the public sector in France.



Recent work by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),²⁹¹ the International Labour Organization (ILO),²⁹² the strategy consulting firm Roland Berger²⁹³ and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)²⁹⁴ shows that generative AI affects jobs in the public and private sectors differently, depending on the level of standardisation of the tasks. Jobs in the administrative sector, which are widely represented in the public sector, are generally more impacted than jobs in the technical sector. **Women are, therefore, generally more exposed than men** because they are more common in these professions²⁹⁵. The least-skilled administrative roles, which are widespread in public administrations, are currently the most vulnerable to automation, but AI may also have a significant impact on the work carried out by certain highly skilled public sector employees.

Although this is a much-debated issue, it is possible that AI could widen the gaps between workers based on their level of qualifications, their access to training and their position within the organisation. With this in mind, the introduction of AI could risk exacerbating certain vulnerabilities that already exist within public administrations.

A specific risk related to AI concerns new entrants to the labour market: its roll-out could undermine the career paths of younger people²⁹⁶ by removing the training opportunities required for the gradual acquisition of expertise, particularly in certain technical sectors (consulting, lawyers, coding, etc.).

1.1.2. Mixed effects on working conditions and work organisation

More than the volume of jobs, according to the available studies – which should be treated with caution – AI could bring about profound changes to the nature of jobs in the public and private sectors alike, as well as to the conditions under which they are carried out, with mixed effects on the quality of public sector employees' work.

AI could free up time for higher value-added tasks, but also, in some cases, risks reducing the role of staff to mere passive supervision of automated systems. Most importantly, AI could reshape the nature of many sectors by automating tasks that sometimes lie at the very heart of long-established expertise or knowledge. The gradual automation of standardised tasks could lead to the restructuring of work ranging from automated activities (under human supervision) to assisted activities and activities that fully require human intervention.

²⁹¹ Peixoto, C. et al, 2024, [AI and the Future of Government: Unexpected Effects and Critical Challenges](#), Policy paper.

²⁹² Cf. OIT, [Observatory on AI and Work in the Digital Economy](#).

²⁹³ Roland Berger, 2025, [The public sector in the age of Gen AI](#).

²⁹⁴ OCDE, 2025, [Gouverner avec l'intelligence artificielle](#), 349 p.

²⁹⁵ 63% of civil servants as at 31 December 2022 are women, DGAFP, 2025, [Rapport annuel sur l'état de la fonction publique - Édition 2024](#) and 64% as at 31 December 2022, INSEE, 2026, [L'emploi dans la fonction publique en 2024](#).

²⁹⁶ Dallas Federal Reserve, 2026, [Young workers' employment drops in occupations with high AI exposure](#): "Consistent with other analyses, we find some correlation across occupations between employment declines and AI exposure, but only for younger workers".



The specific characteristics of AI (speed of dissemination, capacity to learn, information asymmetries) will place increased pressure on working relationships within public administrations (as well as private companies). In doing so, **AI could lead to a cognitive intensification of work**. As a result, new psychosocial risks could emerge, exacerbated by a potential loss of meaning in work²⁹⁷.

According to the Social Security Lab²⁹⁸, “a longitudinal study published by Nature Humanities and Social Sciences Communications shows that while AI can improve perceived efficiency, it **also increases stress** among staff facing greater complexity and partially opaque processes. Another study, conducted by MIT and the University of Southampton, indicates that the use of AI tools in cognitive tasks alters brain activity: users rely more heavily on their executive functions, at the cost of **faster cognitive fatigue**, particularly when tasks are repeated over long periods”.

According to the labour sociologist Juan Sebastian Carbonnel, quoted by the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) in a recent press release²⁹⁹, AI would present a risk of ‘augmented Taylorism’, with management using the monopoly of work organisation to control each stage of the work process and its execution. Thus, according to this author, “generative AI can ‘enhance’ work by eliminating ‘low-value-added tasks’ – namely, routine cognitive tasks – but we are seeing that generative AI can also create more work during the finalisation, correction and checking stages. It can also deprive skilled workers of the creative aspects of their profession and reduce them to the role of mere appendages.”

On another note, the role of local management in public administrations is set to grow in importance with AI. This is because managers are responsible for securing uses, regulating practices, maintaining the quality of the service provided and supporting the public officials who report to them in the face of changes in work. AI could also relieve managers of certain planning, organisational and coordination tasks. However, this will lead them to base their legitimacy on their cross-functional skills and their authenticity, while developing a keener sense of discernment and critical thinking. The deployment of AI could also give rise to more far-reaching changes to the way departments are organised (change in the organisation chart, in the sequencing of missions).

1.2. The impacts of AI on the public sector depends on the reform of the human resources management model

As the report of the commission on artificial intelligence points out, “the public sector should be one of the first to benefit from digital technology. The roll-out of AI presents an opportunity to revitalise this transformation, provided that the barriers which continue to impede a genuine digital transformation of the public sector are removed. These are the very same barriers that will prevent us from capitalising on AI and banking on a proliferation of initiatives.”³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷ See Nurski, L. et al., “Working conditions and sustainable work. Implications of AI for work, employment and social dialogue: Literature review”. *Eurofound Working Paper*. 2025.

²⁹⁸ Social security, Le Lab, 2025, [IA et management](#), monitoring report.

²⁹⁹ UFICT-CGT, 2026, [Le travail au temps de l'IA: Juan Sebastián Carbonell, Un taylorisme augmenté. Critique de l'intelligence artificielle](#). See also, *Le Monde*, 18 Sep. 2025, “[Un taylorisme augmenté » : comment l'IA dégrade l'organisation du travail](#)”.

³⁰⁰ A January 2023 IGF-CGE report on the public sector’s human resources in the digital sector analyses these obstacles and the challenges which the public sector must deal with in this area.



The report highlights that the deployment of artificial intelligence can accelerate the transformation of public services and offers the prospect of more personalised and efficient services, while generative AI makes the relationship with users easier and more fluid. AI also offers significant potential for improving administrative efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in the processing of standardised files or the analysis of large amounts of documents.

But the success of this transformation depends less on technology alone than on the ability of the public sector to redesign roles, career paths and organisations to retain staff expertise and commitment, and to manage the increased cognitive and time demands as a result of routine tasks being eliminated or reduced.

In particular, **the task force's investigations show that a successful roll-out of AI must be embedded at the heart of human resources (HR) management policies and forward-looking management of jobs and skills (GPEC), and not driven solely by information systems (IS) or innovation functions.** The literature review³⁰¹ also indicates that the introduction of AI is facilitated in organisations characterised by a high degree of modularity, where tasks can be isolated and reconfigured without disrupting the entire production system.

The OECD also points out that public administrations that have invested heavily in new technologies in the past without transforming their HR models have seen limited or even counterproductive effects, while those that have integrated training, management and social dialogue into a unified strategy have achieved incremental but lasting gains.

For human resources managers (and digital departments) in the various public administrations, the lesson is strategic: making AI a lever for collective performance implies simultaneously acting on access to tools, skills development, work organisation and the recognition of new skills. Otherwise, AI risks not being up to the task, or even undermining the public sector's commitment to setting a social example.

The successful deployment of AI and its impact on jobs and working conditions in the public sector therefore require significant investment in overhauling work processes, redefining staff roles, human resources management policies, forward-looking management of jobs and skills and adapting management and coordination methods. The level of readiness among the various public administrations in France to carry out such a transformation varies greatly.

1.3. The integration of AI into professional practices in the public sector helps to attract and retain younger generations of public sector staff

The successful integration of AI into the professional practices of different functions is not an option for either public administrations or private companies, even though public and private environments are distinct.

³⁰¹ See Eurofound, above.



Indeed, in a tight labour market characterised by numerous sector-specific shortages, despite a persistently high unemployment rate³⁰², competition for young talent is fierce and entails numerous challenges in terms of attracting and retaining staff for the civil service³⁰³, whose age profile is ageing³⁰⁴. The State now recruits most contract workers who are older than the civil servants it recruited before, in a context where career paths are less linear than they used to be, but still more linear than in the private sector.

If public administrations wish to continue to remain attractive employers for the young graduates³⁰⁵ and other talents they need and whose profiles and aspirations are undergoing profound changes, it is therefore essential to meet the same standards as major private sector employers: career development and fostering a sense of purpose; providing all staff with high-performance AI tools to prevent 'shadow AI'; specific training courses, etc.

2. Dialogue on technology and social issues, which is one of the conditions for the successful deployment of AI, is still not widespread in public administrations

2.1. The constructive and desirable use of dialogue on technology and social issues

As the Blanchard-Tirole report pointed out³⁰⁶, “companies that take stakeholders’ interests into account are more likely to roll out new technologies that empower workers, give them autonomy and put them in control of their working conditions, rather than replacing them or reducing them to performing mechanical and routine tasks”.

The Blanchard-Tirole report is supported by a study by the Council of State on AI,³⁰⁷ which underlines that “the issue of the impact of a task’s automation by an information system on public-sector employment and the working conditions of public-sector employees must be the subject of an appropriate social dialogue, which cannot be reduced to simply convening a technical committee”.

³⁰² According to Eurostat, the unemployment rate in France equalled 7.7% in December 2025, making it the fourth-worst performance in the European Union (after Finland, Spain and Sweden) and 1.8 percentage points above the EU average. According to the OECD, the unemployment rate in France was also 7.7% in January 2026, ranking 8th in the OECD, far behind Japan, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, the United States, Hungary, Norway and Ireland, all of which are below the OECD average unemployment rate of 5%.

³⁰³ For a recent update on the challenges facing the attractiveness of the civil service, see the Court of Auditors, 2025, [L'accès des jeunes aux emplois de l'État, une stratégie à construire](#), 99 p.

³⁰⁴ Court of Auditors, 2024, [L'allongement de la vie professionnelle des agents dans une fonction publique d'État vieillissante](#): “The proportion of people aged over 60 has indeed increased from 4% in 2010 to 9% in 2021 and is expected to reach 12% by 2030”, given, on the one hand, people entering the workforce later and, on the other, longer working lives.

³⁰⁵ In France, 70% of ChatGPT users are under 25. For 65% of them, the role of AI in their future working environment will be a major factor in their choice of first employer. See Miroir social, 2025, [l'IA, nouveau défi RH pour la Fonction Publique](#).

³⁰⁶ Olivier Blanchard and Jean Tirole, 2021, [Les grands défis économiques](#), p. 322 of 510.

³⁰⁷ Council of State, 2022, [Intelligence artificielle et action publique : construire la confiance, servir la performance](#), p. 125 of 360.



The President of the Republic himself insisted, in a speech in May 2024, that “AI should be a topic for social dialogue informed by science and objective research. [...] The changes will be all the more acceptable if they are properly prepared for, if people are supported, and if new opportunities are created”.

According to an international literature review published in 2025 by Eurofound³⁰⁸, dialogue on technology and social issues should, as with previous technological innovations³⁰⁹, play a central role in how AI transforms work. The first dedicated work by MIT – based on interviews with different categories of employees – on generative AI³¹⁰ seems to confirm this point.

A dialogue on technology and social issues can be established without affecting existing legislation. Indeed, the provisions of the Labour Code for companies (“The works council is informed and consulted on the introduction of new technologies”)³¹¹ and the General Civil Service Code (CGFP) for public administrations³¹² (“The specialist committee [reporting to the works council] is consulted for its opinion [...] on major projects to introduce new technologies and when these new technologies are introduced”) can be applied in case of an AI tool’s roll-out.

Such dialogue on technology and social issues appears essential to anticipate the impact of technology on jobs, skills and working conditions; to regulate the use of AI and digital technology, ensuring transparency, human oversight and respect for rights; and to encourage employees to welcome innovation, while protecting quality of life at work (QWLC).³¹³

The dialogue on technology and social issues should enable discussions to take place with workers and their representatives on the aims and significance of the technological changes affecting them, and ensure that these changes lead to progress, particularly regarding skills development and social advancement³¹⁴. It must be an essential catalyst for shaping a climate of trust and acceptability in companies and administrations.

³⁰⁸ Eurofound, 2025, [Implications of AI for work, employment and social dialogue: Literature review](#), 89 p.

³⁰⁹ Vereycken, Y., Ramioul, M. and Hermans, M., 2021, “Old wine in new bottles? Revisiting employee participation in Industry 4.0”, *New Technology, Work and Employment*, Vol. 36, 1 : “There are several rationales for involving workers in the adoption of workplace technologies, ranging from improving implementation outcomes to ensuring fairness and accountability”.

³¹⁰ Kochan, T. A., Armstrong, B., Shah, J., Castilla, E. J., Likis, B. et al, 2024, [Bringing Worker Voice Into Generative AI. An MIT Exploration of Generative AI](#).

³¹¹ [Article L2312-8](#) of the Labour Code: “The works council shall be informed and consulted on the introduction of new technologies and any major changes affecting health and safety conditions or working conditions.” See also [Article L4121-1](#), which stipulates a strengthened duty of care and a principle of prevention (“The employer shall take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and protect the mental health of workers”), which may apply where AI presents a risk.

³¹² Article [R253-28](#) of the General Civil Service Code (CGFP): “The specialist working group reporting to the works council is consulted for its opinion on matters relating to [...] 4. The organisation of work [...] 6. Issues relating to digital detox and measures to regulate the use of digital tools” and, in particular, Article [R253-29](#) of the CGFP: « Aside from the cases provided for in paragraph 5 of Article R. 253-11, the specialist committee shall be consulted for its opinion on: 1. Major development projects that alter health and safety conditions or working conditions, and in particular: a) Prior to any significant alteration to workstations as a result of a change in equipment, a change in product or a change in the organisation of work; b) Prior to any change to the organisation and timing of work, work rates and productivity standards, whether or not linked to remuneration; 2. Major projects involving the introduction of new technologies and, upon the introduction of such new technologies, where they are likely to have an impact on the health and safety of staff [...]”.

³¹³ See in particular ANACT, 2025, [Le développement du dialogue social-technologique-en France](#), capitalisation ratio, 62 p.

³¹⁴ See also CESE, 2025, [Le CESE s'accorde pour définir le cadre de déploiement de l'intelligence artificielle](#): “for the EESC, the deployment of AI in the public interest must be based on four inseparable criteria: compatibility with planetary boundaries, social progress, economic considerations and respect for fundamental rights and individual freedoms”.



Involving staff and their representatives at an early stage of AI implementation – right from the proof-of-concept (POC) phase – would improve the acceptability of AI systems, the performance of AI systems and, ultimately, the quality of employment. Conversely, unilateral roll-out without dialogue on technology and social issues would increase the risk of industrial disputes and a deterioration in working conditions.

The OECD³¹⁵ states that “social partners can facilitate the use of AI by helping to decide which AI technologies are adopted, facilitating their introduction, and defining training needs. They can also help firms in providing flexible and pragmatic – yet fair – responses to technological changes in the workplace and contribute to enhance the quality of the working environment. Social partners can also shape the design and definition of new rights, such as the right to not be subject to automated decision-making without human oversight, and improve existing ones, such as the right to training. Finally, collective bargaining can also complement public policies in enhancing workers’ security and adaptability”.

Basically, dialogue on technology and social issues in public administrations, both at national level and at ministerial and local level, is required by regulation (see below), but also useful to develop the learning capacity of these organisations and to build enabling configurations.

The work of Labor’IA³¹⁶ indicates that successful AI projects need to be based on ‘real work’ rather than prescribed work, at the level and on the same footing as the staff member and their local team, taking into account stakeholders (internal and external, starting with customers – in this case, users of public services).

The Economic, Social and Environmental Council (EESC)³¹⁷ considers it necessary to establish a renewed social dialogue, in step with the development and introduction of AI, on the reality of this technology within work collectives, and on the anticipated changes to skills, jobs and working practices. The introduction of AI into the day-to-day work of public sector employees is also an issue of social democracy: to this end, negotiations between public sector employees, their representatives and employers must be held regularly, not only at the outset but also on a frequent basis.

The EESC highlights nine focus areas that are needed for a constructive dialogue on technology and social issues:

- transparency regarding the process for introducing and rolling out AI by department;
- consequences of this introduction on the content of jobs and the training and support induced;
- consequences on working time and work organisation;

³¹⁵ OCDE, 2023, [Employment Outlook 2023](#) and in particular in chapter 7 “Social dialogue and collective bargaining in the age of artificial intelligence”. While acknowledging the ‘decline’ of traditional trade unions within companies, and the risks of ‘under-representation’ caused by new ways of working resulting from the roll-out of AI (self-employment, remote working), S. Cazes points out that: “Social partners can facilitate the use of AI by helping to decide which AI technologies are adopted, facilitating their introduction, and defining training needs. They can also help firms in providing flexible and pragmatic – yet fair – responses to technological changes in the workplace and contribute to enhance the quality of the working environment. Social partners can also shape the design and definition of new rights, such as the right to not be subject to automated decision-making without human oversight, and improve existing ones, such as the right to training. Finally, collective bargaining can also complement public policies in enhancing workers’ security and adaptability”, p. 224.

³¹⁶ Labor IA, 2024, [Rapport d’étude général](#), 90 p.

³¹⁷ CESE, 2025, [Intelligence artificielle, travail et emploi : co-construire un nouveau dialogue social est indispensable \(analyse de controverses\)](#).



- monitoring the impact on employees' physical and mental health resulting from a possible increase in workload³¹⁸ and, where appropriate, in a blurring of the separation between personal and professional lives;
- conditions for preventing AI-related biases relating to gender, disability, age, etc.;
- conditions for sharing value from expected productivity gains;
- environmental impact of the use of AI;
- how companies can access this technology.
- dialogue on technology and social issues helps to increase the social acceptance of AI within administrations.

2.2. Dialogue on technology and social issues developed in different ways

2.2.1. A conventional framework that is still not very developed

2.2.1.1. The European framework

Article 4 of the European AI Act, which came into force in 2025, requires AI providers and deployers to take measures to ensure a sufficient level of AI proficiency for their staff. But there is still no *ad hoc* EU legal instrument for effective social dialogue on the deployment of AI systems, despite calls from the European Economic and Social Committee to do so³¹⁹.

A framework agreement on the digital transformation of organisations was concluded in 2020³²⁰ as part of the autonomous social dialogue process. It is an 'autonomous framework agreement', formerly referred to as a 'voluntary agreement', so in other words, it does not become an integral part of EU law directly. It does not take the form of a directive, but its implementation at national, sectoral or company level is the responsibility of the social partners themselves. It is therefore not legally enforceable and is rather a reference framework of 'recommendations' for the legislator and the social partners.

Four deep-seated issues, including artificial intelligence, are particularly highlighted: digital skills and job security, the procedures for logging in and logging out, artificial intelligence and ensuring the principle of human oversight, respect for human dignity and monitoring.

³¹⁸ HBR, 2026, [AI Doesn't Reduce Work—It Intensifies It](#) by Ranganathan and Ye (University of Berkeley), who studied a company (specialising in coding and software) with 200 employees over a period of eight months (April to December 2025) using generative AI. The main findings of this study are as follows:

- the employees “worked at a faster pace”;
- the employees covered a “broader scope of tasks”;
- they worked harder than before, often on their own initiative (“more hours of the day, often without being asked to do so”).


³¹⁹ European Economic and Social Committee, 2024, [Intelligence artificielle utilisée à des fins générales: la voie à suivre après la législation sur l'intelligence artificielle](#): “the EESC [...] advises organising dialogues with stakeholders, including social partners, about the codes of practice in workplaces and workers' rights in the context of GPAI”.

³²⁰ See ANACT, 2021, [Accord européen sur la transformation numérique des entreprises : pour un dialogue social technologique](#).



The scope of this agreement is broad, as it covers all workers and employers in the public and private sectors in all areas of economic activity where an employment relationship exists in accordance with national definitions.

Figure 5: Framework agreement on the digital transformation of organisations



Source: ANACT, 2023, [Anticipating European agreements](#), 24 p.

A European framework agreement of the Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee for State and Federal Government Departments on Digitalisation extended the 2020 agreement and was formalised in October 2022³²¹ between trade union (TUNED) and employer (EUPAE) representatives.

It sets out “common minimum requirements designed to regulate the use of digital technology at work, and in particular to ensure that digitalisation is accompanied by social progress and tangible benefits for workers, employers and users, to improve and promote equal opportunities and equal treatment, work-life balance, the organisation of work and meaningful jobs; to encourage and promote constructive and effective social dialogue and trade union rights at national level; to ensure satisfactory levels of administrative efficiency; to prevent and mitigate risks to workers’ health and safety; and to implement human-centred digitalisation, including where artificial intelligence is employed”.

The European framework agreement puts forward many requirements regarding artificial intelligence in public administrations. The main ones are as follows:

- “When introducing or strengthening systems using AI, workers’ representatives shall be closely involved in this process, at an early stage, to ensure that the systems are user-friendly and compatible with respect for workers’ rights and good working conditions, taking into account the potential impacts on workers’ autonomy, their skills and job satisfaction”;
- “Administrations must retain full autonomy in decision-making and oversight when introducing systems using AI, and make the necessary investments to acquire the necessary IT expertise and skills”;

³²¹ [Accord-cadre européen EUPAE/TUNED pour un service de qualité dans les administrations des gouvernements centraux](#), 2022, 11 p.

- “AI shall be governed by the principle of ‘human in the loop’ and human oversight, to ensure that decision-making remains transparent, explainable, understandable and reversible”;
- “New tasks and jobs shall be defined through social dialogue and/or collective bargaining. When designing systems that use AI, job impact assessments shall be carried out in consultation with trade unions to determine at an early stage whether any activities will be replaced, which ones, and how the staff concerned should be prepared for their new tasks”;
- “To avoid redundancies, retraining shall be offered to staff whose jobs are threatened by AI.”

2.2.1.2. The national framework

At the national level, a form of dialogue on technology and social issues is generally provided for in the existing normative texts: the Labour Code for companies³²² and the General Civil Service Code (CGFP) for public administrations³²³.

In private companies, the powers of employee representatives have been extended by two recent court rulings. According to the decision of the Pontoise Judicial Court (*Tribunal judiciaire de Pontoise*, TJ),³²⁴ the introduction of a new technology in itself justifies the right to commission an expert assessment, without it being necessary to demonstrate that there are any repercussions on employees’ working conditions. Even more recently, the Nanterre Judicial Court (*Tribunal judiciaire de Nanterre*)³²⁵ also clarified the powers of the Establishment Social Committee (CSE) in the ‘pilot’ phases of introducing an AI system (AIS).

In addition, the Labour Code³²⁶ lays down a reinforced obligation of means and a principle of prevention. It can be applied when AI presents itself as a risk.

As far as the civil service is concerned, collective agreements are provided for by the law of 6 August 2019 on the reform of the civil service, which reforms social dialogue, and in the ordinance of 17 February 2021 on collective bargaining and agreements in the civil service, as well as in the decree of 20 November 2020. “The digitalisation of procedures, technological developments and the working methods of the administrations are taken into account.”

³²² [Article L2312-8](#) of the Labour Code: “The works council shall be informed and consulted on the introduction of new technologies and any major changes affecting health and safety conditions or working conditions”.

³²³ Article [R253-28](#) of the CGFP: “The specialist working group reporting to the works council is consulted for its opinion on matters relating to [...] 4. The organisation of work [...] 6. Issues relating to digital detox and measures to regulate the use of digital tools” and, in particular, Article [R253-29](#) of the CGFP : “Aside from the cases provided for in paragraph 5 of Article R. 253-11, the specialist committee shall be consulted for its opinion on: 1. Major development projects that alter health and safety conditions or working conditions, and in particular: a) Prior to any significant alteration to workstations as a result of a change in equipment, a change in product or a change in the organisation of work; b) Prior to any change to the organisation and timing of work, work rates and productivity standards, whether or not linked to remuneration; 2. Major projects involving the introduction of new technologies and, upon the introduction of such new technologies, where they are likely to have an impact on the health and safety of staff [...]”.

³²⁴ TJ Pontoise, 15 April 2022, GR no. 22/00134, S.A.S. Atos International v. the Works Council of Atos International.

³²⁵ By ordonnance of 14 February 2025 GR no. 24/01457.

³²⁶ [Article L4121-1](#) of the Labour Code: “The employer shall take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and protect the mental health of workers”.



The 2019 law on the reform of the civil service enabled the creation of a new body: the specialised network unit. This body, which reports to the social and administrative committee, may analyse the occupational risks to which staff may be exposed and suggest any measures likely to improve health and safety at work. In line with Articles L2312-8 and L2315-94 of the Labour Code for private-sector companies, it is therefore possible to involve these bodies in the introduction of new technologies. This may lead, for example, to requests for impact assessments.

♦ The private sector

In the private sector, the trade unions have called for the conclusion of a national interprofessional agreement (ANI) on AI in line with the European framework agreement. However, this request had not yet been accepted by employers at the time of the task force's work.


Dialogue on technology and social issues approaches are gradually being put in place in the sectors and companies:

- the Dial-IA project, led by the Institute of Economic and Social Research (IRES), in partnership with the CFDT, CFE-CGC, UGICT-CGT, and FO Cadres, offers a practical toolbox for rethinking social dialogue in the age of AI;
- the DIAG project, led by the Matrice social and technological innovation centre and the Institut Catholique d'Arts et Métiers (a private, non-profit graduate engineering school) in Toulouse;
- while only less than one in a thousand collective agreements concluded between 2007 and 2024 refer to artificial intelligence, the number of such agreements increased by a factor of 2.5 between 2018 and 2023³²⁷. The sectors where agreements are most numerous are those of information and communication, finance, and manufacturing (see figure below);
- method agreements concluded between the social partners provide for more frequent consultations;
- three commitments for the development of employment and skills (EDEC), signed by the State and skills operators (OPCO), include an AI dimension: the rail EDEC, the EDEC for the entertainment insurance sectors (AFDAS) and the EDEC Trans'Formation.

³²⁷ See Greenan, N. et al., CEET, 2024, [L'IA dans les entreprises : que révèlent les accords négociés?](#), 4 p. and Chagny, O. and Marzo, C., IRES, 2025, [Dialogue social. Accords collectifs et Intelligence artificielle](#), working document, no. 03.2025, IRES, 29 p.



Figure 6: Number of agreements by industry, 2024



The sectors logistics, industry and cultural industries were selected by Labor IA, the action research laboratory dedicated to AI in the professional sphere and coordinated by the Ministry of Labour and the National Institute for Research in Digital Science and Technology (INRIA), to be the subject of specific, in-depth studies in 2025

Source: Greenan et al., CEET, 2024, [L'IA dans les entreprises : que révèlent les accords négociés ?](#)

♦ The public sector

In the public sector, there is currently no national agreement despite requests from several unions.

Several initiatives nevertheless exist, in particular on the part of the General Directorate of Administration and the Civil Service (DGAFP).

The roadmap of the State's Human Resources Information System (HRIS) of 8 March 2023 for the period 2023-2027 has included a new objective since the end of March 2024 of examining the use of AI. This objective is cross-cutting and concerns all areas of HRM (skills, digitalisation, management, etc.).

In June 2024, the DGAFP also published a 'strategy for the use of AI in HRM³²⁸', developed with the interministerial network for HR foresight and debated within the framework of the Human Resources Orientation Council (CORH). In particular, it points out that "the use of AI is currently envisaged as a means of supporting, rather than replacing, human labour, for specific – though by no means exhaustive – tasks within a profession. It therefore appears premature at the very least to envisage, for example, that AI tools could be entrusted with the entire process of strategic workforce planning (GPEEC)". In this context, a survey of the inter-ministerial HR foresight network carried out between December 2023 and January 2024 identified 26 potential use cases for AI in HRM³²⁹ "as three categories and in descending order of votes":

- "Five use cases are considered particularly 'desirable': analysis of internal survey results; context-specific training recommendations; personalised learning; drafting job descriptions; and identification of emerging skills";
- "Four use cases are considered 'to be avoided': early detection of mental health issues; analysis of relationships between colleagues; automated video interviews with applicants; and recognition and reward systems";

³²⁸ DGAFP, 2024, [Stratégie d'usage de l'intelligence artificielle en matière de gestion des ressources humaines dans la fonction publique d'État](#), 18 p.

³²⁹ These 26 use cases are taken from Tomorrow Theory's [AI & HR](#) report, 2023.

- “17 use cases are considered ‘feasible’ subject to certain conditions: personalised onboarding pathways; personalised career paths; assessment of candidates’ skills; real-time feedback on training courses completed; training of interdisciplinary teams; analysis of data measuring staff well-being; succession planning for roles; identification of hidden skills; combating cognitive biases during recruitment; monitoring and evaluating staff progress; personalisation of employee benefits; monitoring and improving organisational culture; mentoring and career development; analysis of objectives and results; analysis of feedback from colleagues and service users; personalised programmes of initiatives to promote staff well-being; measuring the return on investment of well-being initiatives”.

DGAFP has also included AI on the social agenda announced at the end of summer 2025. It has proposed to trade union representatives and employers’ representatives on the Joint Council for the Civil Service (CCFP) a programme structured around five working groups, with meetings held every two months until autumn 2026. This programme could lead to the development of general guidelines on the use of AI in the field of human resources for public sector employers, including local authorities and hospitals, and to potential regulatory changes where necessary.

The topics addressed include, in particular, the conditions for the ethical deployment and use of AI in the public sector (governance, social dialogue, training, support), AI and HR data, raising awareness of the environmental implications of AI, AI and the organisation of work, and AI and its applications in public sector HR management.

Several ministries (the Interior, Justice, Economy and Finance, etc.) have also embarked on discussions on this topic, and local authorities have adopted ethical charters that specifically address artificial intelligence.

2.2.2. Dialogue on technology and social issues facing significant obstacles

While the principle of a dialogue on technology and social issues is a necessity, in practice there are numerous obstacles to its implementation on the ground.

Traditional consultation frameworks (information and consultation, and *ad hoc* consultations) struggle to capture the cross-cutting nature and long-term timeframe of the issues surrounding AI. Indeed, AI is not introduced all at once but in successive stages, which require forms of dialogue that can capture changes in users’ behaviour, perceptions and collective balances. According to research by the Institute for Economic and Social Research (IRES), AI is not a subject for information and consultation at a single point in time or *ab initio*, but rather throughout an entire life cycle (scoping–experimentation–deployment–maintenance/updates), which makes it all the more difficult to manage.



Furthermore, according to interviews conducted by the task force, staff representative bodies and social dialogue procedures are perceived by private and public sector managers as likely to slow down projects, or even hinder the smooth running of businesses and public administrations in the 'race' for AI. They argue that these bodies are often concerned about AI and its implications for employment and working conditions³³⁰. The task force nevertheless identified numerous counter-examples in its interviews with departmental service managers. Social dialogue is generally regarded as being of a high standard, but some department heads interviewed by the task force admit that the subject is sometimes difficult to raise with trade unions at local level.


In practice, public sector employees and their representatives are involved to varying degrees in technological and organisational decisions both in the workplace and at national level, at both the trial and roll-out stages.

Furthermore, according to the trade unions consulted as part of the 'Aghion-Bouverot' Commission, social partners are not sufficiently informed or trained regarding these issues and tools, and the information systems departments (ISDs), on the one hand, and human resources and industrial relations departments, on the other, sometimes operate in 'silos'.

At national level, the responses from the permanent secretaries of the ministries to the questionnaires drawn up by the task force as part of its work give mixed results: half of the permanent secretaries consider that the trade unions are very or fairly well involved in the roll-out of AI, while the other half believe that they are not, or not sufficiently so.

Figure 7: Distribution of trade union involvement levels in the context of AI roll-out, SG

5.6. To what extent are trade unions involved in the roll-out of AI within your organisation? (scale from 1 (not very involved) to 4 (very involved))




Source: Task force.

The situation is broadly similar across the social security sectors surveyed by the task force.

³³⁰ It may therefore be tempting to downplay their involvement or even to bypass them; however, this is precisely what was penalised by an interim order from the Nanterre Judicial Court (*Tribunal judiciaire de Nanterre*), published on 14 February 2025, which suspended the roll-out of IT tools on the grounds that the powers of the Social and Economic Committee (CSE) had not been respected.

Figure 8: Distribution of trade union involvement levels in the roll-out of AI, social security

5.6. To what extent are trade unions involved in the roll-out of AI within your organisation?
(scale from 1 (not very involved) to 4 (very involved))




Source: Task force.

By contrast, trade unions appear to be less active in hospitals:

Figure 9: Distribution of trade union involvement levels in the roll-out of AI, hospitals

5.6. To what extent are trade unions involved in the roll-out of AI within your organisation?
(scale from 1 (not very involved) to 4 (very involved))



Source: Task force.



In large French local authorities (see also Annex 4 above), AI is often introduced through pilot projects led by functional departments that have volunteered to participate. The City of Paris and the Lyon metropolitan area have invested in cross-functional training programmes, but feedback indicates significant variation between departments. Local authorities without a centralised HR strategy for AI are experiencing uneven uptake and a high risk of becoming dependent on a few key individuals.

Consequently, HR constraints are even more pronounced in these large local authorities. Large cities such as Paris and Lyon have sufficient in-house capacity to test AI tools, particularly in urban planning, maintenance and user relations. In contrast, small and medium-sized local authorities face a structural skills shortage, exacerbating the risk of regional inequalities in access to productivity gains. Experience in the UK and Scandinavia shows that shared training and HR engineering schemes can offset these disparities to some extent, provided they are managed at national or regional level.

Box 2: Lessons learnt from the international benchmarking exercise

As the responses from the economic regional services (SER) (see Annex 8) to the task force's questionnaire show, the involvement of management and labour and civil society is generally limited abroad. The structured involvement of management and labour and civil society in public AI governance frameworks is still rare. However, the Netherlands is an exception, as it has established the NL AI Coalition: a public-private consortium that brings together government bodies, businesses, universities, research institutes and civil society stakeholders. This body provides a framework for dialogue and collective action, which the government mobilises for projects that extend beyond its strict administrative remit.

Source: Task force.

3. Training public sector staff in AI is of critical importance, yet this is still not being given sufficient consideration

3.1. The roll-out of AI, which is expected to have a major impact – albeit one whose implications for skills are still unclear – and which requires significant investment in training

3.1.1. An impact that is certainly significant, but whose implications for skills remain unclear

As demonstrated by an OECD study on this subject, the skills required by businesses and public bodies in the digital age differ from those previously in demand³³¹. The study emphasises the need for a three-pillar approach: creating an environment that encourages digital transformation, developing the necessary skills to support the digital readiness of public bodies, and building and retaining a digital workforce.

The roll-out of AI will have an even greater impact on the skills required of workers, particularly those in the public sector.

³³¹ See OECD, 2021, [The OECD Framework for digital talent and skills in the public sector](#). OECD Working Papers on Public Governance no. 45, 78 p.



As such, while certain skills that have been required until now will become less important, or even obsolete, others – such as those relating to data governance, systems integration and monitoring, bridging the gap between sectoral needs and technical solutions, and a thorough understanding of compliance and ethical issues – will become important.

Critical thinking, sound judgement and the ability to solve complex problems are likely to become key factors. The same applies to communication skills and empathy. The ability to question, contextualise and challenge the results produced by AI will be fundamental to professionalism.

According to their responses to the survey, the secretaries-general of the ministries interviewed by the task force agree that AI is a factor contributing to the obsolescence of certain public sector staff members' skills. However, this is not the case for managers of social security bodies or healthcare institutions.

3.1.2. The recognised need for a major training initiative

The rapid roll-out of AI requires significant investment in continuing professional development and changes to initial training. The Court of Auditors report on France's national AI strategy emphasises that adapting training across all sectors is one of the five critical public policy challenges at the heart of AI. In its resolution of December 2025, the European Parliament also states that without significant upskilling, AI will not lead to measurable productivity gains and may even worsen working conditions.

For public sector HR departments, this means going beyond mere familiarisation or awareness-raising and developing a genuine e-learning strategy which:

- ◆ is tailored to functions;
- ◆ is ongoing;
- ◆ is integrated into actual work; and
- ◆ involves managers and decision-makers.

EDF, SNCF and La Poste provide valuable insight. EDF has invested heavily in training its engineers and staff in AI for predictive maintenance, with estimated spending reaching tens of millions of euros over five years. This investment has yielded proven gains in terms of reduced incidents and optimised maintenance cycles. SNCF has introduced internal reskilling programmes for roles in the data sector, thereby reducing the need for external recruitment and staff turnover.

These public-sector companies have accepted a prolonged investment phase without immediate returns, viewing AI as a medium-term competitive advantage. This approach contrasts with the temptation sometimes encountered in the public sector to justify AI based on short-term budgetary savings alone.

These experiences demonstrate that success hinges more on the ability to organise credible and secure career paths than on the level of technological intensity.

The strategies adopted by foreign public administrations are also of interest. A survey of economic departments abroad³³² reveals the emergence of a convergent model for upskilling public sector staff in artificial intelligence. In most of the countries studied, the strategies are based on four complementary levers:

- ◆ a common training framework for all public sector staff;
- ◆ the establishment of internal networks of expertise;

³³² See Annex 8 for more details.



- ◆ learning through testing;
- ◆ strong managerial oversight.

The aim is to foster a general culture of AI within public bodies and oversee uses.

The first component involves rolling out basic AI training, which is sometimes compulsory. This training covers the principles of these technologies, their administrative applications and issues relating to ethics, security and data protection. Several countries are at the same time setting up internal networks of 'experts' or 'champions' who are responsible for supporting departments and disseminating best practices. The most effective schemes prioritise experiential learning through testing, pilot projects and test environments.

Finally, national strategies abroad combine general staff upskilling with more targeted specialisation or reskilling schemes. Some countries are developing ambitious programmes to train AI experts or public sector engineers, while others rely more heavily on external recruitment. Overall, these policies reflect a desire to strengthen the internal capacities of public bodies while supporting the transformation of public sector roles in relation to the implementation of AI.

Box 2: Training abroad

The UK, Canadian and Singaporean governments all have in common the fact that they have made AI training a right and a professional obligation. The UK Government has introduced compulsory AI modules for Senior Civil Servants, making them a prerequisite for certain senior management positions. In Canada, training in the 'Algorithmic Impact Assessment' tool is now compulsory for all managers overseeing automated systems.

International comparisons show that the most advanced public bodies treat the HR aspect of AI as a key strategic lever rather than a by-product of technological deployment. Through the Government Digital Service and the Cabinet Office, the UK has developed national AI training programmes for public servants that combine technical skills with an understanding of risks and change management.

Canada has incorporated AI into its Directive on Automated Decision-Making, explicitly linking training and managerial accountability, and auditing the consequences and effects on public sector staff. Finally, Singapore combines significant investment in continuous civil servant training with a strong focus on securing contracts for rare skills, while maintaining structured social dialogue on AI usage.

Source: Task force.

3.2. A notoriously inadequate range of AI training programmes, particularly in the public sector

Nevertheless, there are several issues relating to AI in the field of professional training in France.

As the Villani report highlighted five years ago³³³, "current training programmes are far from adequate for ensuring [the] transition [to AI]".

³³³ Cédric Villani, Marc Schoenauer, Yann Bonnet, Charly Berthet, Anne-Charlotte Cornut, François Levin, Bertrand Rondepierre, "Donner un sens à l'intelligence artificielle : pour une stratégie nationale et européenne", report submitted to the Prime Minister on 28 March 2018, [online](#).



Issues regarding the quality of AI training also arise across the various segments of provision, including off-market provision, short training courses mainly provided by training organisations and funded by skills operators, and medium- to long-term, certification-based training.

Existing training programmes are often limited to awareness-raising modules and remain largely disparate, with no link to professional standards, strategic workforce planning or career paths. Several major public sector organisations and central government departments are adopting generative AI informally, or even covertly ('shadow AI'), outside any established HR or managerial framework. This fuels concerns regarding liability, data protection and workplace monitoring.

Similarly, managers in public administration, social security and, to an even greater extent, healthcare institutions appear to be (very) inadequately trained in AI project management.

5.9. Are you managers trained in AI project management? (scale from 1 (not very trained) to 4 (very well trained))

